The PHILOSOPHY *of* ART

The PHILOSOPHY *of* ART

By
CURT JOHN DUCASSE
Professor in Brown University

NEW YORK
LINCOLN MAC VEAGH
THE DIAL PRESS

LONGMANS, GREEN & COMPANY, TORONTO

COPYRIGHT, 1929, BY DIAL PRESS, INC.

NORWOOD PRESS LINOTYPE, INC.
NORWOOD, MASS., U. S. A.

PREFACE

THE present volume is the first of a projected group, the aim of which will be to develop in the principal fields of philosophy a certain point of view. Some of the main aspects of that point of view have already been set forth in various articles published in the journals,[1] and in an essay entitled *Philosophical Liberalism*, contributed to a volume on Contemporary American Philosophy shortly to appear. The name, Liberalism, is perhaps the least unsatisfactory of the various labels with which might be tagged a philosophical standpoint which, endeavoring to push relativistic analysis as far as it will go in all fields of philosophy, quickly finds itself confronted everywhere by the fact that individuals as such are the only absolutes to be found, and alone transform the endless "ifs" of the relativistic scheme into "sinces." The complement of the thorough-going relativism of the philosophical standpoint in question is therefore a correspondingly thorough individualism, in its two inseparable aspects of freedom and responsibility.

That standpoint, in its essence at least, is of course far from novel, but it seems to me that it has never been developed in a manner doing it full justice. The present volume attempts to exhibit the meaning of it in the field of aesthetics. Some characteristic theses of the philosophy of art which has resulted from that attempt are, that art

[1] *A Defense of Ontological Liberalism*, Journal of Phil. Vol. XXI, No. 13
A Liberalistic View of Truth, Philosophical Review, Vol. XXXIV, No. 6
Liberalism in Ethics, International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXXV, No. 3
What has Beauty to do with Art? Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXV, No. 7

is the language of feelings; that the range of human feelings includes vastly more than the few emotional states for which we have names; that language is essentially objectification, and only secondarily communication; that art and beauty are things essentially distinct, no matter how closely they may tend to go together in fact; that Beautiful and Ugly are terms predicating of objects only the fact that some one who contemplates them aesthetically obtains from them feelings that are pleasant, or unpleasant; that judgments of beauty are therefore wholly relative to the constitution of the individual observer, and are "valid" for others only so far as those others happen to be constituted like him; that art-critics are therefore never at all "authorities" in matters of beauty and ugliness, but at best only guides, who may direct our attention to things which we then sometimes do find beautiful and might otherwise have overlooked.

My obligations to the writings of Mr. Santayana on aesthetics are overwhelming and gratefully acknowledged. His marvellously acute psychological insight has illuminated for me many an obscure question. The obligations of which I am conscious to other writers are pretty well indicated by the references. They are perhaps no less great to the authors with whom I have found myself forced to disagree than to those upon whom I have been able to lean; for greater service to the cause of philosophical truth is ever done by being definitely wrong than by being vaguely right, — *citius emergit veritas ex errore, quam ex confusione.* I have myself endeavored to bear this maxim in mind throughout, and, instead of politely guarded ambiguous plausibilities, I have tried to make every important assertion clear and definite enough to be susceptible of being conclusively disproved if wrong.

In criticizing the views of other writers, I have I hope represented them fairly. But it seems to me that, especially in the field of philosophy, a writer should be held responsible for what he says, since, apart from that, God

alone can know what he means. Because of the abstractness and difficulty of philosophical problems, the vagueness and logical looseness which have been the bane of philosophy are, indeed, difficult to avoid. But this is no reason why they should be condoned. Progress in this respect will, here as in the field of mathematics, be brought about by giving no writer credit for such possibly good intentions as he has failed to translate into unambiguous words. I shall myself cheerfully welcome criticism of the contents of this volume on that basis, not, far from it, because I think they are proof against it, but because the sharper the issues are made by such criticism, the easier it will become to decide them truly.

The fourth chapter has already appeared in large part in the *Philosophical Review*, and the appendix, in slightly briefer form, in *The Nation*. Thanks are due to the editors of these two periodicals for their kind permissions to use the material here.

PROVIDENCE, MAY 4, 1929.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

1. Doing vs. Discoursing in the field of art.
2. The Philosophy of Art.
3. Art-criticism.
4. The expert in historical matters.
5. What importance has the genuineness of a work of art.
6. The aesthetic "consumer."
7. Aesthetics and the psychology laboratory.

CHAPTER I. ART AND THE CREATION OF BEAUTY 15

1. Art is not a quality of things but an activity of man.
2. Art is not an activity aiming at the creation of beauty.
3. Many works of art are ugly.
4. The artist aims not at beauty but at objective self-expression.
5. The deliberate creating of beauty is not art.
6. If a thing is a work of art, it remains so. But beauty comes and goes.

CHAPTER II. ART THE LANGUAGE OF FEELING. VÉRON AND TOLSTOI . . . 21

1. Véron regards art as being essentially expression of emotion.
2. For Tolstoi, the essence of art is transmission of emotion.

3. What is language? Criticism of Professor Dewey's view.
4. Language is essentially expression of an inner state.
5. Art, which is the language of feeling, is essentially expression.
6. Ambiguity of the term Expression in Véron and Tolstoi.

CHAPTER III. CRITICISM OF CROCE'S "AESTHETIC" 42

1. Croce's *Aesthetic* must be read cautiously.
2. What he calls "expression" is a very different thing from what is usually meant by the term.
3. His doctrine as to the theoretical relation of "Expression" to "Intuition" is obscure.
4. And his description of their psychological relation apparently incorrect.
5. Likewise his view of the nature of the physical work of art;
6. And his view of the nature of beauty.

CHAPTER IV. ART AND THE FREUDIAN WISH 56

1. Outline of Professor Parker's view of art as the imaginative expression of a wish.
2. Criticism of his contention that imagination is of the essence of art.
3. Art does not necessarily simulate reality.
4. Nor can it be said to consist in the satisfaction of a wish.
5. Against Professor Parker's contention that art is the expression of a wish may be quoted inadvertent statements of his own, where he refers to art as the expression of feeling.

6. An emotionalist theory of art need not neglect the clarifying function of expression, as Professor Parker charges.
7. Nature and mechanism of the process of clarification through expression, according to the emotionalist theory of the present volume.

CHAPTER V. ART AS IMITATION; AND AS MEANS OF ATTRACTION 72

1. Plato's view of Art as Imitation.
2. His view of inspired art.
3. Aristotle and the mimetic impulse.
4. The Utility of Art. Darwin's theory.
5. Marshall's theory of art as means of attraction by pleasing.

CHAPTER VI. THE INSTRUMENTALIST THEORY OF ART 84

1. Outline of Professor Dewey's conception of art.
2. Strangeness of the instrumentalist life-ideal.
3. Aesthetic perception does not necessarily involve meaning.
4. Nor does artistic production.
5. The view that art is expression of emotion does not imply the unimportance of subject-matter.
6. Emotions are not always responses to objective situations.

CHAPTER VII. THE PLAY THEORY OF ART 95

1. Schiller's view.
2. Spencer's view.
3. Criticism of Spencer's view.
4. The view of Karl Groos.
5. Play is autotelic, Work ectotelic, and Art endotelic.

CHAPTER VIII. WHAT IS ART? THE ANSWER PROPOSED 110

1. Art in general; Endotelic art; Aesthetic art.
2. Meaning of "objectification."
3. In what sense objectification is conscious.
4. Correction of the product of attempted objectification, vs. correction of the self first objectified.
5. Two things which objectification makes possible.
6. In what sense ulterior ends may coexist with endotelic art-creation
7. Lectical art.
8. Heuretic art.
9. Aesthetic art.
10. The definition of Aesthetic Art proposed differentiates it from cases of expression which are no art; and also from skilled work.
11. Expression of meanings or ideas is no part of aesthetic art.
12. The feeling which an elaborate work of art finally objectifies is not usually present *ab initio;* but develops step by step.
13. Interpretative and autogenous art; pure, and decorative or applied art.
14. Synoptic table of species of art.

CHAPTER IX. THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE 134

1. The receptive, effective, and judgmental attitudes.
2. Art-creation is the effective aspect of the endotelic life; which, however, has also a judgmental aspect, viz. Criticism; and a receptive, viz. Contemplation.
3. Aesthetic contemplation is endotelic receptivity to feeling.
4. Some empirical descriptions of aesthetic contemplation.

5. Comments on the terminology of these descriptions.
6. Aesthetic contemplation is a "listening" with our capacity for feeling.
7. It is not attention, but presupposes it.
8. It has the endotelic character.
9. It is not a rare, esoteric state, but a common and familiar one.
10. Conditions favoring aesthetic contemplation.
11. Professor Langfeld's discussion of the aesthetic attitude.
12. Empathy is not Aesthetic Contemplation, but simply the process by which doing and undergoing are perceived as such in others.

CHAPTER X. EMPATHIC AND PERIPATHIC PERCEPTION 151

1. Empathy.
2. It is interpretation of a thing as dramatic agent or patient. Its mechanism. It is distinct from aesthetic contemplation and from sympathy.
3. Shape-perception is not empathy.
4. But shapes may be empathized, i.e., interpreted as dramatic agents or patients.
5. Colors as well as shapes can be aesthetically contemplated, but colors cannot be empathized.
6. Vernon Lee's account of empathy.
7. Her objection that inner imitation presupposes empathy, unfounded.
8. Difference between empathy of a statue and of a mountain.
9. Essential features of the theory of empathy of the present chapter.
10. Peripathic perception.

CHAPTER XI. ECPATHY, OBJECTIFICATION, AND THE AESTHETIC OBJECT . . . 173

1. Ecpathy or aesthetic "reading."
2. The feeling-import of aesthetic objects.
3. Propriety of the term Ecpathy.
4. An aesthetic object is any content of contemplative attention, as such.
5. The relation of aesthetic object to aesthetic feeling is not causal.
6. The aesthetic object is the natural, immediate, and unique symbol of an aesthetic feeling.
7. Origin of the feeling-import of any specified thing.
8. Santayana's doctrine of "Expression."
9. Relations between the terminology of it, and that used here.

CHAPTER XII. THE AESTHETIC FEELINGS 189

1. Aesthetic feeling is any feeling obtained in contemplation.
2. Under certain conditions, any feeling-quality may acquire the aesthetic status.
3. The nature of these conditions.
4. "Feeling" does not mean merely pleasure and displeasure.
5. The feelings experienced by human beings are endlessly various, and only a very few, such as love, fear, anger, etc., have received names.
6. Aesthetic feeling distinguished from sensation.
7. Aesthetic feeling, passion, and artistic feeling or inspiration.

CHAPTER XIII. AESTHETIC OBJECTS. FORM AND CONTENT IN DESIGNS AND IN DRAMATIC ENTITIES 202

1. Aesthetic objects have both Content and Form.
2. Aesthetic objects are Dramatic Entities, and Designs.

3. Form and Content in Designs.
4. The dividing of works of art into Designs and Representations springs from confusion of thought.
5. Form and Content in Dramatic Entities.
6. Paintings interpreted as designs in two dimensions literally presented.
7. Paintings interpreted as designs in three dimensions, represented.
8. Paintings interpreted as dramatic entities, represented.
9. The dramatic and design aspects can hardly be fully isolated.
10. Remarks on Design vs. the representation of Dramatic Entities in modern art.
11. Painting and Illustration.
12. Representation;—through inevitable and through accidental associations.
13. Any entity whatever may be viewed as aesthetic object.
14. Knowledge of art forms and aesthetic appreciation.

CHAPTER XIV. THE AESTHETIC VALUES . 233

1. Aesthetic valuation.
2. Beauty and Ugliness as inclusive and as special categories of aesthetic valuation.
3. Aesthetic pleasure and "the pleasures of the senses."
4. "Disinterestedness" of aesthetic pleasure.
5. Sense pleasure is a special category of aesthetic pleasure.
6. Beauty in the narrower sense.
7. The pretty.
8. The Graceful.
9. Ugliness in the narrower sense.

10. The Sublime.
11. The Tragic.
12. The Comic.

CHAPTER XV. STANDARDS OF CRITICISM . 267

1. Criticism is (a) Judgment, (b) of worth, (c) mediate or immediate, and (d), respectively fallible or infallible.
2. Possible standards of criticism of aesthetic objects.
3. Success of the attempt at self-expression, as standard.
4. Signability of the work of art by its creator.
5. Signability of the work of art by the beholder.
6. Capacity to transmit the artist's feeling to others.
7. Judgments passed on aesthetic objects constitute information concerning the judge.
8. Connoisseurship.
9. Beauty as standard.
10. It is relative to the individual observer.
11. Why we have a natural inclination to think otherwise.
12. Beauty cannot be proved by appeal to consensus, or to the "test of time," or to the type of person who experiences it in a given case.
13. Nor can it be proved by appeal to technical principles or canons.
14. Beauty and accuracy of representation.
15. Criticism of aesthetic objects in ethical terms.
16. Liberalism in Aesthetics.

APPENDIX 307

"Significant Form."

The PHILOSOPHY *of* ART

INTRODUCTION

§ 1

Doing vs. Discoursing in the field of art. In his well-known essay on *The Critic as Artist,* Oscar Wilde declares that it is much more difficult to talk about a thing than to do it, — anybody can make history, but only a great man can write it! I venture here no opinion as to the truth of that seeming paradox, and mention it only for the sake of pointing to the fact that doing and discoursing are, at all events, very different things. Competence in either does not automatically entail competence in the other. The endowments, the direction of interest, and the training required for each are distinct; and the difficulty of attaining any measure of excellence in either renders it unlikely that the requisites for both will often be present in the same person. The man who has been trained to scrupulous care in reflective analysis and theoretical construction will seldom possess more than indifferent skill in the practice of the activities which have formed the subject of his reflections; and conversely the skilful practitioners will mostly be but amateurish describers and theoreticians of the arts of which they are masters.

Nowhere is this fact more commonly overlooked than in the field of what are called the fine arts. Theoretical questions concerning them arise in the minds of a great many people, — such questions as what, for instance, is meant by calling a thing beautiful; by calling it a work of art; or again, is art a form of play? has it any import-

ant function in human life, or is it but an amusement for hours of leisure? How do aesthetic feelings differ from others? What, if any, are the proper standards in art-criticism? etc. When questions of this sort present themselves, people generally assume as a matter of course that, of all persons, the artist must be the one best able to answer them. But the artist's business is to practise art, not to talk about it. Indeed, an artist with a theory should be regarded *a priori* with suspicion, for such an one is likely to paint or to sing with his intellectual conscience instead of his feelings, and to give us, therefore, not works of art but moral documents.

It would not be much more foolish to expect a lecture concerning the physiology of digestion from a man who can eat things indigestible to others, than it is to expect answers to questions of the sort mentioned from a painter on the strength of his ability to paint pictures. But people, failing to see this, insist on making the artist talk. They regard him as an expert, and naturally he admits being one, — he as well as his questioners innocently but unfortunately overlooking the fact that it is at something very different from dealing with theoretical questions concerning art, that he is expert.

§ 2

The philosophy of Art. Such questions belong to the philosophy of art. Those cited and others of the same sort, — a better idea of the nature of which may be gained by glancing at the table of contents of the present volume, — indicate probably more adequately than any definition could do what the philosophy of art concerns itself with. Yet a conception of the philosophy of art and of the nature of its proper task must be formulated briefly here if we

are to distinguish it clearly from certain other things, such as art-criticism, with which it might be confused.

Philosophy is a mysterious subject. There are few questions which its professors have more difficulty in answering to the layman's satisfaction, or indeed to their own, than the question, what, anyway, is philosophy? Were I limited to one line for my answer to it, I should say that *philosophy is the general theory of criticism.* But this statement may here profitably be somewhat enlarged upon. To refer to anything as "the theory of" this or that, is to say at least that it is an attempt to understand, to exhibit reasons or grounds. For instance, if we have uttered a criticism of something or other, and the correctness or relevance of that criticism is questioned, we then find ourselves formulating, and advancing as reasons for our criticism, various propositions. These propositions constitute a tentative "theory of" the criticism we made. Philosophy, because it is an attempt to formulate the "theory of" various things, is (or should be) like what is called Science, — it is or tries to be a science. And since no other road to knowledge, as distinguished from mere opinions or impressions, has yet been discovered than scientific method, philosophy should be no less scientific in method than chemistry or mathematics. What exactly will constitute scientific method in philosophy, is a difficult question which I shall not attempt to discuss here.

In subject-matter, on the other hand, philosophy radically differs from "Science." There is a certain field of facts concerning which neither physics, nor chemistry, nor biology, nor any of the other sciences ever has a single word to say, namely, facts of the sort called *valuations.* These, with what they involve, constitute the proper and exclusive subject-matter of philosophy. This is not to say that philosophy's business is to pass judgments of

value, — this, where immediate values at least are concerned, is something which each individual has to do for himself. So far as the philosopher, considered as such, does any evaluating, it is evaluating of the truth of judgments in which terms of value (or involving value) are, not *used*, but *talked about*. A judgment of evaluation is a *critical* judgment, i.e., it is the application to the entity judged not of a merely descriptive predicate, but of a *predicate of criticism;* and a predicate of criticism, or critical predicate, is one of *goodness or badness* of some sort, immediate or mediate. Examples of such predicates would be right, wrong, true, false, clear, invalid, real, unimportant, beautiful, ugly, sublime, etc.

We all use such predicates every day, and for every-day purposes we all know well enough what we mean by them. That is, we know it in the sense that we understand, and ourselves can correctly frame, assertions in which such terms occur; but we do not know what we mean by such terms, in the sense of being able to give a correct and precise definition of them. As soon, however, as we raise any question of evaluation that cannot, like those of the "every-day" variety, be answered, as it were, with our spinal cords, we discover that in order to answer them we must first know more exactly what we mean by "true," or "real," or "beautiful"; or by whichever of the other evaluative predicates may be considered. If then we raise explicitly the question, What exactly do we mean by calling anything "true," or "beautiful," etc., the first things we find are the snap-answers which we or others are ever ready to improvise to that question. These, however, are not precise and verified accounts of what we mean by the terms in question, but only *hypotheses* as to what we mean by them, which hypotheses are mostly of the sort that may occur to anybody in the first five min-

utes. The very tentative answers constituted by these hypotheses therefore need to be reflected upon, made precise, and most carefully tested before we give them any weight; and the philosopher is the specialist who makes it his business to examine these would-be accounts of the meaning and fields of applicability of the various critical predicates, and to test their correctness with the same painstaking care given by the physicist to the testing of physical hypotheses.[1]

For any precise, carefully considered answers to questions concerning the meaning and relevance of terms of criticism, it is then to the philosopher that we have to turn, for he and no one else investigates such questions systematically. It is true that only too often his answers have proved obscure, muddled, and unsatisfactory. But this means only that philosophy is still very much in the making, that its task is a peculiarly difficult one, and that it has been much hampered by the lack of a clear understanding of the nature of the methods by which that task could be accomplished. There is reason to hope for better results in the future. At all events, as just stated, there is nothing else to which we can turn for considered answers to questions of the kind described.

§ 3

Art-criticism. From the foregoing brief account of what I conceive to be the nature and task of philosophy in general, the passage to the philosophy of art in particular, is obvious. We may characterize it as *the general theory of the*

[1] The task, it should be noted, involves much beyond what is immediately apparent. It requires, for instance, the investigation and classification of the sorts of entities to which any given predicate of evaluation is relevant; and study of the nature of the "mediation" involved where mediate values are concerned.

criticism of art and aesthetic objects. Art-criticism, were it fully and explicitly aware of the meaning of the assertions that it makes, could be characterized conversely as *applied philosophy of art.* Of art-criticism which, as in the immense majority of cases, has no such conscious theoretical background, all that can be said is that it implies some philosophy of art, and, unavoidably, one replete with errors and contradictions. And since no one can walk a straight path in the dark except for brief moments by chance, art-criticism of that sort is not simply futile, but muddling.

The people who are commonly referred to as art-critics, in the vast majority of instances may, as Max Nordau I believe says somewhere, be described simply as persons who criticize works of art in public. They do this, for the most part owing to the possession not of greater capacities but of fewer inhibitions than the man of average ignorance. Their equipment in the main consists of what the French call a well-hung tongue, — or pen; and the very ease and abundance of their adjectives hide the fact that what they say is neither important nor authoritative. This estimate of the most of what goes by the name of art criticism — musical, graphic, dramatic, literary, etc., — seems rather harsh and cynical, and upon a final rereading of the manuscript of the present work, I had almost decided to eliminate it. But Providence, disguised as The Literary Digest, just then intervened to bolster up my courage by means of a quotation from no less distinguished and qualified a critic than Mr. Ernest Newman.[2] What he says confirms the above so fully, and is based upon reasons so similar to those set forth in later chapters of the present work, that I must insert it here. He writes as follows:

[2] In the *London Sunday Times.*

"After a lifetime spent in musical criticism, I find that I can no longer read it — thus, I imagine, coming at last into line with the general public. It is bad enough to have to write the stuff; to read it, except for some definite purpose of the moment, is impossible, for the reason that it tells me nothing about the composer, who is the real object of my interest, but only something about the critic, in whom I am not in the least interested. His view of the composer is merely the result of his own personal reaction, which is a matter of no concern and no value to any one but himself. If he answers me with a *tu quoque!* I cheerfully give him right; my own personal reactions are valid for myself alone.

"There was a time when I, too, young and innocent, thought my own reactions to music the only correct ones, and believed everyone who differed from me to be wrong. Older and wiser now, I do not trouble about these things. The proselytizing spirit is dead within me. I have not the vanity to think that my own mental and emotional constitution should be the norm for the rest of musical mankind, and, therefore, I can only smile when younger writers, or older writers, who by this time ought to know better, implicitly claim that they are the world's norm. There was a time when I had a half-idea that it was really quite intelligent on the part of Providence to have sent me on earth, for had I not been born the world would never have known the truth as to musical 'values.' In my boyish simplicity I thought that it was essential that other people should feel as I felt; now I have developed, on this point, a toleration so magnificently comprehensive that it amounts to complete indifference."

There is, however, a legitimate function which the art-critic, if he be properly equipped, can discharge. It is a function analogous to that of the professional guide who

conducts the traveler through a foreign city and points out to him the sights, — or at least the things that are deemed such by himself. If the critic possesses an extensive and intimate acquaintance with works of art, and his faculties through much observation and comparison have become sensitive to facts and differences which would pass unnoticed by others, he may then similarly be able to take the plain "consumer" of art upon a personally conducted tour of a given canvas or symphony, and call his attention to features which he might otherwise overlook, or which it might take him much time to discover for himself. But of course, once such features are pointed out and perceived, the "consumer" must do the rest. That is, the question of their aesthetic worth is one that he must decide for himself. The critic's judgment of it represents neither more nor less than the judgment of anyone else; namely, it represents his own preferences only, and is in no sense to be regarded as "authoritative" or binding on anyone. For in matters of aesthetic taste it is as with taste in matters of cookery. The gourmet may gather for us the rarest dishes most expertly prepared, or those most relished by himself; but neither he nor his chef, however skilled, can compel our taste. They can but succeed, if ours be timid or suggestible souls, in making us hide that taste in the belief that we ought to be ashamed of it. But such psychological browbeating establishes nothing. Tastes of course can be modified, and by appropriate and assiduous cultivation a taste of almost any sort can be developed. But whether it then is to be described as an educated or as a perverted taste, is itself a pure matter of taste. The critic, however well and abundantly trained he may be, must therefore not for a moment be thought of as an authority on matters of aesthetic worth. As to that, *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος.*

§ 4

The expert in historical matters. There is another type of person who is sometimes referred to as an art-critic, but who is in fact something quite different. He is the sort of person whose opinion we seek when, for instance, the genuineness of a given painting is in question. He is the expert in matters not of aesthetics or of art as such, but of the *history of art.* His training, if he is competent, must have been that of a highly specialized detective. Not only must he have learned to recognize the characteristics of the art works of any period or school, but he must also have made a minute study of the marks peculiar to the work of individual artists. For instance, he must know which colors a given painter did and did not use, what sorts of brush strokes he employed and for what, and, indeed, what his fingerprints were like, if any of them happen to have been left in the paint of his canvases. Such knowledge is quite indispensable for the task of saying to what period or individual painter a given picture is to be ascribed; but obviously all that sort of thing has nothing whatever to do with aesthetic worth or the aesthetic interest in works of art.

§ 5

What importance has the genuineness of a work of art? Occasionally we read of some factory in Italy or France that has been turning out reproductions or imitations of the work of famous artists or ancient periods, and doing it with the most scrupulous care and the highest skill. Some dealers, we read, buy these products and, being very busy men, they occasionally forget where the things came from and sell them as "genuine" to private collectors or muse-

ums, whose experts have accepted them as such. When the truth comes out, the joke is supposed to be on the expert and on the purchaser.

Viewed in the light of common sense, however, the matter seems to me to be as follows. Art museums have two principal *raisons d'être*. One of them is to function as laboratories for students of the history of art, where they will be able to observe for themselves what the work of a given school or of a given artist is like. And it is obvious that if an imitation is so good that the best-qualified experts mistake it for an original, it is precisely as good as an original would be, for the purpose just mentioned. The other great function of a museum is to be a place where people who are interested in works of art as aesthetic objects rather than as historical specimens, will find them in abundance. For them the only things of importance about any given work of art are the aesthetic feelings and aesthetic enjoyment which they derive from the contemplation of it. And as to this also, it is obvious that if a copy or an imitation of a Rembrandt, for instance, is so faithful that only the most expert detectives, or perhaps not even they, can tell it from an original, it is thereby proved to be just as good for aesthetic purposes as the original would be.

It is then evident that all the embarrassment and mortification over the fact that one has mistaken an excellent imitation for an original, means only that one is interested not in having good pictures or good historical specimens, but in collecting rare or expensive things as such. This is a perfectly legitimate interest, which has many other manifestations; for instance, the collecting of postage stamps, of memberships in exclusive social organizations, of letters after one's name, etc. The most vital if not the only root of that interest is probably the usually rather harm-

less, but ubiquitous and tremendously strong human impulse to be or have something unique or at least rare, in which we may take correspondingly great pride. That rarity is what we prize, is evident enough in the case of the collecting of postage stamps, which is accordingly considered a somewhat childish sort of thing to do. But where the objects collected have an aesthetic or scientific value, besides that of being rare, one may very easily deceive oneself and others as to the nature of one's interest in them.

The matter of genuineness is of importance also from the standpoint of another sort of interest in works of art, namely, that of persons who have no interest in them, but think they ought to have! The name of the artist, with a knowledge of the standing he has, then becomes the indispensable indication of the sort of reaction which is appropriate to a given work. And such is the hypnotic effect of famous names that even in people who have a genuinely aesthetic appreciation of works of art, a favorable or unfavorable bias is likely to be induced in advance by the name of the artist alone.

§ 6

The aesthetic "consumer." Beside the artists, the most important class of persons having to do with works of art consists of those whom we may call the *aesthetic consumers.* They are the numerous persons who usually say little about works of art, but who, if they voice an opinion, are often careful to preface it with the disarming remark that of course they "know nothing about art." They are the people who look at pictures, or listen to music, or read poetry, or go to the ballet, etc., simply because they really get aesthetic feelings from such things, and more or less

of aesthetic enjoyment. I feel sure that they constitute the public which really matters in the sight of the Muses, and also in that of the truly creative and sincere artists, as distinguished from the mere stuntsters and the mere notoriety-seekers of art. For it should be remembered that sonatas are not played by musicians for teachers of harmony, nor sonnets published by poets for dissecting professors of English, but for amateurs, i.e., lovers of music and of poetry. The dilettante — the man who takes delight in works of art, — is the one who, with the artist, counts most, of all the persons who occupy themselves with works of art. The present volume might almost be said to be dedicated to him, not in the sense that he should read it, but in the sense that it aims to show among other things how much more important than critic or aesthetician is the true dilettante. The vitality of art depends upon him to a considerable extent, — upon his numbers, upon the vigor of his interest, and upon his refusal to let himself be bluffed or his actual taste awed, by the impressive but aesthetically irrelevant learning of the so-called authorities. To be "a mere dilettante" is something bad only where some definite task demanding strictly technical training must be accomplished. But the true "consumption" of works of art is nothing of this sort. People who think otherwise are confusing the *talking about* works of art with the "consumption," i.e., the aesthetic contemplation, of them.

§ 7

Aesthetics and the psychology laboratory. The word Aesthetic is derived from the Greek word *αἰσθητικός* which means perceptive, or fitted to be perceived. In 1750 A. G. Baumgarten published a work entitled *Aesthetica,* deal-

ing with Beauty, and the term Aesthetics has since come to be used to mean the study of such matters as art and the beautiful. The preceding sections of this chapter will have served to show that art and the beautiful may be made objects of study in a good many different ways, so that the term Aesthetics has a rather ambiguous denotation. It remains to say a few words concerning a sort of study of aesthetic facts not yet mentioned; namely, the experimental study of them in the psychology laboratory. Examples would be the study of color preferences; of preferences in the proportions of rectangles or other regular figures; of preferences in tone combinations; of the peculiar emotional effects connected with given colors, shapes, tones, etc., or with given combinations of them, or with given rhythms, or types of meter in poetry; or again the study of the relative contributions made to the total aesthetic value of poetry, by its musical and its imaginal elements, etc.

Such investigations are perfectly legitimate, and are apparently interesting to psychologists; but it is very difficult in the case of most studies of that sort to see of what possible value they might be either to the artist, or to the critic, the consumer, or the philosopher of art. Consider for instance the investigation of color preferences by the method of paired comparisons. Squares of paper of many colors but of the same size, each pasted on a piece of gray cardboard, are shown to an observer in pairs, and he is asked to indicate which color of each pair he prefers. His preferences are recorded, and the process is continued until each color has been paired with every other. One then tabulates the record and finds that a certain color has been preferred by him more often than any other. But now what can be done with that hard-won fact? Virtually nothing. The color which has been preferred most often

by him, is not even in many cases his "favorite" color. One reason is that one's "favorite" color usually means, favorite as color of some assumed sort of object. For instance, blue might be one's favorite color for neckties or dress goods for oneself, but it would not be one's favorite color for soup, let us say, or for the hair or complexion of one's sweetheart. The laboratory conditions are deliberately artificial, and yield results which are abstract in the sense that they are true, *other things being equal.* But the other things never are, outside the laboratory. This, of course, is the case also in physics, but it has a very different significance there, for the physical laws discovered are fixed and universal laws. But the results of the study of color preference for a given person may not be valid for another, or for himself at a later time. And even if prolonged investigation should establish some statistical law, to the effect, perhaps, that about eighty-seven per cent of native-born American males between the ages of twenty and twenty-five prefer a given color under laboratory conditions, what could be done with that? Possibly it might be of some slight use to the manufacturers of wall-papers for love-nests, — brides' tastes being equal! Perhaps a somewhat better case for the possibility of obtaining psychological "laws of beauty" might be made out in the instance of some of the other laboratory investigations. But, as will be shown later, such "laws" never can furnish an "ought" or "ought not" to the artist; and, in any event, an artist's studio is not to be thought of as a beauty factory. That beauty has no essential connection with art, is a fact of fundamental importance in aesthetics, to the consideration of which we may now turn.

CHAPTER I

ART AND THE CREATION OF BEAUTY

§ 1

Art is not a quality of things but an activity of man. When art is mentioned, pictures, statues, music, poetry, cathedrals, and so on, naturally come to mind; and the question whether a given picture, for instance, is truly art, which is sometimes put to the supposed expert, would indicate in the questioner a naïve assumption that "art" is some subtle attribute, to be discerned in the picture by people whose training has fitted them to do so. But strictly speaking, pictures, statues, and the like are not art at all but works of art; and art is not a quality discernible in them but an activity of man, — the activity, namely, of which such things are the products. The task of stating the exact nature of this activity has often been attempted, and one may gain an idea of the difficulty of it by glancing at the many would-be definitions of art, by various writers, to be found in histories of aesthetics.

§ 2

Art is not an activity aiming at the creation of beauty. By far the most common opinion concerning the nature of art is that it is the human activity which aims at the creation of beautiful things. This definition at first seems plausible because most of us find some degree of beauty

in the vast majority of the works of art of which we think spontaneously; for instance, the contents of museums and art galleries. But reflection quickly shows, I think, that art cannot possibly be defined in terms of beauty. For, particularly in these "modern" days, we meet with many objects which are undeniably works of art, but which are none the less very ugly. I shall name no instances, for they would represent only my own aesthetic evaluations, which are no more binding on others than are theirs upon me. Instead, I shall leave each reader to supply instances of ugly works of art for himself out of his own experience; and I wager he will have no difficulty in doing so unless perchance he be one of those misguided souls who, either because timid of being thought unperceptive, or because persuaded that development of a pantophagous taste is a merit or a duty, would never confess themselves unable to find beauty in everything. But if my reader is not one of these, and he yet says that he cannot think of examples of ugly art, then I venture to assert that it is not because he has never seen at exhibitions any pictures, for instance, which he found ugly, but rather because he holds that, as a matter of definition, something which is not beautiful cannot properly be called a work of art. Art may deal with the ugly or the painful, he will say, — and the tragedy is a typical instance of it, — but the work of art which does this somehow transmutes the ugliness and is itself a thing of beauty.

§ 3

Many works of art are ugly. There, however, lies a possibility of misunderstanding, and to remove it I must state explicitly that when I assert that ugly works of art exist, I do not at all refer to examples of what has been called

"the ugly in art," or "the art of pain," that is to say, to examples of the pleasing representation by art of an ugly or painful subject. By ugly works of art, I mean on the contrary works of art which themselves finally displease us, i.e., works in the aesthetic contemplation of which, for whatever reason, we got not pleasure, but displeasure (or at all events more displeasure than pleasure), and from which we therefore turn with aversion. Naturally enough, works of art of this sort are not much noticed or purchased, for most buyers of works of art want beauty; and beauty therefore comes to be almost a condition of the social visibility and preservation of a work of art. But beauty is not a condition of the existence of one, for ugly art, although easily overlooked or forgotten, exists in vast quantities: there are ugly designs, ugly color-schemes, ugly paintings, ugly architecture, ugly music, ugly dances, and so on.

But it might be objected again that an ugly design or an ugly picture should not be called a work of art but rather of lack-of-art, for the ugliness proves the failure of the art. This, however, is not necessarily so. The creator of such a work might well admit the ugliness, and insist that he was not concerned to create beauty, but to give objective expression to something that was in him; and that his work such as it is does just that, with complete success. This ugly picture to which you deny the name of work of art, he might say, was born in exactly the same way as that other work of mine, which is beautiful and to which you grant the name. Each proceeded from the same sort of impulse, and was created through processes of the same kind. Not a whit less of skill was needed in the production of the one than in the production of the other, and each equally is in truth a work of art. The trouble is with your conception of art as necessarily involving beauty.

That is a conception arbitrarily framed in terms of what you, as a "consumer" of works of art, desire to find in them; and it reveals your lack of personal acquaintance with the psychological state out of which pictures are born.

§ 4

The artist aims not at beauty but at objective self-expression. This answer, indeed, voices the most decisive of all the objections to describing art as the activity which aims at the creation of something beautiful. Such a description of the art-activity is simply and flagrantly untrue to psychological fact.

Anyone who, no matter in what field or on how humble a scale, has ever felt the art impulse and is capable of describing accurately his then psychological state, will I think unhesitatingly declare that his endeavor was not "to create beauty," but much rather, and essentially, to give adequate embodiment in words, lines, colors, or what not, to some particular and probably nameless feeling or emotion that possessed him. If the feeling was a pleasant feeling and the embodiment of it is adequate, the object created will indeed have beauty; but this in no way explains the particular nature of the object created, for the fact that it has beauty does not in the least distinguish it from countless other equally beautiful possible objects, which he might have created but did not create nor try to create. On the other hand, if the feeling which possessed him was an unpleasant one, the object by constructing which he gives the feeling adequate embodiment, will be ugly, but it will be a work of art none the less. The question in the light of which the artist criticizes his own attempts at creation is not "Is this beautiful?" but "Is this exactly what I want to do?", i.e., *"Does this adequately*

objectify what I feel?" For this reason, when other people, measuring in terms of beauty, praise some work of his with which he himself is disappointed, he replies, "Yes, but it does not really express what I felt." He is like a man who had some definite thought to express but who finds that, owing to his imperfect command of the language, he has instead uttered unawares some witty remark, for which people praise him.

§ 5

The deliberate creating of beauty is not art. That the characterization of art as the attempt to create the beautiful is incorrect, is shown by the fact that some things to which it would be quite arbitrary to deny the name of works of art are ugly. But it is also shown by the further fact that certain things which are brought into existence through the deliberate intention to create something beautiful, are not works of art. As instances of things which can be and occasionally are so brought into being, may be mentioned the figures created by the turning of a kaleidoscope; the spectrum created by passing sunlight through a prism; the forms and colors created by pouring a little crude oil on water; the curves created by operating a cycloharmonograph, and so on. Art implies among other things the critical control of a process of objectification, and this is absent in any true sense from the processes creative of beauty just mentioned.

§ 6

If a thing is a work of art, it remains so. But beauty comes and goes. Finally, attention may be called to the variability of beauty. We may to-day not judge beautiful

a picture or a musical composition which we once pronounced to be so, or which others now so pronounce. Shall we then say that it was a work of art, but has ceased to be so? Or that it both is and is not a work of art, according as it gives or fails to give aesthetic pleasure to various beholders? This, I submit, would be absurd, for to describe anything as a work of art is merely to say something as to the *sort of process* through which it came into being. If on the other hand we mean to say something, not as to the nature of the process, but as to the *pleasingness of the product* to aesthetic contemplation, then we have for this the terms Beautiful and Ugly. These terms concern only the object judged, and imply nothing as to how it came to be, for we apply them no less readily to natural objects than to objects which are products of art. The predicate "work of art," unfortunately, has come to be used by some people as though it were eulogistic of the object to which it is applied; whereas the truth is that "work of art" means nothing whatever but *product of art,* and this implies nothing as to the aesthetic merit of any object so described. If being a product of art has any eulogistic implication at all, the eulogy has to do with the skill presumed to be involved in the process of production, and not with the beauty of the product.

It has been shown in this chapter that some things which are beautiful are not works of art; and that some things which are works of art are not beautiful. From this it follows that no matter how close in actual fact may be the relation between beauty and the activity called art, no essential connection exists between them. Such connection as there is remains wholly adventitious.

CHAPTER II

ART THE LANGUAGE OF FEELING
VÉRON AND TOLSTOI

§ 1

Véron regards art as being essentially expression of emotion. One of the first writers to perceive that art cannot truly be defined in terms of beauty was Eugène Véron.[1] His book is not well known to-day, and I shall therefore give here a brief outline of his views, which constitute an important contribution to the philosophy of art.

According to Véron, art is essentially language; and language originates in cry and gesture. These expressions of pain and joy are natural to man, as to the animals; but man has the capacity to vary, diversify, and elaborate them as the animals cannot. Such elaborations are at first imitative; for instance, pictorial. But with the development in man of more and more general and abstract thought, the inadequacy of imitative means of expression becomes greater and greater; and symbols that are essentially arbitrary (in the sense of not attempting to be like what they stand for), become indispensable. This marks the bifurcation of language into "prose," i.e., the language for the expression of facts and ideas, by means of symbols in which the imitative character is attenuated or lost; and on the other hand "poetry" (i.e., art), which is the

[1] *L'Esthétique*, Paris, 1882. First Ed. 1878.

language for the expression of concrete and personal impressions (namely, of feelings and emotions), and which inherits the imitative and concrete signs given up by "prose."

Art then adapts these signs more and more to its purposes, completing them, rendering them more precise, and multiplying them till they include all forms, colors, sounds, lines, etc. Art, therefore, is "*l'expression émue de la personnalité humaine*," — the emotional (literally, the moved) expression of human personality; and Véron writes (p. 35): "What properly constitutes artistic genius is the imperious need to manifest externally by directly expressive forms and signs the emotions felt; and the capacity for finding such signs and such forms by a kind of immediate intuition, in which reflection and desire intervene only as later additions." Art is therefore much wider in scope than beauty. The truth is not that the beautiful contains art, but on the contrary that art contains the beautiful, just as it contains the terrible, the sad, the ugly, the joyous, etc. (p. 133).

As a general thesis it may then be said that any work of art is *expressive*, in that it manifests the manner in which the artist apprehends a sensation or sentiment, and in that it gives the measure of the impression he has felt, and of his emotional power (p. 141). But, using the word "expressive" in a more special sense, we may nevertheless distinguish two species of art, — expressive and decorative. In decorative art, which springs "from the instinctive or voluntary seeking for the pleasures of the eye or the ear," the intervention of ideas or sentiments is not necessary. Beauty of form, line, color, etc. is its essential object; and Véron believes (although, I should say, incorrectly) that most of Greek sculpture is art of this "decorative" sort. In expressive art, on the other hand,

grace and beauty need not enter. Art is expressive so far as its object is the external manifestation of the artist's emotional states as peculiar to himself. And therefore "expressive art, which modern art really is, rests very largely on sympathy. It depicts emotions, sentiments, characters. It manifests in artistic form the peculiar interest that man has for man. The beautiful then becomes but a secondary matter. The goal is man himself — the study of his accidental or permanent sentiments, of his virtues and vices" (p. 109). What we admire in it, Véron asserts, is the artist and his genius as much as what he sets before us.

The distinction between decorative and expressive art entails a certain difference in the standards of evaluation relevant to each: "Inasmuch as decorative art is devoted to the pleasure of the eye and the ear, that very pleasure is the only measure of its worth. But with regard to expressive art, the object of which is above all to express sentiments and ideas . . . it is obvious that the worth of the ideas and sentiments expressed must to an extent enter into the evaluation of the work as a whole" (p. 155). And at the last, Véron declares that the idea which he has endeavored to develop in his book is this: "Sincerity in art, by the spontaneous manifestation of the personal emotion of the artist. It alone can renew art by restoring to it the originality forbidden by the pedantry of those who exclusively admire Greek or Italian renaissance sculpture" (p. 460).

§ 2

For Tolstoi, the essence of art is transmission of emotion. Véron's views on the nature of art, on the relation of art to beauty, on the bearing which the sentiments expressed by art should have on the evaluation of it, and on the

primary importance of sincerity in the artist, all reappear in Tolstoi's book, *What is Art?* Indeed, Tolstoi's philosophy of art would seem to have been suggested by Véron's, in much larger measure than one would be led to think by the few merely critical references to the latter which appear in Tolstoi's book. But in any case, there is no doubt that it is through Tolstoi that the doctrines of art as the language of feeling, and of art as independent of beauty, have received their widest-reaching and most vigorous proclamation, and exerted their most real influence. Tolstoi's interpretation of them must therefore be compared with Véron's, in respect to certain essential issues. But in reading Tolstoi's book it is well to bear in mind that his discussion of the nature of art is shot through and through with an estimate of the value of art which, starting from Véron's suggestion that the worth of the feelings expressed determines in part the worth of the art, would make the conveying of Christian feelings the essential test of good art. In the minds of many, Tolstoi's book has come to stand for little else than this aesthetically startling proposal, and has been judged accordingly. But this aspect of his doctrine may be wholly disregarded without affecting in any way his analysis of the nature of art.

Like Véron, Tolstoi declares that art is essentially the language of feeling. Art, he writes, "is one of the means of intercourse between man and man"; and what distinguishes art from speech is that "whereas by words a man transmits his thoughts to another, by means of art he transmits his feelings." The only important difference between this view of the nature of art and Véron's, is to be found in what "the language of feeling" is taken to mean in each. Véron thinks it means the *expression* of feeling, whereas Tolstoi takes it to mean the *transmission* of feeling.

§ 3

What is language? Criticism of Professor Dewey's view. The question whether language is to be thought of rather as expression, or as communication, is an important one for the philosophy of art, and must therefore be examined here with some care. Most discussions of it have had in view language in the sense of ordinary speech, rather than the language which art constitutes. But the two are so closely related that an inquiry into the one will shed much light on the other.

Professor Jespersen, through an inductive inquiry into the psychological history of language, comes to the conclusion that language does not spring from, and therefore does not essentially consist in, the endeavor to transmit thought or feeling. He writes: [2] "One point must be constantly kept in mind. Although we now regard the communication of thought as the main object of speaking, there is no reason for thinking that this has always been the case" (p. 437). Utterances "were at first, like the singing of birds and the roaring of many animals and the crying and crooning of babies, exclamative, not communicative — that is, they came forth from an inner craving of the individual without any thought of any fellow creatures" (p. 436).

Professor Dewey, on the other hand, would deny to such utterances the name of language. "The story of language," he writes,[3] "is the story of the *use* made of these occurrences . . . they become language only when used within a context of mutual assistance and direction . . .". And, more explicitly: "The heart of language is not 'expression' of something antecedent, much less expression of

[2] *Language, Its nature, development, and origin.* Ch. XXI.
[3] *Experience and Nature.* P. 175.

antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of coöperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership." (p. 179). He also writes that the human being, as distinguished from the animals, "puts himself at the standpoint of a situation in which two parties share. This is the essential peculiarity of language, or signs" (p. 178).

Now, I should admit that the utterances mentioned by Professor Jespersen are not developed speech as we have it to-day. On the other hand, everyone seems agreed that it is out of them that our speech has evolved. Moreover, no matter how elaborately molded they have become or by means of what influences, no matter what social ends they have served or what effects they have had on the minds of the speakers themselves, such acts of expression of what Professor Jespersen calls "an inner craving of the individual" are I think, to-day no less than at first, intrinsically present in speech, and indeed constitute the very stuff of which it is made.

Another admission which I willingly make is that speech is an extremely powerful factor in the development of thought. Words make possible thinking which is abstract, or at least abstract to any extent worth mentioning. But it is I think no less true to say that thinking which was beginning to be abstract made words, i.e., arbitrary signs, necessary. What made thinking begin to be abstract is another question.[4]

[4] Professor Grace de Laguna, in a most able work (*Speech, its Function and Development*, Yale press, 1927) which came into my hands since this chapter was written, plausibly argues that the passage of the protohumans from arboreal to ground life, with the resulting greater need of coöperative action, is mainly responsible for the advent of "speech." Her study of the social function of speech and of the social factors in the development of both speech and thought, is an outstanding contribution to the subject, and many of her conclusions seem to me very sound. But

But I find myself quite unable to agree with Professor Dewey's contention that meaning is a product of coöperative behavior,[5] and with his account of the genesis of signs and meaning. He calls attention first to what Max Meyer refers to as the "signaling reflexes" of animals, e.g., the crowing of a rooster, the spreading of its tail by a peacock, etc., "which have no *direct* consequences of utility to the behaving animal, but which call out certain characteristic responses, sexual, protective, food-finding . . . in other animals"; which responses themselves in some cases have an important consequence for the first agent, or for the spe-

they do not seem to me to affect the essential contention of the present chapter, which concerns *what* speech is, and not (except incidentally), *how* it came to be what it is. I am aware that there is a tendency to-day, (with which I do not charge Prof. De Laguna), to think that the answer to the second question constitutes the only meaningful answer to the first, and therefore to consider oneself enlightened as to what a dog is, for instance, when, instead of being named, it is referred to in terms of its genealogy. As against this, I should maintain that a statement of *what a thing is,* is one from which may be deduced the various possible functions that it is capable of serving, including, of course, that to the necessity of serving which it may owe its development. (The distinction between what a thing is essentially, and its various possible uses, is thus of the same sort as the distinction familiar to logicians between a "propositional function" and the various propositions obtainable from it by assigning to its "variables" their various possible "values.") A statement of what a hand is, for instance, enables us to infer the possible uses to which it can be put, — including the grasping use incidental to the arboreal life which developed it (in the ape but not in the squirrel!). If this meaning of the question as to what speech is, is kept in mind, then, the answer still seems to me to be that it is external expression of an inner state (no matter what the cause or occasion of that inner state itself may be). This is true of speech at all stages of its development from the animal cry, to the utterances of civilized man. If and only if speech is this, can it be anything more, for instance an instrument of conscious coöperation. On the other hand, speech need not be serving (nor even be intended to serve) as an instrument of coöperation, in order to be speech, in a given case.

[5] "Intelligence and meaning are natural consequences of the peculiar form [viz., reciprocally coöperative] which interaction sometimes assumes in the case of human beings. Primarily meaning is intent and intent is not personal in a private and exclusive sense. . . . Secondarily, meaning is the acquisition of significance by things in their status in making possible and fulfilling shared coöperation" (p. 180).

cies (p. 176). Similar activities without intent in human beings would be facial changes, which are signs to others of our emotions, the baby's scream, etc. Professor Dewey goes on to say that such acts, although a material condition of language, are not language nor the sufficient condition of language. "Only from an external standpoint, is the original action even a signal; the response of other animals to it is not to a sign, but, by some preformed mechanism, to a direct stimulus." Then comes the passage in which Professor Dewey sets forth his view of the difference between such acts and language, and of the way in which the transition from them to language is effected. It is as follows: "By habit, by conditioned reflex, hens run to the farmer when he makes a clucking noise, or when they hear the rattle of grain in a pan. When the farmer raises his arm to throw the grain they scatter and fly, to return only when the movement ceases. They act as if alarmed; his movement is thus not a sign of food; it is a stimulus that evokes flight. But a human infant learns to discount such movements; to become interested in them as events preparatory to a desired consummation; he learns to treat them as signs of an ulterior event so that his response is to their meaning. He treats them as means to consequences. The hen's activity is ego-centric; that of the human being is participative. The latter puts himself at the standpoint of a situation in which two parties share. This is the essential peculiarity of language, or signs" (pp. 177/8).

I am unable to perceive, however, that the passage just quoted in the least supports its conclusion. On the contrary, it seems to me to contain evidence against that very conclusion. Professor Dewey mentions two ways in which the hen's reflexes become conditioned (by the farmer's call, and by the rattle of grain in the pan). As regards

these, the hen has done exactly what he says the human infant does, viz., discount (or here rather take account of) a noise which in the absence of previous experience it would ignore, or possibly flee from, but certainly not respond to as if it were food. The fact that a given hen or flock of hens has not yet learned in a similar way to discount another act of the farmer (the movement of his arm) seems to me quite irrelevant. That act could undoubtedly be made to condition the food-approaching response of the hen as do the noises mentioned. But this would be nothing new. It would be only one more fact against the conclusion contended for by Professor Dewey. That is, it would show again that the hen can learn to perform the food-approaching act, in response to a stimulus which is not food, but a quite arbitrary sound or sight, and which *means or signifies* to the hen both the imminence and the location of food, because in its past experience it has been invariably associated therewith. The hen thus does exactly what Professor Dewey claims for the human infant; and so far as the passage quoted goes, the infant does nothing different in kind (although of course much in degree) from what Professor Dewey grants that the hen does. If the infant's activity *thereby* ceases to be ego-centric and becomes entitled to be called participative (which I cannot see), then so does the hen's.

The difference between the hen and the infant is not that the latter, but not the former, learns to discount (and take account of) certain stimuli, i.e., to respond not to what they are but to what they mean or signify; for the hen as well as the infant does exactly that. The true difference between them, I submit, is the *extent* to which this identical process of "conditioning" can be carried in each. Words are merely one kind of signs among others, to which both animals and men can learn to respond. But for man,

words are an extraordinarily useful sort of signs, for a number of reasons. One is that he can both distinguish, make and remember an immensely greater variety of sound (or line) combinations than can any animal. Another is that (partly as a cause and partly as a result of this, as well as of other factors), man goes far beyond the animals in his interest in and capacity to discern the abstract, that is to say, the likenesses and unlikenesses, or the kinds, of the concrete things, relations, and actions which he perceives. This interest and this capacity both call for words, and are fostered by words.[6]

The passage quoted above, it is true, is immediately followed in Professor Dewey's chapter by a discussion of what is involved when, for instance, a person A points to a flower and requests B to bring it to him. Professor Dewey there stresses the fact that in such a case the flower is considered, both by A and by B, partly in terms of its function in the other's experience, i.e., the situation involves coöperation; and he then declares: "Such is the essence and import of communication, signs and meaning" (p. 178).

Of course, since the situation described assumes language as already in existence, analysis of that situation cannot fail to reveal in it signs and meanings. But so far as I can see Professor Dewey exhibits no evidence what-

[6] On the matter of abstract ideas, Mr. Bertrand Russell writes as follows (*Philosophy*, p. 54): "It has often been supposed that, because we can use a word like 'man' correctly, we must be capable of a corresponding 'abstract' idea of man, but this is quite a mistake. Some reactions [on our part] are appropriate to one man, some to another, but all have certain elements in common. If the word 'man' produces in us the reactions which are common but no others, we may be said to understand the word 'man'." To this I would reply that the psychic state in us which corresponds to this making by us (incipiently) of only the reactions appropriate towards any man, is precisely what constitutes having an abstract idea of man. To have an abstract idea, however, does not automatically confer the capacity to give an *analytical* account of it.

ever that situations of that particular sort are needed to beget signs and meanings. As we have already seen, signs and meanings already existed for the hen, whose correct apprehension of the meaning of the farmer's signals involved no coöperation on its part. The sort of situation described by Professor Dewey is not, then, what begets signs and meanings; on the contrary, it presupposes them, and, being a situation involving coöperation, they are used (in it) for purposes of coöperation. The most that could be claimed for situations of that sort would be that they beget the special sorts of signs and meanings needed for purposes not just of communication, but of coöperation. For the viewing of one thing by two persons each in terms of the possible function of the thing in the other's experience, i.e., coöperatively, is not at all an invariable characteristic of the cases where language is used as a means of communication. It represents, on the contrary, an advanced stage of linguistic communication, the special features of which mask, instead of revealing, those which are alone essential to communication in general. A much simpler and more typical case of the use of language for communication would be such commands as "Get out," "Shut up," "Stop," "Run," etc. These are recognizable relatives of, for instance, the spontaneous growl of anger. The next level in communication might be represented by commands not merely of action, and not yet of coöperation, but only of operation on an object, e.g., "Catch it," "Kill it." Communication of either of these two sorts presupposes signs and meanings, but goes beyond them in that it involves *signals,* which are not the same thing as signs, although Professor Dewey's discussion does not distinguish between them. A signal is always a sign, viz., it is a sign made with intent to affect someone, — a sign addressed to someone. But a sign, on the contrary is by no means always a signal;

in fact only a small fraction of signs are signals. A signal is in its very nature communicative, but a sign need not in the least be so. Words have not only to exist, but also to be signs for those who hear them, and to be known by the utterer to be such, before they can properly be called signals. A signal, on the other hand, is only a particular form of tool: one stops an animal with a club, a man with a word. With other words one starts him, turns him to right or left, or directs him to the performance of more complicated acts. Man, we could say, is the animal that can be controlled by puffs of wind! To signal is to use as tool a sign. But to do this is not *ipso facto* to coöperate with, but only to operate on another, or both on and by means of another. Coöperation is only a special case, involving *reciprocal* signaling. It is worth noting, in this connection, that animals no less than men face situations in which elaborate, consciously directed coöperation would be very useful to them. Men are the only ones to practice it, however, not because they alone possess signs and meanings, but because they alone have in sufficient degree the necessary capacity for abstraction, and interest in kinds (vs. cases), already mentioned. On the other hand, as noted above, man's possession of signals in addition to signs, does not mean that signals have exclusive reference to situations involving conscious coöperation.

§ 4

Language is essentially expression of an inner state. With these considerations in mind, we may now return to the question which led us to them. That question was, what essentially is language? Is it intentional *expression* of an inner state (a belief, doubt, volition, emotion)? Or is it intentional *communication* of such an inner state to

someone else? The answer to this question seems to me to be that the former hypothesis is correct, and not the latter. To remove any possibility of misunderstanding as to the import of this assertion, however, the following observations are in order:

(a) That the language act in developed speech (with which we are here primarily concerned) is an intentional, and not a merely reflex or mechanical act, is assumed. That the language act not only in developed speech, but at all stages of its evolution, is expression of an inner state, is asserted.

(b) The alternative hypotheses in the question as formulated both imply the antecedent presence of an inner state. Even on a purely behavioristic view, this would be true, but the antecedent inner state which eventuates in overt utterance would then be described in purely physiological terms. The purely behavioristic view, however, is not here taken. The antecedent inner state meant is a psychical one. And the evidence for asserting its existence is that of introspection. For instance, before I began writing the present words, I was aware of intending to say something, and not merely something but a particular something. In other words, there was antecedently present in my consciousness a thought, which it was my problem to express in words; and in the light of which I passed upon the adequacy or inadequacy of the words which presented themselves. Moreover, having now written the sentence, I read it and gather its meaning; and ask myself, Is this meaning that which I *was* trying to express? And inasmuch as, upon comparison, I judge that it is, I let the sentence stand as written.

(c) It is freely admitted that language would not have reached its present stage of development, nor assumed its present forms, had it not been for the fact that, in a being

having the capacities of man, words were extraordinarily useful as signals, that is to say as means of communication of certain inner states, viz., meanings. On this account, language as it is to-day has, thoroughly built-in, the possibility of functioning as instrument of communication. The possibility, however, is not the necessity. Silver coins have, likewise built-in, the possibility of functioning as money, but that does not prevent them from being used as ornaments for the person by savages and others, or, by the Hopi Indians, as material from which to make rings and buckles. Indeed, the very characters built into the coins to fit them to serve as money, such as recognizable design, and being made of precious, non-corrosive, hard metal, also fit the coins to serve ends such as just mentioned, which are quite other than the end to which the coins actually owe the possession of those characters. That a certain function which needed to be performed has led to the use of a thing that had characters fitting it to perform that function does not imply that the essence of the thing consists in performing it, not even if such use has led to the development in the thing of characters increasing its capacity to perform that function. The essence of the thing is a matter of the *actual* characters which it possesses, and which constitute the basis of all its *possibilities* — including (but only as one among others), that of doing what it has been used for. When we ask what a man is, it is not literally an answer to drag in his evil past, or his noble lineage. This tells us at most how he got to be what he is, and it is relevant only as a datum from which we may be able to infer the answer to our question, in default of being able to examine the man's inner nature directly.

But in the case of language, we can make a direct examination. What it reveals is that (developed) language

is an (intentional) *external expression of an inner psychical state.* Expression of one's meaning in words may be undertaken with the further intention of conveying that meaning to someone else, and possibly of affecting his behavior through this. But it may fail to effect this conveyance of meaning, and yet it remains speech. Moreover, expression of one's meaning in words may be undertaken without any intention of conveying the meaning, then or eventually, to another, even supposing that other to be one's own future self (as when one writes not a letter, but a memorandum or record for one's own use). For one may undertake the expression of one's meaning in words, purely for the sake of the clarification of it which results from the immediate contemplation of the product, apart from anything further that one might do with that product. And this again truly constitutes speech, or writing, i.e., language. Or again, one may engage in expression of one's meaning in words without any ulterior purpose, i.e., for the sake of such expression, simply because one craves the achieving of it. This is doubtless the case with a large part of creative writing. And this, too, beyond question constitutes a genuine language act. An account of what the language act, — speaking or writing, — consists in, does not in any way involve the notion of communication, and still less that of coöperation. These notions are connected only with something quite different, namely, with an account of factors which have contributed to the development of language as it is to-day, out of animal cries; or with an account of the various purposes as means to which language may be used. Indeed, as concerns the purpose of communication, speech is only a part of the means to it; for that purpose further requires that the speech be heard, that the hearer bestow on it enough attention to gather its meaning, and that the words have for

him the same meaning as for the speaker, — all of which conditions are subsequent to or independent of the act of speech. Language is one thing; and community of language another.

§ 5

Art, which is the language of feeling, is essentially expression. The conclusions reached above concerning the language of meaning, and the considerations upon which they were based, apply equally to the language of feeling, that is to say, art. Indeed the conclusion that art is not essentially communication but expression, derives additional strength from the fact that no such strong case can be made for the biological utility of art, as was possible (although, as we have seen, irrelevant) in the case of speech.

In art, it is equally possible, and most important for clearness, to distinguish between the art-impulse itself, viz., the impulse to express a feeling by creating something that objectifies it, and the other impulses which the thing created (the work of art) may serve at the same time or later, e.g., the impulse to communicate the feeling to others. The fact that the latter impulse very generally exists in the artist together with the former, is no reason for confusing the two. The artist's display of his work to others in the hope that it will transmit to them the feeling objectified in it, is a manifestation not of the art-impulse but of one quite other, namely, the gregarious impulse. Man dislikes to be alone not only physically, but also in his opinions, and no less in his moods and feelings. Yet the impulse to express his feelings is different, separable, and very often actually separate, from the impulse to *share* those feelings. The latter constitutes merely one of the many factors which in various ways condition the mani-

festations of the art-impulse, furnishing it opportunities, limiting its scope, forbidding or permitting it to use a given vocabulary, and so on.[7]

In addition to distinguishing between what the art-impulse does, and what can then be done with what it has created, we must distinguish also between the art-impulse and the other impulses or needs which may put the artist in the way of experiencing and surrendering himself to the art-impulse. Art, we are sometimes told, is more often than not born of utilitarian impulses, or at least of an admixture of such with the true art impulse. Thus we hear that Balzac's novels were, many of them, written as pot-boilers; that the art of primitive peoples springs not from the art-impulse, but from belief in the magical powers of certain shapes or designs, etc. But in all such cases we must distinguish the need which determines the practical features given to the object created, from the impulse which determines the non-practical, namely, the aesthetic features, which are *also* given to it. Thus, the need to make a living may well urge an author to set about writing something, and determine further that what he writes shall be a novel rather than poetry, that it shall deal with the queen of Sheba rather than with Queen Victoria, that it

[7] Cf. L. Abercrombie (*Towards a Theory of Art*, p. 45, ff.) who writes for instance, that a man "does not begin to be an artist until he begins to publish his experience" . . . "unless he produce something in which others can share, he has not produced what is called art." . . . "External expression then — publication — there can be no art without that" . . . "the essence of its [art's] activity is communication." But external expression and publication are *not* the same thing; and the first can and often does occur without the second. In his healthy reaction against the Crocean kind of "expression" theory of art, Abercrombie falls needlessly into the arms of Tolstoi. The fallacy on which rests the view that art *consists in* the communication or "transportation" of feeling, is well pointed out in the following words: "That transportation of certain acids can be effected only in stoneware carboys is a fact; that stoneware is very convenient for this purpose is possible; but it is none the less true that stoneware is not thus defined." (P. Guastalla, *Esthétique*, pp. 25, 26.)

shall be written in English rather than in Esperanto, and so on. But these and similar requirements imposed by the need to make his work pay, do not *completely* determine what he shall write. Within the limits they impose, the artist in him is free to write as he will, and he has to thank the need to make a living both for the definiteness of the artistic opportunity that finally confronts him, and very possibly also, for the fact that he eventually finds himself actually at work in the field of his art, instead of loafing still vaguely in wait for an inspiration. Again, practical needs determine that a spoon, for instance, shall be made and in a general way what its size and shape shall be. But the merely practical requirements still leave the spoon very indeterminate; and this is to say that in addition to providing an opportunity otherwise lacking for the exercise of the maker's artistic impulses, the practical needs at the same time leave to those impulses a very wide scope. It is only when scope is left by the demands of utility for the free expression of feeling that the maker of an object may from an artisan become an artist. Art as such, is thus never born except of the pure art-impulse, although other impulses may provide and prepare for it a stage on which to perform, that it could not itself have afforded. Art is essentially free. It is true that the artist's freedom, like that of anyone else, is always ultimately of the sort which a prisoner enjoys in jail, where he is free to sit, stand, lie, or pace in his cell, or to sleep or wake. Such freedom as exists is always freedom *within* limits. One's cell may be large or small, shaped this way or that, and so on, but real walls there always are whether of the visible sort or the invisible. Art is possible when the imposed limitations are not so cramping as to preclude all initiative; and it actually begins only when the limitations are not only understood and accepted, but are perceived as definite and

positive opportunities for free spontaneous self-expression. Walls shut out possibilities, but they no less truly create possibilities. Without walls, one is indeed free, — to spread oneself out thin. With walls, a dam or a channel is created, which permits one's energy to accumulate pressure or to concentrate in a given direction.

§ 6

Ambiguity of the term Expression in Véron and Tolstoi. Since for the reasons that have now been stated, the transmission of feeling from the artist to others cannot possibly be regarded as of the essence of art, Véron, in describing art as the *expression* of feeling, appears to have come closer to the truth than Tolstoi. Véron's characterization of art is open to criticism only owing to the ambiguity of the word Expression. Owing to this ambiguity, we are left in doubt as to the import of Tolstoi's objection to it, for Tolstoi says no more than that a man might express his emotions by means of lines, colors, sounds, or words, and yet might not act on others by such expression.[8] If in so writing Tolstoi had in mind such cases as that of the picture which moves no one because it remains unbeheld, or because it is beheld only by indifferent or insensitive persons, then his objection is ill-taken for the reasons that have already been mentioned. But if he is on the contrary referring to such "expressions of emotion" as swearing, laughing, crying, the angry slashing of an offensive caricature, etc., then his objection is rightly rooted in the perception that Véron's definition is too broad, covering as it does not only art, but also such other expressions of emotion as just named, which certainly are not art.

But then a precisely analogous defect characterizes Tol-

[8] *What is Art?* Ch. V.

stoi's own definition of art as transmission of feeling, since it likewise covers cases which are certainly not art. Tolstoi, indeed, clearly perceives this and himself explicitly mentions as instances of such emotionally infectious acts, yawning, laughing, crying, and acts expressive of suffering, to exclude which his definition must be narrowed in some way. The distinction by means of which he proposes to do this is one between transmission of feeling by spontaneous acts instinctively performed at the time we ourselves are prey to the feeling; and transmission of feeling by acts that are consciously performed "in order to evoke in others" a feeling we have ourselves experienced, "with the object of joining" them to ourselves in that same feeling. This distinction would indeed serve to rule out the cases of transmission of feeling that are not art, but unfortunately it rules out at the same time most of what is truly art. For such deliberate plotting to move others as he describes, is in fact no more a part of the state of consciousness out of which art is born, than was the preoccupation with beauty already considered. This conscious planning to evoke a feeling in others much rather characterizes the state of mind of the professional manufacturers of emotion who, whether from conviction or for a consideration, go pulpiteering, patrioteering, or promoteering through the length and breadth of the land. But Tolstoi really knows this; for a hundred pages later (Ch. XV), when he is no longer looking for some distinction that will make his definition of art exclude what is not art, but is on the contrary turning untrammelled to a direct empirical examination of the state of consciousness out of which true art is born, he tells us that in the creation of true art the artist "writes, sings, or plays for himself and not merely to act on others," and that when on the contrary he does not write, sing, or play for his own satisfac-

tion, but does these things for others, then he fails to move them. True art, Tolstoi believes, unavoidably infects others with the feeling that gave it birth. Counterfeit art does not. And the difference between art that has this contagiousness and art that lacks it, — between genuine and counterfeit art, — is that in genuine art the artist is "impelled by an inner need to express his feeling" (Ch. XV).

Véron and Tolstoi, we may now conclude, are right in conceiving art to be the language of feeling. Tolstoi, however, is wrong in taking this to mean either actual or intended transmission of feeling from mind to mind. Véron is right in taking language to consist essentially in expression; but he fails to qualify the term Expression in a manner which will exclude expressions of feeling that are not art.

I shall attempt to supply the needed restriction, and in other ways to develop systematically and in details the view that art consists in the expression of feeling. Before turning to this task, however, it is necessary to examine critically certain other theories of the nature of art which might be held to stand in the way of the one I shall advocate. And since contrast, as Royce used to say, is the mother of clearness, the discussion of those rival theories will serve very effectively also to sharpen various important parts of the outline of the theory to be propounded in these pages.

CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF CROCE'S "AESTHETIC"

§ 1

Croce's Aesthetic must be read cautiously. A more recent writer, Benedetto Croce, also regards art as being essentially language, and language as being essentially "expression," but he uses that term otherwise than does Véron. Croce's characterization of art as "expression" is often heard of to-day, and has appeared strikingly correct to many people. However, I should venture the opinion that agreement with it has been the more ready, the less clearly has it been realized how vast a difference there is between what Croce means by "expression," and what is commonly understood by the term. It will therefore here be well to consider his doctrine of expression with some care. Croce's *Aesthetic* is a book which must be read very cautiously,[1] for the merit of the just, instructive, and often pithily stated concrete observations in which it abounds goes far towards obscuring the arbitrariness and precariousness which, I think, nevertheless characterize the foundations of its aesthetic theory. That which it is above all necessary to notice as one reads the book is that Croce, when he appears to be *analyzing* the meaning of certain

[1] And more cautiously still in the English translation, by Douglas Ainslie (2nd Ed. 1922) to which are my page references; for the translation at more than one important place takes with the text liberties that would furnish occasion for certain objections, to which the author's doctrine as stated in his own words does not.

familiar concepts, is on the contrary for the most part only *prescribing* for them meanings to suit his needs. This entails that, when he uses these concepts, he is then often speaking a private language of his own, in which indeed the same terms occur as in ours, but not in the same sense; and therefore, when he seems to be discussing certain familiar problems, he is really doing nothing of the sort, but only elaborating the implications of his own arbitrary use of words. That this should be the case is no doubt hard to believe, but the evidence, some of which I shall produce directly, permits of no other conclusion; and persons familiar with the history of philosophy know that instances have not been lacking where a writer's preoccupation with what Croce calls "the theoretical systematization of the forms of the human spirit," has caused him to do such violence to certain terms as to ruin them almost altogether.

§ 2

What Croce calls "expression" is a very different thing from what is usually meant by the term. In the case of the word Expression, with which we are here particularly concerned, Croce indeed leaves his readers no excuse for believing that when he uses it he speaks the same language as most of them, for in Chapter XIII he lays down a distinction between expression in the "aesthetic sense," and expression in the "naturalistic sense." He first sets forth a creditable list of cases exemplifying various meanings which the word Expression actually has in language. But instead of then attempting to formulate definitions of the term that would fit these solid language facts, — thus making explicit the common intensions that the term in fact has, — Croce on the contrary says: "One can well imagine what sort of scientific results would be attained by allowing

oneself to be governed by verbal usage and classing together facts so widely different" (p. 95). Now it is indeed true that often there is no core of common meaning in various occurrences of the same term which all constitute cases of already well-established usage of the term. But in any given case it is perhaps still less safe to assume *a priori* that there is no such core of common meaning, than to assume that there is. At all events, the scientific procedure is not to dismiss the possibility off-hand and boldly appropriate the word to one's own purposes in defiance of such usage or usages of it as are already established. Such a procedure can result only in misleading others and oneself into thinking that one is talking about a familiar thing when one uses the term, when in fact one is talking about something quite other. The scientific thing to do is to examine carefully the manner in which the term is actually used in established language, and to formulate tentative definitions covering such usage or variety of usages, checking the correctness of such definitions by their capacity to cover not only the cases of which they represent an analysis but also other cases that were as yet unexamined.[2] But Croce, as the statement quoted shows, scorns to do this, and attains "scientific results" by merely laying it down that there is "nothing in common between the science of spiritual expression and a *semiotic,* whether

[2] No doubt, as Croce says in another place, "language is perpetual creation." The meaning of terms is not something fixed once for all, and for everyone. Indeed there is no reason why each person should not express his thoughts in a private language of his own; and to a certain extent, each person actually does this. But when language is addressed to others, with the purpose of communicating to them the thought one has expressed in it, the matter stands otherwise. Unless in such a case one uses one's terms in the sense which is the established one at the time, one conveys nothing to others, or, — which is worse, — one imparts to them a thought different from that which one intended to convey. One misleads them and also probably oneself, since the force of habit makes it very easy for one to forget a sense arbitrarily imposed on a familiar term.

it be medical, meteorological, political, physiognomic, or chiromantic" (p. 95).

If this be so, I submit that the proper thing to do would then have been to leave the word Expression to such lowly semiotic employment as Croce suggests already belongs to it, and to coin some new term to designate the "spiritual aesthetic synthesis" (itself much in need of elucidation) which is what Croce means when he talks about "expression." But one is shocked to find that far from thinking of doing so, Croce on the contrary considers himself free to do with the word "expression" as he likes, and expects the rest of us to regard our use of it as *metaphorical,* for on page 96 he refers to the "expression or spiritual aesthetic synthesis . . . which is lacking to the merely naturalistic manifestation or construction *also metaphorically called expression*" (italics mine).

There are other passages in the *Aesthetic,* and in the *Breviary of Aesthetic,*[3] which further support the charge made above, that Croce forces upon words having an established common use wholly arbitrary meanings of his own; but the example just given will be enough to show that it is not safe to assume that Croce is talking about what he would seem to be according to the ordinary usage of terms.

Let us now turn to Croce's declaration that art is "expression," and endeavor to apprehend more definitely what meaning he attaches to that term. Some of his statements bearing on this question will first be quoted. Intuition and Expression, he asserts for instance, are identical. "To intuite is to express; and nothing else . . . than to express" (*Aesth.* p. 11); and elsewhere (*Brev.* p. 259) allusion is made to "the false distinction of the indistinguishable, intuition and expression." We read also that

[3] Rice Institute Pamphlet, Vol. II. pp. 223/310.

"art is *vision* or *intuition*" (*Brev.* p. 229), and that expression is "spiritual aesthetic synthesis" (*Aesth.* p. 96). These statements, however, are bewildering rather than enlightening, and perhaps what Croce means by expression is made more clear in the following passage: "Everyone can experience the internal illumination which occurs when he succeeds,[4] and only to the point that he succeeds, in formulating to himself his impressions and feelings. Feelings or impressions, then, pass by means of words from the obscure region of the soul into the clarity of the contemplative spirit." Feelings, moreover, can be formulated not only in words, but also in line, color, and sound (p. 8) and this formulation, this giving form to, is "expression."

If this were the whole story, there would be little occasion to quarrel with Croce's use of the term Expression, for what the words quoted above (taken by themselves) describe, is indeed very nearly Expression in one of the meanings commonly given to that term, although, of course, those words do not specify what it is that differentiates this sort of expression from other sorts. But from the immediate context of the passage quoted, as well as from other passages (e.g., pp. 95, 96) it appears that by Expression Croce means not really formulation in words, lines, colors, sounds, etc., but *only* formulation in word-*images,* line-*images,* color-*images,* and so on. Expression, he says, is intuition, and intuition — of a geometrical figure, for instance — means possession by us of so accurate an *image* of it as to be able to trace it immediately (p. 8, italics mine). Expression *in images* is expression in the *"aesthetic"* or

[4] Mr. Ainslie says instead (p. 8), "which follows upon his success." But the original says nothing about *following.* It reads: "la luce che gli si fa internamente quando riesce." (*Estetica,* p. 11.) Croce's doctrine is on the contrary that the "intuition" coexists with, not follows, the expression.

"spiritual" sense; but expression in physical material is only expression in the "naturalistic" sense, and "lacks expression in the spiritual sense" (p. 95). It is a "merely naturalistic manifestation or construction" (p. 96), a mechanical "translation of the aesthetic fact into physical phenomena" (p. 96); and these physical phenomena are merely aids to the re-performance of the act of expression-in-image-stuff, "physical stimulants of reproduction" (p. 97), "expedients which succour the weakness of memory and are its *aids*" (p. 96). They are thus but memoranda or "monuments of art" (p. 97); and Beauty is at this place characterized by Croce as the "hedonistic accompaniment" of expression.

Croce thus believes that aesthetic expression is necessarily expression in images, and that the physical work of art is nothing but a subsequent mechanical *copy* of what the artist has created and beholds in imagination. The basis of this doctrine, however, is, I submit, only a certain confusion which is rather frequent, namely, the confusion of creation, origination, invention, with imagination. It is true that there is such a thing as aesthetic expression, i.e., art-creation, in image-stuff. But it is not true that aesthetic expression needs to be, or always is, in image-stuff; nor is it true that imagination is always an active, creative process. Although expression in images, to a limited extent, often precedes expression in physical terms (as in writing, for instance, a few words at a time are thought of in advance of being written), this is by no means universally or necessarily the case. In ordinary conversation, for example, the usual fact is that one literally *thinks aloud*. And, *a priori*, there seems to be no reason why one's thoughts could not be expressed *directly* in perceptible sounds, but should have first to go through a stage of expression in mere sound-images. There is nothing conse-

crated about image-stuff, that would render it alone fitted to be the direct medium of expression. That expression in image-stuff often precedes to a small extent physical expression, is rather due to the fact that expression in image-stuff is usually (but not always) easier and quicker than expression in perceptible stuff. For instance, it is easier and quicker to try a word mentally, than to write it and then scratch it out if inadequate. But in the speech of ordinary conversation it is otherwise. As noted above, our thoughts then express themselves *directly* in physical words; and if what we have thus uttered without previously trying it out in imagination proves unsatisfactory to us, additional statements are then made, amplifying, qualifying, modifying, or withdrawing it. And, in passing, it may be said that some books give the impression that such also is the method according to which they were written. One German philosopher, it will be recalled, was accused by another of thus doing his thinking in public.

The use of image-stuff as the medium in which to carry out the trial-and-error process incident to any difficult expression of feeling or meaning, has exactly the same significance as the use of paper and pencil by an architect, instead of steel and stone, in planning a building. If some *Jinn* out of the Arabian Nights conferred upon him powers rendering steel and stone as cheap, as quick, and as easily and directly responsive a medium of expression for him as are paper and pencil, he certainly would use steel and stone to sketch and try with. The peculiar dignity that image-stuff possesses as a medium of expression is thus not that of being sacred to creative activity and alone appropriate to it; but that of being cheap and easy stuff to build and experiment with. It is quick and responsive, but on the other hand, like clay which is too wet, it also very quickly becomes blurry and is impermanent. Therefore, while

a short poem may be composed wholly in imagination, no whole book ever was, nor any other difficult and complicated work of art; and where, as in representative art, the object created consists in large part of images, they have to be fixed by firm association with the perceptible material of which the object also in part consists. They are in such cases used as constituents of the object, not in preference to perceptible material, but in default of sufficient capacity on our part to produce, mold, and do with the latter as we would.[5]

There is then no reason to depart from the ordinary usage of the term Work of Art, according to which it means, not exclusively something made of images, but also, and indeed primarily, the perceptible statue, picture, music, and so on.

§ 3

Croce's doctrine as to the theoretical relation of "Expression" to "Intuition" is obscure. We may note next that Croce would seem to be himself rather uncertain both as to what he means by intuition and as to what he thinks is the relation between intuition and expression, for he

[5] According to Croce's doctrine, Beethoven, had he lived two thousand years earlier, could have composed all his music even then, since all art-creation takes place in Imagination, which needs no instruments or technique; but he could not have played it. The actual fact, however, is that the scope of the Imagination, although wider than past experience, is rather closely dependent upon past experience. For this reason, the feelings which artists express, even in mere imagination, do not go very far beyond what they are able to embody in some perceptible medium, — be it, perhaps, as tenuous as words. As new musical or other instruments are invented, artistic creativeness is made aware of new ranges of possibilities. Feelings which before had to remain unexpressed even in mere imagination, now reach objectification, and so do the far more numerous ones which are the progeny of these, that is to say, the feelings which the artist comes to have at all only owing to the fact that he has already objectified others, and been able to contemplate the objective embodiment of those others. (Cf. Delacroix, *Psychologie de l'Art*, p. 157.)

implies at one place (p. 8) that *what is expressed is intuition:* "that which does not objectify itself in expression is not intuition . . . but sensation . . ." i.e., impression; whereas elsewhere (p. 13) he tells us on the contrary that *what is expressed is impressions:* "Art is expression of impressions, not expression of expression." Yet impressions and intuitions are for him so far from being the same thing that they are rather each the other's very opposite.

One moreover wonders why Croce needed to use constantly two words (Intuition and Expression) when he tells us that only one thing is designated, saying, for instance, that "they are not two but one"; this indeed being given as the reason why what he yet refers to as the *one* and the *other,* appear at the same instant, and are indistinguishable.[6] They are also said to be inseparable.[7] Moreover there is to be added a third word, viz., Beauty, as synonymous (for Croce) with Expression and therefore also with Intuition, for he says that "Expression and beauty are not two concepts, but a single concept" (*Breviary,* p. 263). This insistence by Croce that two, or even three words which nobody but himself uses as synonymous, mean the same thing, reminds one of what occurs in the eleventh proposition of the first part of Spinoza's Ethics, where, as Schopenhauer points out Spinoza's need of confounding Cause with Reason (in order to maintain his system) "becomes so urgent, that he never can say *causa* or *ratio* alone, but always finds it necessary to put *ratio seu causa,*" this occurring as many as eight times on one page.[8] What Spinoza wants is to be able to speak of God as the

[6] *Estetica,* 4th Ed., p. 12.

[7] The English translation gratuitously makes Croce say that expression is an inseparable *part* of intuition (p. 8); but the original says nothing about *part,* but only that expression cannot be wanting to intuition "dalla quale e propriamente inscindibile" (*Estetica,* 4th Ed. 1912, p. 11).

[8] Schopenhauer, *Fourfold Root,* Engl. Transl. by Hillebrand, p. 16.

cause of the world; but others will be better able than myself to say just why it is that Croce's system requires him to treat as synonymous two words which are not.

§ 4

Croce's description of the psychological relation of intuition and expression is apparently incorrect. Let us, however, now examine some of the descriptions that Croce gives of what occurs in "Expression"; for instance, those on p. 9, and on p. 118 of the *Aesthetic*. Grave reasons, as it seems to me, quickly appear to question their soundness. For instance, the illumination or intuition of one's impressions or feelings, which Croce says occurs at the same instant as expression, does not, I submit, occur at the same instant but, if at all, later. The illumination does not come *in* the act of creative expression, but only in the subsequent contemplation of its product. It is then only that we apprehend clearly what we meant or felt, or, as likely, did not mean or feel. What coexists with the creative act is only pleasurable exaltation which, incidentally, is not at all what the term Beauty designates. But whether or not we say with Croce that expression which is not successful is not expression, the fact remains that the successful creative act is not distinguished in any direct and immediate manner from the unsuccessful; it does not, in the very occurring, automatically proclaim itself by turning on a light. The light is turned on by subsequent contemplation of the object created; it is in such contemplation that we discover whether the attempt at expression failed or succeeded. In the latter case, we also then apprehend *clearly* what it was we were attempting to express. In the former, we apprehend, also clearly, something which is other than what we were trying to express.

In very simple bits of expression the fact that illumination as to what we were trying to express, comes not in the expressive act but only in the contemplation of its products, easily escapes attention, for the alternation of creation, and of contemplation of its results, is then very rapid. But when a long and elaborate piece of work is attempted, contemplation of the *total* achievement up to any given moment, can easily be postponed and thus distinguished. Who has not spent a tense evening writing page after page in the full thrill of expression, only to find on re-reading the stuff the next morning that it is not really what he meant, and that he has thus failed of adequate expression? That which at the instant feels different from successful expression is not unsuccessful expression, but lack of any expression for existing feeling or meaning. Such lack begets depression, instead of the exaltation which accompanies the expressive act whether or not its product turns out to have been adequate.

§ 5

Also incorrect is Croce's view of the nature of the physical work of art. Croce's view that the physical work of art is essentially an aid to the reproduction of the act of expression which created it seems to me to rest on a very questionable psychological analysis. For in the aesthetic contemplation of a work of art, what takes place is not at all an induced repetition of the act of expression in which it originated, but on the contrary the very inverse of it. In such contemplation what we attempt is not to express a feeling, but to obtain one; that is, to have impressed upon us the feeling which the artist expressed. We do this, not by a creative act, but on the contrary by lending our attention with wholly docile compliance to every invitation of the object before us, and letting the resulting feeling quietly

develop in us. The object, as it were, is allowed to take our attention by the hand, and lead it as it will. There is a vast and all-important difference between the expressing of a feeling by (actively) *drawing* a line, and the obtaining of a feeling by (passively) *following* a line. The fact that in both cases the eye or the hand moves, and along the same path, is a purely superficial likeness, which leaves the fundamental difference between the two quite untouched. This difference, obvious as it is, Croce entirely overlooks when on p. 97 he describes what he calls the process of reproduction in ourselves of an already produced expression, by means of the stimulus which the presence of the physical work of art provides. For what we do when we are passively obeying external guidance is as radically different from what we do actively from inner impulse as, for instance, massage is from exercise, or reading from writing. When by aesthetic contemplation we have succeeded in extracting from the contemplated object the feeling which was objectified by it, and have thus made that feeling our own, we then if we please, can, and sometimes do, express it for ourselves either in imagination or in reality. This, however, is something totally different from the contemplative act, and is to be described as *interpretation* by us of the given work of art. It is what the concert musician, for instance, does with the music of the composers that he plays. His hearers, on the other hand, if the music is new to them, are not expressing or re-expressing a feeling at all, but on the contrary *being impressed* with one, by the aesthetic contemplation of the music they hear.

Aesthetic contemplation is to artistic expression exactly as reading is to writing. The difference is only that in aesthetic contemplation and expression, feelings are what is obtained or expressed, while in reading and writ-

ing it is not feelings (at least not directly), but meanings. But reading, even when it involves muttering, is not a kind of speaking or writing in the sense of self-expression in words, but the very inverse of it. The relation of the two is that which obtains between ciphering and deciphering.

§ 6

Untenable also is Croce's view of the nature of beauty. This complete misapprehension, as it seems to me, of the nature of aesthetic contemplation by Croce, is closely connected with his extraordinary declaration, already quoted, that Expression and Beauty are not two concepts, but a single concept. For if this were true, or even if beauty were only (as he says in other places) the pleasure of the expressive act, then indeed no beauty could possibly be found in a work of art in contemplation, unless contemplation of it did consist of re-expression. But as I have tried to show above, aesthetic contemplation is in fact no such thing; and nevertheless it is *only* in aesthetic contemplation that beauty is perceived. Moreover, such joy as there is in the creative, expressive act, is something so totally different and distinct from the experience of beauty, that it is difficult to see how anyone could confuse the two. Yet Croce tells us that the term "beautiful" can be applied *to things* only elliptically (p. 98), for the beautiful "does not belong to things, but to the activity of man, to spiritual energy" (p. 97).

To perceive clearly what this assertion involves, and make easy the reaching of a decision as to its merits, all that is necessary is to translate it into concrete terms. The doctrine means, for instance, that if Antony ever complimented Cleopatra upon her beauty, and she was pleased thereat, it was only because, not having read Croce, she

failed to understand that when Antony said to her "You are beautiful," he was not really talking about her at all, but, man-like, only about himself, and was simply praising his own "spiritual energy." To her, what he literally meant to say was only that she was a natural memorandum or aid to reproduction of his pleasant spiritual activity!

When one thus realizes what the "literal" use of the word Beauty involves, one can only regret that the author of the *Aesthetic* should after all weaken, and announce his intention of using the term "elliptically" himself (p. 98).

The truth which lies behind the contention that beauty does not belong to things but to the activity of man is only that in the contemplation of a sunset, for instance, it is of course not the sunset that is experiencing pleasure, but ourselves. But the very way of declaring precisely that fact, is to say that *the sunset* is beautiful. On the other hand, to say that it is not the sunset but our spiritual activity at the time, which is beautiful, is not at all to use the word "beautiful" more literally, but only to use it incorrectly. This sort of procedure takes us not one single step nearer an understanding of the nature of beauty. It is a step not towards the needed analysis of the concept, but only towards the useless invention of an arbitrary private language.

CHAPTER IV

ART AND THE FREUDIAN WISH

Another conception of the nature of art, which also characterizes it as Expression, is that formulated by Professor De W. H. Parker in his recent volume *The Analysis of Art*.[1] Professor Parker, however, believes that emotionalist theories of art are infected by a fundamental vice, and regards art as being the expression not of emotion, but of wish. Art, he says, is *the imaginative expression of a wish* (p. 19).

The lucid and agreeable style of Professor Parker's book, its abundant documentation, its candor, and the subtlety and at times the profundity of insight that it exhibits, make of it without doubt one of the most important recent contributions to the field of aesthetics. The second and following chapters of it, if thoroughly digested by our art-critics, would make impossible the one-sided, doctrinaire, and even wholly irrelevant judgments which they so often deliver. But the conception of the nature of art which he sets forth (in the first chapter) seems to me so widely open to attack at vital points as to be quite untenable. The case which he makes for it, however, is on the surface so plausible as to require careful examination.

§ 1

Outline of Professor Parker's view of art as the imaginative expression of a wish. In its most condensed form,

[1] Yale Press, 1927.

Professor Parker's contention, as already mentioned, is that "art is the imaginative expression of a wish" (p. 19). According to him, "there are two ways in which wishes may find satisfaction; one of which may be called the real way and the other the dream way" (p. 3, 4). The first, or practical way, is that which appropriates from the environment what is needed. In the second, on the contrary, "the wish is satisfied by something that occurs entirely within myself, within my own mind and body, in the realm of my fantasy" (p. 4), namely, by a dream or imagination. A typical characteristic of dreams (whether night or day dreams), is the "as if" attitude; i.e., while the dream lasts, it is believed as if it were reality. But this acceptance, Professor Parker says, is seldom complete; a part of us believes, but a part of us knows better, "and it is this unique combination of belief and unbelief which creates the 'as if' attitude, the attitude of make-believe" (p. 5). In the dreams that we call art, there is equipoise of the two: "we dream on, knowing full well and luminously that we are dreaming" (p. 5). Professor Parker then goes on to argue his thesis by endeavoring to show, first, that all art induces us to make believe by creating a semblance of reality, and second, that all works of art satisfy wishes, both for their creators and for their beholders. Lastly he points out the differences between ordinary dreams and art. Dreams in the ordinary sense exist wholly in the imagination, but in art the dream is given sensuous shape, viz., it is expressed in colors, lines, sounds, etc. But this must not be thought of as a leaving of the world of the imagination for that of reality; on the contrary, what the artist does is to take the senses into the imagination (p. 21) and thus give the latter "a steadiness, clarity, and independence that permit us to observe it, as we cannot observe a dream" (p. 25). On this account, in addition to satisfying a wish as does any sort of dream,

art becomes also a means for "the clarification and communication of imagination, with its values" (p. 24). The expression that the work of art constitutes, unlike practical and scientific expression, "is expression for the sake of expression because in the process of expression a dream is embodied, a wish satisfied" (p. 30). And when expression thus becomes an end in itself, "it tends to assume a harmonious, delightful form," viz., design.

§ 2

Criticism of the contention that imagination is of the essence of art. The first point in Professor Parker's doctrine which calls for comment is the assertion that art is essentially imagination. This term is meant by him to imply four things, viz., (1) springing from a wish, (2) satisfying the wish, (3) not being real, (4) effectively simulating reality. I propose to consider each of these supposed characters of art.

Beginning with the third, according to which art is not reality but imagination, it seems to me obviously to contradict the plain fact that works of art in numberless cases are at least in part quite real objects of the perceptual world, and not merely (when at all) mental images. Professor Parker, indeed, not only admits this sensuous aspect of works of art but insists upon it, saying for instance that "a dream is an inner fact only, an affair wholly of the imagination, while a work of art belongs also to the outer world, to the senses" . . . it "is something to be seen, heard, perhaps even touched" (p. 21).

But he nevertheless writes: "Yet the artist never does, of course, achieve reality . . . he takes the senses into the imagination, he does not leave the world of the imagination. . . . Despite its sensuous side, a work of art remains within the sphere of imagination"; the colors seen

by the beholder of a canvas "might as well be hallucinations" (pp. 21, 22).

Now I submit that the statements of this second group plainly contradict those quoted immediately before, and are plainly false if "imagination" is used in them in the same sense as in the first group. On the other hand, if they are to be regarded as true, then the sense in which "imagination" must be taken in them is not only different from the first but arbitrary and impermissible. In other words, the meaning which the statements of the second group have if true, cannot correctly be expressed by saying that art is imagination. The reasons are as follows:

In the statements of the first group, *sensation* and the external world are contrasted as real with the unreal and subjective world of *images*. In the second group, on the other hand, reality and imagination are used as defined by Professor Parker on p. 4, namely, reality is now taken to mean that which gives to our wishes satisfaction in the *practical* way, and imagination that which (supposedly) satisfies them *otherwise* than practically. The essential import of the second group of statements is then that although the work of art contains sensuous elements, their capacity to satisfy our wishes is independent of the fact that they belong to the practical world; i.e., they are not by art treated practically; and therefore they "might as well be hallucinations" although in fact they are not.

This, of course, is perfectly true, but does not in the least imply that art is imagination or has any necessary connection with imagination. It is true that images or dream-contents cannot really be dealt with in practical fashion; [2] but a fallacy of undistributed middle would be involved in

[2] My use of the words "really" and "practical" in this sentence obviously rejects the alleged synonymity of "real" and "practical." I would admit only that the practical is what a distinguished philosopher has characterized as our "Americanly real."

arguing that because images cannot be so dealt with, and works of art are not so dealt with either, works of art are therefore essentially images. That this conclusion not only does not follow, but is actually not true, is shown by the fact that if the practical attitude, which cannot *really* be taken towards dream images, is taken towards them in imagination (as indeed almost always is the case both in night and in day dreams), then the dream images have in no way the status of aesthetic objects; whereas if the contemplative attitude is taken towards something which is not dreamt or imagined at all but ever so really existing, that thing then at once does assume the status of aesthetic object.[3] That status is thus a consequence not at all of the fact of being an image, but only of the fact of being aesthetically contemplated; and the contrast which, in the second group of statements Professor Parker describes as one between reality and imagination, is therefore in truth no such thing, but is on the contrary a contrast between the practical attitude and the aesthetically contemplative attitude. And the object towards which the aesthetic attitude is taken may equally well be a real, viz., a sensuous, external object, as a merely imagined or dreamed object.

§ 3

Art does not necessarily simulate reality. I pass now to the fourth of the characters listed above, which are ascribed by Professor Parker to art. His specification of the *simulating of reality* as a character of the imagination, taken with his assertion that art is imagination, commits him to the

[3] I am forced to use "aesthetic object" and "work of art" here as if they were essentially the same thing, by the fact that for Professor Parker the beholder's satisfaction in contemplating an aesthetic object, and the artist's satisfaction in creating it, are essentially of the same nature, viz., satisfaction of a wish.

abolishing of the distinction between representative and non-representative art. All art, from his premises, must be representative, and on pp. 6 ff. he makes a skillful but, as it seems to me, an unsuccessful attempt to show that music (other than program music), the dance (other than pantomime), and architecture, are representative, i.e., are a make-believe, a simulation of reality.

With regard to the dance as watched (vs. as danced by oneself), he writes: "I enjoy it fully only when it is as if I, too, were dancing; when, in the imagination, I move with the motions of the dancer, experiencing vicariously her ease and her joy." Now to this I would first reply that the enjoyment, whether full or not, of the dance, and the dance's status as either work of art or aesthetic object, are wholly different matters. The perceiving of the dance as an aesthetic object or a work of art does not require that it be enjoyed, rather than disliked or found indifferent.

But secondly, it should be remembered that the claim which Professor Parker is here supposedly establishing is that the work of art (viz., the dance) effectively simulates reality (which here can be only the spectator's inwardly imitative activity); whereas what his statement quoted above shows is, on the contrary, that in the case considered it is the reality which imitates the work of art.

Lastly and chiefly, however, it must be insisted that the dance that we behold neither is a dream, nor does, like a dream, possess the "as if" character, of making us believe that we are perceiving something which as a matter of fact is not there. What our inner imitation does in the case of the dance we behold, is not to make us believe that we are ourselves dancing, but to enable us to perceive that dance *as action* instead of as mere changes of place and shapes; and the action thus perceived is really there, and

is not our own but the dancer's, and is believed such by us.

With regard to the dance considered from the dancer's standpoint, Professor Parker says that although the dancer's motions are not make-believe but real, her experience nevertheless "possesses the essential character of imagination. For it is a satisfaction of impulses through occurrences within her own mind and body. For the moment it is as if she were having her way . . . through action within her own self" (p. 7). The answer to this is obviously that she is *really* having her way. Her impulse at the moment is to make certain movements, and she really does make just those movements. There is no "as if" about it at all, unless the dance is not only rhythmical action but also pantomime, and such a case is not here being considered.

Professor Parker, indeed, admits that the action which satisfies the dancer's impulses is "not confined to her mind, . . . but overflows into the body." But what was needed here was not to admit the obvious bodily actions, but to show that the actions need to take place at all in the dancer's mind, viz., in images; and this he does not so much as attempt. He merely asks who has ever set the limits of the mind or the body. But I submit that to ask this is in effect to throw overboard his own contrast between the actual and the dream satisfaction of impulses; for the satisfaction of the dancer's impulse to move her own body, by actually moving it, can no more legitimately be described as satisfaction by the imagination than could yawning and stretching, which are also cases of impulses satisfied within the body. And the dancer's actions in many cases doubtless flow from her impulses just as directly (i.e., without the intervention of images), as do yawning and stretching from the impulses which these acts satisfy. Nothing, perhaps, better shows how violently

Professor Parker wrests the word Imagination from its ordinary meaning, than his characterization of the dancer's satisfaction by her actual movements as satisfaction by the imagination.

The attempt to show that absolute music has the make-believe character is along the same lines as with the dance, and is open to the same objections. Still greater, I think, would be the difficulty of showing that the character of make-believe is present in such a work of art as, for instance, a piece of Mexican lace.

§ 4

Art cannot be said to consist in the satisfaction of a wish. Passing now to Professor Parker's characterization of art as the *satisfaction of a wish,* we have to note in it first a certain ambiguity. There are four distinguishable "wishes" that might be in question.

There is first of all the artist's wish that expression shall take place. But the expression is expression of something which is itself a feeling, not a wish. The "wish" that expression shall take place rather than not take place, does not in the least determine *what* the expression shall be. That is determined by the nature of the feeling to be expressed. That feeling is what gets expressed, i.e., objectified. On the other hand, the "wish" that this should occur does not get "expressed," but merely indulged, carried out, satisfied. The "satisfaction of a wish," in that sense, is equally involved in every act whatever that we perform, and not in any special way in acts creative of art-works.

Secondly, there is the artist's possible wish (if he happens to be working from an image), to draw just this line, to paint just that patch of color, to utter just this sound, etc., — the wish, namely, to translate the image into sen-

sation. Now this impulse to the perceptual precipitating of an image is satisfied both really and practically by his activity at the moment, for what he has the impulse or wish to do is to alter the environment, e.g., his canvas, in certain definite ways, and he really does just that. This sort of "satisfaction of a wish," however, although it is generally involved to some extent in the process of art-creation, does not of itself produce art, for satisfaction of a wish in the same sense, is no less involved in what is done by the house-painter or the engineering draftsman. It is only a wish to copy, and Croce is right so far as he insists that copying, as such, is not art.

From this wish to copy an image in perceptible stuff, is to be distinguished another, namely, the probably more momentous wish or longing of which the assumed image or dream or the represented situation, itself constitutes the expression. In the case of this wish, however, the word Expression, if used, means the imagining or the representing of a situation which would satisfy the wish; and, let it be well noted, that imagined situation is one in which the wish receives satisfaction *of the practical sort.* That is, when we dream, we imagine ourselves as doing or getting what we want; as having our practical way with, or in, or about the environment. This is so even when what we attain in the dream is (as in travel) the realization of the desire to contemplate some beautiful scene. Now this fact, that the satisfaction which the dream-content gives to our desire is essentially practical satisfaction, is here all-important, for it means that there are not, as Professor Parker contends, two ways of satisfying a wish, but only one, namely, the practical way, which consists in obtaining or in achieving what one wants. This getting what one wants, however, may *either really occur, or else it may be only imagined to occur.* And it seems to me

that what Professor Parker describes as the genuine satisfaction of a wish *by* the imagination, is in truth only the imagining that the wish is genuinely satisfied — which is quite another thing.[4]

To imagine that, may indeed rid us of the wish, but such manner of riddance is not to be called satisfaction of the wish. It is but a special case of something very different, namely, *sublimation* of the wish. In it, we do not really get what we wanted; instead, we find ourselves wanting, or at any rate, enjoying, *something else* which we really are getting, namely, the *act of dreaming*, as distinguished from the situation dreamt. The wish which is satisfied not fictitiously *in* the dream, but really *by* the act of dreaming, is thus yet a third wish. It is the wish to dream, or in more general terms, the wish to sublimate the original wish, since dreaming is but one among other possible means of sublimation.

But even when the wish to sublimate a given wish receives satisfaction by means of the act of dreaming, the performing of that act does not constitute the creation of a work of art or of an aesthetic object. Nor as we have seen is the dream-content which if real would give practical satisfaction to the original wish, to be called a work of art or an aesthetic object. Nor, as we have also seen, does the satisfying of the wish to copy an image in sensuous material *eo ipso* result in a work of art. Nor, lastly, is art the satisfaction of the wish to act rather than not to act, which occurs when the act of art-creation is performed,

[4] A lady who is a painter, and who finds it necessary to diet much more strictly than her wishes would dictate, once in my presence exclaimed with great conviction: "I want cake!" I advised her to paint a picture of a cake, telling her it had been maintained that wishes could be genuinely satisfied by imaginative expression of them in art. But I was unable to persuade her that the experiment was worth trying, — perhaps because I did not think so myself.

since satisfaction of the same wish occurs equally in the performance of acts of any other sort. But these four are the only sorts of wishes out of which art might be thought to arise. Therefore the position that art is essentially the satisfaction of a wish is untenable.

§ 5

Against Professor Parker's contention that art is the expression of a wish may be quoted inadvertent statements of his own, where he refers to art as the expression of feeling. With Professor Parker's statement that art is expression for the sake of expression, I am on the other hand in full agreement, but, as stated above, the expression is of a feeling, not of a wish. And it is interesting to note that although according to Professor Parker it is a wish which determines the "what" no less than the "that" of a work of art, there are nevertheless numerous passages in his book where, not being at the moment deliberately engaged in formulating a theory of art, he spontaneously refers to art as expression *of emotion.*[5] The explanation of his doing so, if every such passage is not to be regarded as a *lapsus calami,* might be that Professor Parker regards a wish and an emotion or feeling as being virtually the same thing. This is suggested, for instance, when he writes "I hum the tune because it pleases me; because some wish, some emotion of mine, is satisfied thus" (p. 8). But Professor Parker himself (p. 3) refers us for the mean-

[5] "melody . . . is a glowing experience of motion . . . color . . . is a thrill of feeling . . . any work of art . . . is an expression of feeling . . ." (p. 33). "But the artist, as aiming always *at the expression of feeling* is not interested even in the primary qualities of nature for their own sake, but only so far as they are *embodiments of emotion*" (pp. 78, 79, italics mine). See also the reference to cubism on p. 91; and p. 26, where a certain procession is described as an expression of *grief,* a "way of giving form to . . . mixed and varied feelings."

ing of the term "wish" to Professor Holt's book, *The Freudian Wish,* where we read not only that the wish is a course of action which some mechanism of the body is set to carry out whether it actually does so or does not, but also that "All emotions, as well as the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, are separable from the wishes" (pp. 3, 4). But that an emotion or feeling is by no means the same thing as a wish hardly needs to be established by quoting authorities.

§ 6

An emotionalist theory of art need not neglect the clarifying function of expression, as Professor Parker charges. Lastly, I come to Professor Parker's assertion that "one fundamental vice of emotionalist theories of art is their neglect of the clarifying function of expression in its effects upon the dream . . . they overlook the need in man to reflect upon, to come to some certain understanding of his experience" (p. 28).

It may be that some emotionalist theories of art are guilty of the neglect of which Professor Parker speaks, but he says nothing to show that incapacity to deal with the clarifying function of expression is a vice necessarily inherent in every emotionalist theory. At all events, the emotionalist theory of art advocated in the present work seems to me to have no difficulty in giving an account of the clarification which follows expression. Something as to this has already been said above while discussing Croce's account of the psychological relation of "expression" and "intuition"; and also at the place where the conclusions of the discussion of language in the second chapter were stated.

§ 7

Nature and mechanism of the process of clarification through expression, according to the emotionalist theory of the present volume. A more explicit and systematic statement of the nature and mechanism of the process of clarification through expression may, however, well be given here. An account of clarification will first be given, point by point, in terms of the language of meaning; and the modifications of this account needed to make it apply to the language of feeling, i.e., to art, will then be stated. The account proposed is as follows:

(a) Speaking or writing is essentially an attempt to express objectively in words a meaning present at the time in the speaker's or writer's mind. This proposition has already been argued at length in Chapter II.

(b) What "presence of a meaning in a mind" (apart from and antecedent to any expression of it even in images), consists in, is something that each person has to observe for himself by introspection. It is something no more describable than is color to a person born blind. All that it is possible for me to do in order to enlighten my reader (if he should need it), as to the nature of such antecedent "presence of a meaning in a mind," is to lead his introspective attention to the "water" of which it itself must "drink" to be enlightened; and I can do this only by saying that there is such a thing, in introspection, as the state of "having something to say," or "being ready to formulate something," or "meaning something"; and that this state is quite distinguishable from, and precedes, the saying even inwardly or partially to oneself of what one has to say. That state is sometimes what is referred to by the words "having an idea," as distinguished from any formulating as yet, of the idea.

(c) Moreover that state is one of "being ready to formulate," or "having to say," not anything but *some*thing. That is, the state has, previous to and apart from any formulation of it, an individual nature, a proper tang of its own, as real but as unanalyzed at the time as that of, for instance, the color blue. Thus, two such states of "having something to say" are, previous to any formulation, different from each other in the same immediate, intuitive way as are the sensations of blue and red.

(d) By expressing this meaning that one had in mind, one analyzes it, and gives it a more or less lasting objective embodiment, — the words, namely, in which one expresses it.

(e) The words make possible the prolonged contemplation of the analyzed meaning; and the clearness results from the double fact that what is then contemplated is an *analyzed* meaning, and that the contemplation of it is *prolonged* at will. The clearness does not come directly and automatically from the performance of the analysis, but from the contemplation of its results. It is one thing, for instance, to have formulated a doctrine, and another to know clearly what it is. The latter requires reading one's own formulation with studious care. That the clearness does not come directly from the performance of the analysis, but from the contemplation of its results, is something which tends to be veiled by the fact that one naturally thinks of examples consisting not of *one* act of formulation, but of a series of such acts, the meaning analyzed by each subsequent act having occurred to one as an aftermath of the clearness obtained by contemplating the results of the analysis of the previous one. In other words, writing more than a few words involves more or less of contemplating what we have written just before.

(f) Thus the clearness as to what we meant, obtained

in the way now described, itself constitutes a new fact, as a result of which new meanings may occur to us which otherwise would not, and which are likely to have some intrinsic connection with the meaning that we originally had. In this way the clarification which expression makes possible is an indispensable step in the writing of anything that goes beyond a few words, because (but *only* because) such an elaborate piece of writing is the product of the expression not of one meaning, but of a series of meanings, genealogically related in the way just mentioned.

This account of the process of clarification through expression in the case of writing (or speaking), may now be carried over bodily to the case of art, with only the following modifications:

(a) In the case of art, what is to be expressed is not a meaning but a feeling, — an emotional state. It should in this connection, however, be carefully noted that emotional states are not merely the few (e. g., anger, love, fear, jealousy) for which the existing language has names, but are on the contrary infinitely numerous and various. This fundamentally important fact will be dwelt upon later, when the aesthetic feelings are discussed, but must be mentioned here if misunderstandings are to be avoided.

(b) The relation of a meaning to its analytical components is that of "resultant"; *but the relation of a feeling to its analytical components is that of "emergent."* These terms to-day are familiar to readers of Lloyd Morgan, C. D. Broad, and others. I need only recall here that a complex is a *resultant,* so far as the nature of it can be predicted from the nature of its elements and their relations; and that it is on the contrary an *emergent,* so far as such prediction is impossible.

(c) Clarification, in the case of a meaning, means the becoming conscious of the elements (and relations between

them) of which the meaning is the resultant. In the case of a feeling, clarification means the becoming conscious of the elements (and their relations), of which the feeling is the emergent.

However, this speaking of the meaning and the feeling as respectively the resultant and the emergent of certain elements in relations, makes it appear that the elements and relations existed somehow *first*, and that the meaning or feeling *then* resulted or emerged. But as a matter of psychological fact, the very reverse of this is the case. The misleading character in this respect of the way in which the matter was stated above, may, however, be avoided if one notes that emergence (and likewise resultance) occurs no less as the outcome of the *disintegration* of a complex into its elements, than as the outcome of the integration of elements into a complex. We may thus distinguish between *integrational* and *disintegrational* emergence (and likewise with resultance)[6] and reword our statement of what clarification consists in by saying that in the case of a meaning, it is the coming to consciousness of the disintegrational resultants of it; whereas *in the case of a feeling, clarification means the coming to consciousness of the disintegrational emergents of it.*

Before proceeding with the formulating of the theory of art as the objective expression of feeling, which constitutes the main task of the present volume, it is necessary to consider yet certain other theories of the nature of art, which at various times have been plausibly argued.

[6] I am indebted for these terms and for the distinction that they express to a paper by Dr. Charles A. Baylis, entitled *The Philosophic Functions of Emergence.* (Philosophical Review, July, 1929.)

CHAPTER V

ART AS IMITATION; AND AS MEANS OF ATTRACTION

§ 1

Plato's view of Art as Imitation. The view that art is essentially imitation is closely associated with the name of Plato. In the third and the tenth books of *The Republic,* for instance, Plato refers to poets and painters as *imitators,* and since mere skill in imitation does not imply any capacity to discern whether what is imitated is good or bad, the artist is regarded by him as an irresponsible and therefore dangerous sort of person in a community where everything is to promote the growth of the citizens in virtue. Plato therefore writes: "When any one of these clever multiform gentlemen, who can imitate anything, comes to our State, and proposes to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that there is no place for such as he is in our State, — the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city." [1] In the tenth book, the art of painting is described by Plato as an imitation of appearances, and its excellence as consisting in such accuracy as may lead to the mistaking of the copy for the model: "A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and,

[1] *Republic* Bk. III, p. 221, Jowett's trans.

if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter." [2]

From such passages it would be unfair, however, to infer that Plato was as completely devoid of insight into the nature of art as they appear to indicate. The "artists" of whom Plato there speaks would seem to have been more nearly what to-day we should describe as vaudeville entertainers. Their sole gift, as he depicts them, is cleverness in imitation. This is shown, for instance, by the following account of what the mere imitator, who has no knowledge of or care for the worth of what he imitates, will do: "He will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large audience . . . he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the rattle of wind and hail, or the various sounds of pulleys, of pipes, of flutes, and all sorts of instruments; also he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, and crow like a cock." [3]

§ 2

Plato's view of inspired art. That Plato is well aware of the existence of another sort of art, abundantly appears from other passages. Thus in the *Phaedrus* [4] he writes, "There is also a third kind of madness, which is a possession of the Muses; this enters into a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy awakens lyric and all other numbers; with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, not being inspired and having no touch of madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the

[2] *Ibid.* Bk. X, pp. 428/9.
[3] *Ibid.* Bk. III, p. 220
[4] Jowett's transl., p. 550.

temple by the help of art [i.e., of imitative skill] — he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man is nowhere at all when he enters into rivalry with the madman." Moreover, when a few pages later (p. 553) Plato ranks human souls on nine levels according to the measure of truth that they have seen before birth, and names the sorts of earthly occupations appropriate to each, he tells us that a soul belonging to the first or highest level will come to birth as a philosopher *or artist,* or musician or lover; while to a soul on the *sixth* level, life as a poet *or imitator* will be appropriate. Concerning inspired art, as distinguished from imitative skill, Plato has nothing but good to say. It proceeds from a vision of the pure celestial forms of Beauty, Goodness, Truth and the like, and the works that it brings forth are of necessity good in every way. In spite of current opinion, then, Plato does not regard art as being mere copying skill, if the word art be used to designate the sort of activity which we consider entitled to that name. Art in this sense is for Plato the expression of an inner inspiration. What we can blame him for is not blindness to the nature of true art, but rather the bad judgment which made him class Homer as "a mere imitator" (*Rep.* p. 431).

The passages in which Plato speaks of artists that are mere imitators, moreover, can hardly be interpreted as implying that even art of the purely imitative sort is the fruit of the *mimetic impulse.* Such artists are represented not as imitating in obedience to such an impulse, but rather for the sake of applause, or perhaps of gain. Plato's theory of the impulse which produces works of art properly so called, so far as he has any theory of it, is rather as we have seen that it is an inspiration from within, due to a dim recognition of the pure Beauty once directly beheld by the soul.

§ 3

Aristotle and the mimetic impulse. On the other hand, the view that art is imitation not merely in the sense that its products for various reasons more or less resemble various natural objects, but in the sense that the *mimetic impulse* itself is responsible for the creation of works of art, is to be found in a passage of Aristotle's *Poetics*. He writes that "poetry in general seems to have sprung from two causes," the instinct for imitation and the instinct for harmony and rhythm. "The instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one difference between him and the other animals being that he is the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons." [5]

Aristotle's references to this "instinct of imitation" leave the supposed nature of it somewhat uncertain. The urchin who on the street spontaneously walks behind some pompous person, aping his gait, his air, and his movements, might be said to illustrate the working of the imitative impulse. On the other hand, the person who goes about with a camera and snaps whatever particularly attracts his attention, might also be said to be indulging his inclination to imitate or copy nature. And indeed this second case would connect itself more closely than the other with what Aristotle seems to have had in mind, as indicated by the remarks immediately following the passage just quoted. "No less universal," he writes, "is the pleasure felt in things imitated. . . . Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity: such as the forms of the most ignoble animals and of dead bodies. The cause of this again is, that to learn gives the liveliest pleasure. . . .

[5] *Poetics* IV. 2, 3. Butcher's tr., p. 15, 4th Ed.

Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, 'Ah, that is he.' " The implication would seem to be that, inversely, men enjoy making a likeness because in so doing they find themselves teaching, or recording for themselves interesting information. The case of the man with the camera exactly illustrates imitation so motivated, and is as such obviously not art. Moreover, a drawing such as explorers and others used to make of places of interest before the days of cameras, would not be art either, but simply a document. The instance of the aping urchin, however, would have to be described otherwise. The pompous man's walk appealed not to his curiosity, but to his dramatic sense. It gave him a particular feeling, which his actions now express objectively. In so acting, however, he is not *essentially* imitating the man, but *editing* him. He is not endeavoring just to copy him; he is endeavoring to express objectively what the man made him feel. What he creates is not a document but a work of art, viz., in this case, a caricature. The work of art is here more or less like a certain natural fact, because the feeling which the artist is trying to express was obtained by him by contemplation of that natural fact, which objectified it. On the other hand, the work of art is also different to some extent from the natural fact, because the latter objectified also other inner facts, which do not at the moment interest the artist, and which he leaves out of his objectification. That objectification constitutes a caricature, because the feelings which it expresses proceed, as Schopenhauer has pointed out, from the model's *individual* characters, more or less in abstraction from those of the species to which it belongs.

The term "mimetic impulse" is then rather ambiguous.

It may be said, however, that in its rather vague commoner acceptance, the "tendency to imitate" is a primarily passive sort of thing, whereas in art the active, originative aspect is prominent; and the tendency to imitate is on the whole too weak and transitory an impulse to account for the extraordinarily laborious productions of art. The imitation theory of the nature of art, moreover, is totally unable to account for the non-representative arts. But most decisive against the proposal to identify the mimetic impulse with the art impulse, is the testimony of direct introspective observation of the nature of the latter.

§ 4

The utility of art. Darwin's theory. From the Imitation theory of art we may now pass to another very different, the starting point of which is the felt need to find some useful function served by art, to explain its persistence. Art as we observe it being practiced and "consumed" about us, seems to be a biologically useless activity. The practice of it is, perhaps, a pleasant hobby; and the beholding of its products an agreeable way of occupying one's leisure; but biologically considered all this seems to be only a by-product of life. Human beings would apparently live just as long and be just as healthy without it. How then is the fact to be explained that art is a phenomenon to be found at virtually all stages of human development, even the most primitive? The thought inevitably suggests itself that art must somehow have contributed to survival in the competitive struggle for existence; for vast quantities of time and energy have almost always been expended upon it, which could ill have been spared had the expenditure not in some way constituted a biological investment.

The most famous hypothesis concerning the evolution-

ary utility of art is doubtless that formulated by Darwin who, in *The Descent of Man*[6] sets forth the view that art, beauty and the capacity for aesthetic appreciation, are important factors in sexual selection. An excellent brief summary of Darwin's position is given by Yrjo Hirn[7] in the following words: "Darwin supposes a necessary connection between beauty and art. He takes it for granted that music, poetry, drama, and the rest chiefly aim at pleasing. When he sees that activities and forms, which at least technically correspond to the various kinds of art, are to be met with not only among the lower tribes of man, but even among some of the higher animals, he therefore explains these forms and activities as emanating from a conscious or unconscious endeavor to please through beauty. And for this endeavor he finds a reason in the necessity of gaining preference in the favor of the female. By endowing the female with aesthetic attention and aesthetic judgment he has been able not only to explain the appearance of art amongst savages and animals, but also to account for the importance of beauty in life."

As Hirn, following Wallace and Westermarck, points out, however, in the case of animals at least, all the facts of gaudy plumage, dancing, and singing can be accounted for without supposing the hen, for instance, to be endowed with aesthetic judgment, or the cock with artistic endeavor. Plumage is accounted for partly as protective coloration in the bird's natural surroundings, and partly as marks by which birds of the same species recognize each other as such. The latter is also in part an explanation of song. The dances and displays of plumage of male birds at mating time are most naturally interpreted as direct manifesta-

[6] Parts II and III, and in particular, with regard to birds, Ch. XIV. Also *Origin of Species*, Ch. VI, p. 192.

[7] *The Origins of Art*, pp. 186/7.

tions of sexual excitement, which serve to induce it in the hen, quite apart from aesthetic considerations. To all this may be added the fact that recent researches into the color-vision of animals have tended to show that many of them are partially or totally color-blind.

According to the conception of art and of aesthetic contemplation of the present volume, as more precisely set forth in later chapters, the bird's display could not be called art in the absence of any evidence that he exercises over it the critical control which differentiates art from expression of feeling in general; nor could the hen's attitude towards the display be that of aesthetic contemplation since, when the fact to be contemplated is a dance or like activity, empathic apprehension of it is first necessary; whereas the hen does not so apprehend the cock's display: she reacts not *with* it but *to* it.

§ 5

Marshall's theory of art as means of attraction by pleasing. A more recent writer, H. R. Marshall,[8] has formulated a view of the evolutionary utility of art which also assumes that the products of art are naturally beautiful, but which does not limit the utility of art to sexual selection.

In our more passive life, he points out, we find certain emotions arising instinctively in typical situations: Joy upon the approach of the advantageous, and Dread, of the disadvantageous; and on the other hand, Sorrow upon the departure of the advantageous, and Relief, upon the de-

[8] *Pain, pleasure and Aesthetics,* Ch. II. *Aesthetic Principles,* Ch. III. *The Beautiful,* Ch. VIII. The second of these works, *Aesthetic Principles,* is out of print, and, as I understand, not to be reprinted. This is very unfortunate, for this short, non-technical, and lucidly written work is, from the standpoint of the general reader (to say nothing of the students in aesthetics courses), much the more serviceable of the several statements of his views by Dr. Marshall.

parture of the disadvantageous. We should expect, analogously, certain typical emotions to be connected with our own *active* responses to situations, and we do find Love, connected with the tendency to go out toward an advantageous object; Fear, connected with the tendency to flee from a disadvantageous; and Anger, connected with the tendency to act to drive away a disadvantageous object. But we do not find an emotion connected with a tendency *to act so as to attract* an advantageous object.[9] Such a tendency, however, does obviously exist, and the absence of a corresponding typical emotion is accounted for by the fact that that tendency does not lead to any *immediate* reaction, and that the reactions to which it eventually leads are too various to be accompanied by any fixed mental elements.

There are two typical ways in which the tendency to act so as to attract an advantageous object, manifests itself, namely, either by benefiting, or by pleasing the being to be attracted. And it is with it as manifesting itself in the latter way that Dr. Marshall identifies the art-impulse: it is the "instinctive tendency within us which, with no knowledge on our part of the end in view, . . . does work for results which shall please others, and which has no other *raison d'être* than this pleasure-giving." [10] More briefly, the art-impulse would be *the (blind)impulse to act so as to attract by pleasing.* The phrase is somewhat awkward, and, fortunately, the possibility exists to-day of boiling it down, if we wish, to one single word, that expresses it exactly. The word, which is one of the few things for which we have to thank the "movies," is still to be reckoned as slang, and for the sake of respectability I shall therefore put it in quotation marks. That word is

[9] *Aesthetic Principles,* pp. 55 ff.
[10] *Aesthetic Principles,* pp. 62, 63.

"vamping," which means precisely, to act so as to attract by pleasing. We could then say that according to Dr. Marshall's view, the art-impulse is the "vamping" impulse, blind as to its end. It leads to self-adornment and self-exhibition, in its cruder manifestations; and in the more refined, to the construction and exhibition of pleasing objects, viz., works of art.[11] Like the other "instinct-feelings," the art-impulse is wholly blind as to its utility. Just as "we love and hate and fear spontaneously, and without any notion whatever that we are doing what nature calls us to do for the protection of the individual and the race," so in the case of the art-instinct, we find it "impelling the man to his work without any appreciation whatever that he is really aiming to do what shall attract others to him. In other words, the art instinct under this view . . . is totally unselfish."[12] Its function in the development of man is *social consolidation*.[13]

Dr. Marshall's view of the art impulse might be said to include Darwin's as a special case, inasmuch as attracting by pleasing is something which will, among other things, act as an instrument of selection in mating. But Dr. Marshall's view leaves room for the fact that there are many other "advantageous objects," beside females, which it is very useful to the individual to be able to attract. This

[11] Cf. J. Mark Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*. Ch. IV, § 3. It seems to me that Prof. Baldwin (p. 150) goes a good deal too far when he writes: "The reaction of this social recognition upon the producer [of art] is not alone the foundation of his stimulus and the test of his success; it is also the very source of his sense of values." This may be true of journeyman artists, but it is not true of the greater ones, who have been pioneers and who, far from deriving their sense of values from society, have on the contrary imposed their own upon society, — producing in the face of social disapproval sometimes until their death, and eventually succeeding in opening society's eyes to the values that they, as individuals, saw long before and held to firmly.

[12] *Aesth. Princ.*, pp. 67/68.

[13] *Aesth. Princ.*, p. 82

theory does furnish a clear account of a sort of utility that art-production may have, which would enable us to understand its survival. It seems to me, however, that, to be completely sound, it requires modification in some important respects.

One of them is that, here as in the case of the "communication" view of language discussed in an earlier chapter, what we have is not a statement of what the activity considered *is*, but of one important function that it has. That function, of course, may well explain the fact that the sort of activity considered has been *preserved* instead of eliminated in the course of evolution. But, for the reasons stated in the discussion of language, I should hold as unsound the procedure which would *define* the art-impulse in such manner. As to this, however, I do not believe there is any fundamental clash between Dr. Marshall's views and mine, for he recognizes quite well in what consists the directly observable nature of the art-impulse, as distinguished from its possible evolutionary function, when he writes: "The true artist is driven to his work by an overwhelming impulse. A man may, of course, deliberately determine upon an attempt to express himself aesthetically in some manner, to be an architect say, or a writer of verses, but this does not constitute him an artist, however much he may attain of skill in the profession he chooses. He shows himself a true artist when he appears *compelled* to the production of his art expression by an impulse that seems often to come from without himself, — to be a voice calling him, a muse inciting him."

A more fundamental objection to Dr. Marshall's theory arises from his sharing in the general but, as I have argued, false assumption, that the art-impulse is something the exercise of which naturally results in the production of beauty. This false premise seems to me to vitiate his

main conclusions. Thus, I should insist that the exercise of the art-impulse actually leads to the production of things which *repel by displeasing,* no less than of things which *attract by pleasing.* And each is equally important from an evolutionary standpoint. From that standpoint, art may be regarded as the chief means of *soul-exhibition.* The nature of the "soul" which it exhibits in any given case determines whether the artist attracts or repels, *and whom.* That is, the social function of art is not to be described as social *consolidation,* but rather as social *assortment.* It is, to human beings in whom the "soul" of another is more important than his external appearance, what plumage is to birds: a means of recognition of kind. Even the "plumage" of human beings, i.e., their clothing and other adornments (which can be altered by them at will as it cannot by birds), serves to this end; for the would-be-decoration of the person, although engaged in with the conscious aim of attracting, does, from the standpoint of others, actually discharge a broader function, of which attracting is only one case. That broader function is *guidance to others,* attracting, repelling, or leaving them indifferent, through the revelation of the individual's nature which is constituted by the sort of "bait" of which he avails himself.

This description of the social function of art as revelation of the individual's inner nature, obviously connects itself directly with the conception of art as language of feeling, that has been argued earlier, viz., language as first and essentially objectification of feeling, which makes possible the social function to which it may well owe its preservation, namely, transmission of feeling.

CHAPTER VI

THE INSTRUMENTALIST THEORY OF ART

§ 1

Outline of Professor Dewey's conception of art. Professor Dewey's conception of the nature of art is in harmony with his well-known instrumentalism. In *Experience and Nature* (p. 369) he writes that "all the intelligent activities of men, no matter whether expressed in science, fine arts, or social relationships, have for their task the conversion of causal bonds, relations of succession, into a connection of means-consequence, into meanings. When the task is achieved the result is art."

On the basis of this view of the nature of art in general, fine art is then conceived to be more particularly what occurs "when activity is productive of an object that affords continuously renewed delight. This condition requires that the object be, with its successive consequences, indefinitely instrumental to *new* satisfying events.... Any activity that is productive of objects whose perception is an immediate good, and whose operation is a continual source of enjoyable perception of other events exhibits fineness of art" (p. 364). Again, Professor Dewey writes, it is a commonplace "that a measure of artistic products is their capacity to attract and retain observation with satisfaction under whatever conditions they are approached, while things of less quality soon lose capacity to hold at-

tention becoming indifferent or repellent upon subsequent approach." This shows "that a genuinely esthetic object is not exclusively consummatory but is casually productive as well. A consummatory object that is not also instrumental turns in time to the dust and ashes of boredom" (p. 365). In art, means and end are indissolubly bound together: "The end-in-view is a plan which is *contemporaneously* operative in selecting and arranging materials"; and the means "literally, . . . *are* the end in its present stage of realization" (pp. 373/4).

The distinction between the artistic or objectively productive, and the aesthetic, is conceived by Professor Dewey as follows: "In esthetic perceptions an object interpenetrated with meanings is given . . . ; in the esthetic object tendencies are sensed as brought to fruition; in it is embodied a means-consequence relationship . . . ; in appreciative possession, perception goes out to tendencies which *have* been brought to happy fruition in such a way as to release and arouse." Sensual pleasures as distinguished from aesthetic are on the contrary "pleasing endings that occur in ways not informed with the meaning of materials and acts integrated into them." On the other hand, the artistic or objectively productive sense "grasps tendencies as possibilities." In it "there predominates the invitation of an existent consummation to bring into existence further perceptions. Art in being, the active productive process, may thus be defined as an aesthetic perception together with an *operative* perception of the efficiencies of the esthetic object" (pp. 374/5).

§ 2

Strangeness of the instrumentalist life-ideal. The aesthetic philosophy of which the foregoing quotations exhibit

the essential positions would seem to be the only one consistent with a thoroughgoing instrumentalism; but on this very account it seems to me that it contributes to show what a strange picture of human life such an instrumentalism must paint. The life of man, or rather of intelligent man, that is to say of man as he supposedly ought to be, is in effect depicted by it as a life of toolmaking, all the tools made (whether physical or psychological) being themselves essentially tools for toolmaking. In a life of that sort there is no such thing as tool-using except for the making of other tools; and the only satisfactions acknowledged are those arising from the process of toolmaking itself, or from the perception of the utility of some tool for toolmaking. Immediate satisfactions are paradoxically said to be "their own excuses for being just because they are charged with an office" (p. 366).

Such a life would indeed avoid the "dust and ashes of boredom" to which Professor Dewey says that a consummatory object which is not also instrumental turns in time; but it would bring to replace it a characteristic evil of its own, — the fatigue and weariness which no less surely result in time from the ever renewed stimulation of the ever instrumental; and the ingrained restlessness and incapacity for contemplation, — all too widespread to-day, — which insistence on somehow turning everything into a means, produces. The only prescription that seems to have any chance of curing *all* the evils of life is, I submit, as with the ills of the body, to vary the prescription according to the disease. There is thus, I should insist, room in life for *meaningless* satisfactions,[1] anarchistic pleasures.

[1] I do not use Professor Dewey's word, viz., (purely) "consummatory," for such pleasures, because that word has at least the appearance of implying that pleasure can arise only from either pursuit or attainment. But such a theory of pleasure could be maintained only by assuming the existence of "unconscious tendencies" in cases of the occurrence of pleas-

And if it were objected that the pleasure to be found in heedless, self-absorbed feeling, for instance, (such as I claim aesthetic pleasure to be), is in the long run suicidal, I should admit the fact. But I should insist that it is arbitrary to assume that prolongation of life is worth more than a short period of bliss. The choice between them is a matter of individual taste. There are all sorts of things which some persons, in full awareness, have actually preferred to the prolongation of life. And if a man, with his last dime, should prefer to buy himself a rose rather than bread, all that we could say ultimately would be that his scheme of relative values is other than ours.

Moreover, that the happiness to be found in mere feeling apart from meanings is suicidal in the long run, is irrelevant if one does not propose to live one's long run exclusively or principally in terms of it, but only to grant it some room in one's life. Irrational, meaningless, anarchistic satisfactions have a price, of course; but then, so do rational, meaningful, systematic satisfactions; and like the latter, they are sometimes worth it. If the purchaser, counting his costs, is satisfied with his bargain, what sage will call him fool?

These observations are not to deny that what most of us, in our own reflective estimate, find ourselves in need of, is more meaning and rationality in our lives, rather than less. But, for one thing, this is only the verdict of our rational, reflective self, and it is naturally such as might have been expected of *that* self, which, like any other, posits itself as supreme, and fights for *its* life and growth. Secondly,

ure where no tendencies (of the fruition of which it could be the result), are actually observable. And with regard to such "unconscious tendencies," I should be pragmatist enough to urge that unless the inventions required by a theory have some function beside that of saving the theory, the theory is not worth saving, and is anyhow then only verbally saved by them.

however, even if our irrational self needs combating, I should insist that the proper end of combat is not death to the enemy, but a fair peace. Combat induces hate, and hate blinds one to the rights to existence of its object.

§ 3

Aesthetic perception does not necessarily involve meaning. Let us, however, leave the question of the fundamental assumptions that underlie Professor Dewey's philosophy of art, and turn to some of its doctrines. The assertion quoted above, for instance, that in aesthetic perception what is given is an object interpenetrated with meanings and a sense of tendencies brought to fruition, seems to me very questionable. The most that could be said, I think, is that that is *sometimes* the case. Meanings, at least, there are in works of representative art, and in instances of what Santayana calls beauty of expression. And tendencies, whether brought to fruition or not, may be discerned in the sorts of aesthetic objects for the apprehension of which empathy is required. But this falls far short of exhausting the field of aesthetic objects, i.e., of facts in the contemplation of which aesthetic feelings are obtained. In the aesthetic perception of colors and tones as such, for instance, no interpenetrating meaning or sense of tendencies brought to fruition need in the least be involved; nor, in my own case, is it involved in numerous instances of the aesthetic perception even of facts into which it might more easily be imported, — rainbows, sunsets, the colors and patterns of flowers, fabrics, etc. A distinction will be made in a later chapter among aesthetic objects, between those which are dramatic entities or are interpreted as such, and those which are, or are interpreted

as, entities of pure design (independently of empathy).[2] From the second group, meanings and the sense of tendencies are absent, and yet they constitute genuine objects of contemplation, from which aesthetic feelings are obtained. As Santayana observes, the feeling of nausea in seasickness does not consist of fear of the possible shipwreck which it may mean to us; nor, it may be added, of regret for the overindulgence in some favorite dish, which in other circumstances it may signify. It has its own intrinsic disagreeable nature, quite apart from that of the company that fate may have given to it in our individual history. The matter stands likewise with the objects of aesthetic perception. A certain beauty or ugliness belongs to them as *directly* present in our experience at a given time, whether or not they derive some beauty or ugliness also from what they represent or mean to us.

Meaning within the object of aesthetic perception is possible, but not at all necessary. Not possible, on the other hand, is meaning *of* (vs. *in*) the object of aesthetic contemplation; for as it seems to me, the very phrase constitutes a contradiction in terms. As Schopenhauer rightly perceived, the attitude of aesthetic contemplation is precisely that in which one ceases to trace the meanings and connections of one's content of attention, and gives oneself wholly to its immediate nature. It should, however, be clearly realized in this connection, that to trace and apprehend meanings and connections is not to *contemplate* them aesthetically, but to *understand* them, noetically, — which is very different. The object of aesthetic contemplation may contain meanings; but in such a case what we do in the act of aesthetic contemplation is not to gain an understanding of them, but to contemplate aesthetically that

[2] It will be shown later that the aesthetic attitude is by no means identical with empathy, as some writers think.

which we have *already* come to understand. In other words, the fact aesthetically contemplated, in such a case, is presented for contemplation not by the senses but by the understanding, — it is a fact conceived instead of a fact perceived.

The existence of the state of aesthetic contemplation (as more particularly described in a later chapter) is something which Professor Dewey's account of aesthetic perception does not appear even to recognize, mentioning as it does only what is accidental to it, and leaving out what is truly essential. That account seems to me a *Hamlet* with the Prince of Denmark left out.

§ 4

Artistic production does not necessarily involve meaning. A similar criticism seems to me to apply to Professor Dewey's account of the nature of artistic creation. It is not of the essence of art-creation to take place piecemeal, — on the instalment plan, as it were, — in such fashion that each step taken constitutes a faced situation, and the next step a response to or solution of it. As already pointed out, this is only an account of the history of the creation of works of art that go beyond a certain degree of complexity or difficulty. The unit-art-creative-act may be and often is adequate and finished at one stroke, and, as will be shown presently, often is not a response to any situation. It does involve a critical judgment of its product, but that judgment often pronounces it adequate, in which case the product is not modified.

§ 5

The view that art is expression of emotion does not imply the unimportance of subject-matter. The art-creative

act, moreover, is essentially one of self-expression, and it is only by accident that the feeling to be expressed is itself directly due to some perceived situation. This, however, leads us to Professor Dewey's criticism of the view that art is expression of emotion or feeling. His objection to this view seems to arise from its (supposedly) implying that "subject-matter is of no significance except as material through which emotion is expressed" (p. 390).

As to this, I should not only agree but insist that in art in which there is a subject-matter, that subject-matter is of cardinal importance. I shall have occasion in the sequel to express myself on this point and hope to do so in a manner which will make clear that the philosophy of art I am setting forth does not countenance the liberties which our "moderns" at times allow themselves with subject-matter. But I should emphatically deny that unimportance of the subject-matter is an implication of the thesis that art is the expression of emotion, when that thesis is taken in the sense which I shall indicate. Artists indeed have sometimes endeavored to justify the atrocities on subject-matter of which they were guilty, by appeal to a view of the nature of art stated by them in terms of "expression of emotion." Such appeals, however, indicate not the falsity of the thesis, but only the appellant's blindness to the distinction between objective expression and mere excretion, of emotion. The feeling which any given subject-matter expresses cannot be expressed by anything else; and any feeling that can be expressed independently of that subject-matter *must* be so expressed. Willy-nilly the subject-matter makes its own contribution to the feeling finally objectified by the work in which that subject-matter was introduced.

§ 6

Emotions are not always responses to objective situations. The statements concerning emotion upon which Professor Dewey bases his criticism of the view that art is expression of emotion, may next be examined. He writes: "Emotion in its ordinary sense is something called out *by* objects, physical and personal; it is response *to* an objective situation. It is not something existing somewhere by itself which then employs material through which to express itself" (p. 390). But it seems to me obvious that what Professor Dewey sets forth in the above words is not at all, as it claims to be, *what* emotion is, but only *when* it (sometimes) occurs.

What emotion, or any given emotion, is, can be learned only by experiencing it; and remains what it is no matter in what way we came to experience it. The history or aetiology of an emotional experience or feeling is one thing, and its intrinsic, concrete nature another. There are few people who have not some morning awakened with a disinterested, *a priori,* objectless grouch, indistinguishable in quality from the *a posteriori* grouches which at other times were called out by objects. Again, the feeling called Depression remains qualitatively the same whether caused by objective difficulties in one's way, or by obscure, unconscious physiological causes. The emotion called Conviction occurs under nitrous oxide, as well as in the presence of a coercive argument. The feeling of exhilaration occurs as a response to good news, or as a result of the presence of alcohol in the blood stream, etc. In short, the plain fact, as distinguished from theories, is that emotions, feelings, and moods, in a large proportion of their occurrences do well-up in us spontaneously from the unconscious workings of body and soul, and not at all in response to an

objective situation. This, I submit, is an everyday occurrence even with regard to the "standard," labeled emotions; and with regard to the vast wealth of less violent and less stereotyped nameless feelings which we may observe in ourselves at any time we free our attention from the bondage of labels, the proposition that they are "called out by objects," or responses to objective situations, could only be termed an article of faith, true in only a part of the cases. As Santayana justly observes: "Emotion is primarily about nothing, and much of it remains about nothing to the end." [3]

Now every instance of an emotion which thus arises "about nothing," constitutes an actual case of what Professor Dewey says that emotion is not, viz., something existing in us by itself, which then employs material through which to express itself. The expression of it may be artistic, that is, it may consist in creating an object which will mirror back to us in contemplation the emotion which was objectified in it; or it may be utilitarian. Utilitarian expression of emotion, in cases where the emotion does arise as a response to an objective situation, consists in action adapted to destroy or preserve (as the case may be) the objective situation which was the cause of the emotion. On the other hand, in cases where the emotion has no such cause, but wells up in us spontaneously from unconscious physiological or other subjective causes, the utilitarian sort of expression of it cannot be spoken of as a reaction upon the arousing object, since there is none. In such cases, the same sort of thing occurs as in the case of the *a priori* matutinal grouch already referred to. Although not born of the presence of anything offensive, it does — hunger-like — soon enough pick out for itself, and "pick-on," an object. Most anything will do. Fault-finding and the like

[3] *Reason in Art*, p. 56.

is its typical, predetermined practical expression, and the particular object upon which it happens to vent itself is of importance not owing to its nature, but only as an occasion for the venting of the grouch. In every such case, practical expression of the emotion constitutes no longer man's act of self-defence from a threatening universe, but man's spontaneous attack upon an unprovoking world (whether the *a priori* feeling to which practical expression is given be of the malevolent or the benevolent sort).

I do not by any means contend that the emotion which the artist expresses through art-creation cannot be an effect or resultant, more or less direct, of some situation that he faces. On the contrary, that is often the fact. But it is a fact which in no way alters the nature of art as objectification of emotion, or the nature of the artistic as distinguished from the utilitarian sort of expression of emotion. How the artist came by the emotion which he objectifies is an interesting question perhaps, but it is one wholly irrelevant to that of the nature of art. As concerns that, the only important facts are that the artist has first an emotion to express, and then does employ material through which to express it; and that he expresses it not in the utilitarian way, (which deals with the object of the emotion), but by creating something which objectifies, i.e., mirrors back, the emotion.

CHAPTER VII

THE PLAY THEORY OF ART

§ 1

Schiller's view. In his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man,*[1] Schiller depicts art as a development of the play impulse, and play as the manifestation of a superfluity of energy. Thus he writes (letter 27): "If no hunger gnaws the lion, and no beast of prey provokes to battle, his slumbering energy creates for itself an object; he fills the echoing waste with vehement roaring, and his exuberant power satiates itself in an aimless effusion. . . . The beast *labors,* when a want is the incitement to its activity, and it *plays,* when profusion of vigor is this incitement, when superfluous life is its own stimulus to activity. . . . The imagination of man, like his corporeal organs, has also its free emotion and its material play, in which it merely enjoys its native power and liberty, without any reference to shape." This play of the imagination consists in a free, unconstrained flow of images, which, however, because of the absence of form, is not yet aesthetic. But from this free play of ideas, "the imagination . . . makes at length a leap to aesthetic play. . . . An entirely new power comes here into requisition; for the directing spirit for the first time interferes in the operations of a blind instinct, subjects the arbitrary process of the imagination to

[1] *Schiller's Aesthetic Prose.* Tr. by J. Weiss; Little, Brown. 1845, pp. 139, ff.

its immutable, eternal unity . . ." Art, in other words, is born when taste, asserting itself, imposes a form upon the products of the free play of man's imagination.

§ 2

Spencer's view. Herbert Spencer, in the chapter of his *Principles of Psychology* dealing with the Aesthetic Sentiments,[2] tells us that many years before, he met with a quotation from a German author whose name he does not remember, to the effect that the aesthetic sentiments originate from the play impulse. This view, thus doubtless reaching him from Schiller, constitutes the foundation of his own discussion.

"The activities we call play," he writes, "are united with the aesthetic activities, by the trait that neither subserve, in any direct way, the processes conducive to life." The functioning of a faculty, in normal circumstances, results in three things: the pleasure of its exercise, the maintained or increased ability due to exercise, and the *objective result achieved.* On the other hand, in the case of the functioning of a faculty in play or in an aesthetic pursuit, the first two of these results are present, but not the last; that is, no direct objective result is accomplished.

Play is "an artificial exercise of powers which, in default of their natural exercise, become so ready to discharge that they relieve themselves by simulated actions in place of real actions" (p. 360). This, "which holds of the bodily powers, the destructive instincts and those emotions related to them, . . . holds of all other faculties. . . . The higher but less essential powers, as well as the lower but more essential powers, thus come to have activities that are carried on for the sake of the immediate gratifica-

[2] Vol. II. Part VIII. Ch. IX.

tions derived, without reference to ulterior benefits; and to such higher powers, aesthetic products yield these substituted activities, as games yield them to various lower powers" (pp. 631/2). Thus, "the conception of *beauty* is distinguished from the conception of *good* in this, that it refers not to ends to be achieved but to activities incidental to the pursuit of ends" (p. 635). The primary requirement, for aesthetic activity, being that the activity shall not be one of a directly-life-serving kind, "we conclude that it rises to the aesthetic form in proportion as it is great in amount and is without the drawback of any such units of painful feeling as result from discordant actions" of stimuli (p. 636). Aesthetic pleasure, however, is traceable not only to such activity of the higher powers, but also, secondarily, to the diffusion of the voluminous stimulus through the organism, with a resulting glow of agreeable feeling; and, thirdly, to the partial revival by this discharge, of agreeable associations established by past experience (pp. 636/8).

§ 3

Criticism of Spencer's view. Concerning Spencer's doctrine just summarized, it may be observed in the first place that it is ostensibly a theory of the aesthetic sentiments. It is not definitely presented as a theory of art, although at many points one is virtually forced to construe it as such. The aesthetic experience in contemplation, and the art-creative act, are phenomena of the realm of feeling just as distinct from each other as reading and writing, which are their exact analogues in the realm of meaning. But Spencer, like Schiller and many another writer, appears not to be clearly conscious of this, and his treatment therefore at more than one place has the ambiguity which cannot fail to characterize any discussion that does not sharply

distinguish the aesthetic experience in contemplation from the art-creative act.

Granting a similarity of the general sort described by Spencer, between play and what he ambiguously calls "aesthetic activity," objection may however be made to his view of play as the spontaneous expenditure of surplus energy accumulated in an organ, in the absence of any real situation calling for the exercise of that organ. Groos, for instance, points out that a game once begun is often carried not only to the point where superfluous energy has been expended, but indeed to the utmost limit of exhaustion.[3] And elsewhere [4] he writes: "It is the simple force of the demon instinct that urges and even compels to activity not only if and so long as the vessel overflows . . . but even when there is but a last drop left in it." As regards the beginning of the playful act, he points out that a stored up surplus of energy is no more needed for it than for the performance of the corresponding serious act: "When a ball of cord is rolled toward a kitten, nothing more is needed to set her claws in motion than in the case of a full-grown cat that starts up at the sight of a mouse." [5] Surplus energy is only a favorable circumstance, but would be a necessary factor of explanation only if there were absolutely no external stimulus, which is usually not the case. Groos' view is that "the life of impulse and instinct alone, can make special forms of play comprehensible to us. . . . In many cases the inherited impulse toward prescribed reactions in certain brain tracts seems to be in itself a sufficient cause for play without the necessary accompaniment of superfluous energy." [6]

[3] Groos, *The Play of Man*, p. 366.
[4] *The Play of Animals*, p. 21.
[5] *Play of Man*, p. 363.
[6] *Play of Man*, p. 363. See also *The Play of Animals*, pp. 19/24, where he argues this thesis at length.

Again Spencer's assertion that "in play or in an aesthetic pursuit there results only the immediate gratification plus the maintained or increased ability" of the faculties employed, but not the achievement of any objective end or fulfillment of any requirement (p. 628) is obviously incorrect. As Groos points out,[7] "It seems a very mistaken proceeding to characterize play as aimless activity, carried on simply for its own sake. Energetic exertion may be provocative of pleasure . . . but it is by no means the only source of the pleasure produced by play. . . . It may be an insignificant aim that inspires us, but there is always some goal that we are striving for, an 'end to attain,' whose value our imagination usually enhances." And he quotes Paul Souriau's statement that "to talk about such a thing (as disinterested play) is to expose our ignorance. Players are always interested in the results of their efforts." Spencer's opinion that in play there is no achievement of any objective end is thus only a misinterpretation of the fact that the objective end pursued in play usually has no real utility, and that that pursuit is enjoyed. The mistake is probably a corollary of his error in regarding play as consisting essentially in the spontaneous discharge of surplus energy.

Play may, I think, accurately be characterized as *the systematic pursuit of an end set up or accepted expressly for the purpose.*[8] The end which is ostensibly pursued in play, is in fact only a means to, or precondition of, the pursuing activities which constitute the play. The immediate enjoyment of these (which is not necessarily due to expenditure of surplus energy) is the true "end" of play, i.e.,

[7] *The Play of Animals,* p. 291.

[8] As will be noticed, the well-known facetious definition of philosophy as the systematic abuse of an elaborate technical terminology invented expressly for the purpose, has for its very effect the exhibiting of philosophy *as mere play.*

it is the answer to the reflective question, Why do it? Play is thus *activity, telic in form only, performed for its own sake.* Taken in this sense, the characterization of it as *autotelic* activity is correct. It is to be noted, incidentally, that the question whether an end which is being pursued is really wanted, or is only a pretext for the pleasure of pursuing it, is one which can be answered by the spectator as well as by the performer. Thus an activity may be play from the standpoint of the one, and not from that of the other; and we find adults calling play some activities of children about which the children themselves are in deadly earnest, and which they would not class with the activities that *they* call play.

There is, however, another defect, which touches Spencer's theory of the "aesthetic activity" directly rather than, as those just considered, indirectly through its foundation in his theory of play. This defect lies in Spencer's overlooking the "leap," the "new power," which in Schiller's account distinguishes, although none too precisely, "aesthetic play" from non-aesthetic. In other words, although art, like play, differs from work in not being a means to an end external to itself, there is yet between art and play this great difference (and between art and work this likeness), namely, that art is essentially productive, creative; while play is not. Hirn, who clearly perceives this, writes: [9] "The aim of play is attained when the surplus of vigour is discharged or the instinct has had its momentary exercise. But the function of art is not confined to the act of production; in every manifestation of art, properly so called, something is made and something survives." [10]

It must further be objected to Spencer's view, that the difference between play-enjoyment, and aesthetic enjoy-

[9] *The Origins of Art,* p. 29.

[10] The view of play implicit in the above quotation is, however, not here endorsed.

ment is not, as he claims (p. 636) a matter of quantity and purity, but a matter of the difference between the sorts of activities yielding the enjoyment, — the one, play as described above, and the other aesthetic contemplation as described farther on in these pages.

Lastly, it should be noted that it is to the object, whether created by art or found in nature, that the predicate Beautiful can properly be applied, and not, as Spencer asserts, (p. 635) to our "activities incidental to the pursuits of ends," whether the activities so referred to be understood to be the art-creative activity or (as Spencer rather appears to intend) the contemplative.[11] But what Hirn has called "the fatal confusion between art-theory and the science of beauty" [12] pervades the whole of this passage in Spencer, for a few lines below he nevertheless writes that "in the conception of a *thing* as . . . beautiful . . . consciousness . . . is occupied with the thing itself as a direct source of pleasure" (Italics mine); whereas in the next sentence this pleasurable consciousness is referred to as "a pleasurable consciousness in the object *or act*" (Italics mine). In the preceding paragraph, moreover, while setting forth the separateness of the "aesthetic consciousness," from life-serving function, he declares that "the aesthetic consciousness is essentially one in which the actions themselves . . . form the object-matter," — a highly ambiguous statement, which would be true if high-handedly made to mean that the art-creative activity is itself enjoyable; but false in most cases if taken to mean, as Spencer says it does, that "the thing contemplated as a source of pleasure" is "an affection of self," whether direct or indirect.

11 Attention may incidentally be called to the fact that on pp. 646/7 Spencer gives an excellent characterization of the aesthetically receptive attitude, as distinguished from the utilitarianly practical. It will be found quoted in the chapter on the Aesthetic Attitude, below.

12 *The Origins of Art*, p. 24.

From the foregoing examination, it would then on the whole appear that Spencer's view of the relation of "aesthetic activity" to play, although much more elaborate than Schiller's, does not improve upon it in essentials but rather the reverse, ignoring as it does the creative expression of self which, as Schiller seems to have understood, differentiates the sort of non-utilitarian activity that art is, from the sort specifically called play.

§ 4

The view of Karl Groos. The general nature of the theory of play set forth by Karl Groos in his two books on the play of animals and the play of man, already appears in what has been said above.

In the first chapter of *The Play of Animals,* he criticizes the Schiller-Spencer theory of play as expenditure of surplus energy on the grounds already indicated; and he also expresses dissent from Wundt's view of play as "imitation of the business of practical life stripped of its original aim and having a pleasurable mental effect," [13] on the ground that although many plays originate in such imitation, "the most important and elementary kinds of play can be attributed neither to imitative repetition of the individual's former acts, nor to imitation of the performers of others." [14] The recreation theory of play, Groos also regards as inadequate. Although freely admitting that play can furnish recreation, he does not believe anyone can seriously maintain that the necessity for recreation originates play.[15] His own view is that the real essence of play, the source from which it springs, is to be sought in instinct" (p. 15),

[13] Wundt. *Vorlesungen ueber die Menschen und Thierseele.* Eng. Tr. p. 357.

[14] *Play of Animals,* p. 9.

[15] *Play of Animals,* p. 17.

the imitative impulse being only a special instinct, related to the others (p. 13, note). Play has thus "a clearly defined biological end, — namely, the preparation of the animal for its particular life activities" (p. 23) and may be defined objectively, as "practice in distinction from the exercise of important instincts." [16] But although instinct is the real foundation of play, not all play is purely instinctive activity. As we ascend in the scale of existence, psychological phenomena "supplement the mere natural impulse, ennobling it, elevating it, and tending to conceal it under added details" (p. 24). And in *The Play of Man* (p. 375), he writes: "Play is the agency employed to develop crude powers and prepare them for life's uses, and from our biological standpoint we can say: From the moment when the intellectual development of a species becomes more useful in the 'struggle for life' than the most perfect instinct, natural selection will favor those individuals in whom the less elaborated faculties have more chance of being worked out by practice under the protection of parents — that is to say, those individuals that play."

The relation of play as so conceived to art is through the psychological accompaniments of play just mentioned. Play is at first mere satisfaction of instinctive impulse in response to a stimulus. That is, the act is not performed for its own sake, nor for that of an external aim, but automatically. At the next stage, although the situation faced is not objectively a serious and real one, it is subjectively regarded as such, and the animal exerts to the attainment of an aim such power as it does have. At the third stage, "a consciousness of make-believe is rising gradually, and to the force of instinct is being added the recollection of the pleasure-giving qualities of play." This acts as a

[16] *Play of Animals*, p. 292.

restraint, checking the earnestness of the instinctive acts. Finally, "the make-believe is fully developed and conscious . . . the animal, playing a part as an actor, comes very near to art; henceforth he plays for play's sake with very little external aim."

In the case of man, however, the outward aim reappears at this stage in a modified form, "in the desire to impress the hearers or spectators, and is at bottom our familiar pleasure in power, delight in being able to extend the sphere of our ability." In the artist this becomes "the hope of influencing other minds by means of his creations, which, through the power of suggestion, give him a spiritual supremacy over his fellow-creatures. This suggestive effect is his real aim, for while it is true in a sense that the artist should not regard applause by the multitude, but listen rather to the voice in his own breast, it is yet nonsense to say that a great artist has no thought of the effect on others. . . . Spiritual supremacy is the aim of the highest art, and there is no real genius without the desire for it." [17]

Groos is quite conscious of the difference between aesthetic enjoyment and artistic production. But the conception of play is for him applicable to both, inasmuch as, from a psychological standpoint we recognize as play "any act that is practised purely for its pleasurable effect." [18] Thus, aesthetic enjoyment is not only "playful sensor experience," but also the playful exercise of "the higher psychic grounds of perception," especially "the subjective activity of inner imitation as such," which gives us the joyful "feeling of being a cause"; — aesthetic enjoyment arising thus both from the exercise of the sensory and other faculties, and from the nature of what is sensed or

[17] *Play of Animals*, pp. 292/5.
[18] *Play of Man*, p. 390.

imitated.[19] With regard to artistic production, he declares that, especially in highly developed art, it is further removed from play than is aesthetic enjoyment (p. 393), but that the relatedness of artistic production to play becomes more and more conspicuous as we approach the springs of art (p. 394). In the child's artistic efforts, for instance, enjoyment of his own productive activity predominates over the idea of making an impression on others; and although highly developed art transcends the sphere of play, yet "it too is rooted in playful experimentation and imitation," which, indeed, "is present in all creative activity, gilding earnest work with a sportive glitter." This it is which gives to artistic production the enjoyable character which distinguishes it from ordinary toil (p. 394/5).

§ 5

Play is autotelic, Work ectotelic, and Art endotelic. Groos' theory of play is obviously more adequate than the Schiller-Spencer theory, or the imitation and recreation theories, and it is, I think, sound in essentials. But it does not seem to me that Groos has succeeded any better than Spencer in showing that art is to be regarded as the *play* of the higher faculties.

If, biologically considered, play is what Groos maintains, namely, the agency through which crude powers are developed and prepared for life's uses, then it seems impossible to regard either artistic production or aesthetic contemplation as play. No one would maintain that the art of singing, for instance, is a playful exercise of the voice, preparing it to be used perhaps in calling for help more loudly when dangers arise; and in the case of most other arts, — piano or violin playing, for instance, or painting, — it would be still more difficult to suggest even such an

[19] *Play of Man*, p. 391.

absurdly far-fetched biological utility to either the performer or his public. The most plausible instance that could be adduced of an art closely similar in externals to an activity that constitutes play as biologically defined by Groos, would probably be the art of acting; and the capacity to act a part does have biological and social utility in deceiving enemies, rivals, or prey. Yet no one could seriously maintain that what the actor, or the novelist, or in general the practitioner of a representative art, is engaged in, can be described as the developing and preparing for life's uses, of his crude natural powers of lying! Thus, art is not biologically, like play, practice or rehearsal of anything. Moreover, art-production, and aesthetic contemplation, are, like work, serious activities, while play and amusements are not, but only at times intent and absorbing. Again, as already mentioned, art is essentially creative, while play is not; and the experimentation which Groos mentions as present in all creative activity is not, as he terms it, playful, but on the contrary earnest. It is enjoyed, but is not engaged in with the view of enjoying oneself, as games are. It is engaged in for the sake of creating something, i.e., it has an end, and the creating of it is regarded as something that one *must* do, — it is a real end, not, as in play, a trumpery one. The obligation to attain it, however, is not as in work external and conditional, but internal to art, and categorical. Art, as thus *containing* a real end, is not autotelic but *endotelic;* whereas work is properly termed *ectotelic* (or heterotelic). The obligation of art is a categorical imperative, uttered, as it were, to ourselves by ourselves. It is the obligation imposed by the laws of one's inward being, to give birth to that which one bears darkly in oneself. From play, however, this character of obligation is wholly absent. Playing chess, for instance, so long as it is play, could not be de-

scribed as a means to the mating of the opponent's king; nor is any obligation to attempt it felt. Play, as already stated above, is only the enjoyed systematic pursuit of an end set up or accepted expressly for the purpose.[20]

Between art and work, moreover, there is also this difference: In work the particular nature of the end to which the work is (or is believed to be) the means, is clearly known beforehand. In art, on the contrary, the particular nature of that which one is in process of creating is clearly known only after it is created. Therefore, whereas work can be described as successful or unsuccessful in the sense that the product of it does or does not copy the particular antecedently conceived desired end; art, on the other hand, can be spoken of as successful or unsuccessful only in the different sense that its product is or is not such as to reimpart in contemplation the same subjective state from which it sprang, and of which that product is not at all a copy in a material denser than images, but an objectification, no matter whether in image or in sensation-material.[21] In other words, in work, what occurs is the creating of a real *object* copying a desired and merely imagined *object*. But in art what occurs is the creating of an object, whether real or imaginal, and of a nature not antecedently known,

[20] Cf. Henri Delacroix, *Psychologie de l'Art:*
"The true difference [between play and art] is elsewhere. Play is almost indifferent to its material. It does not attempt to make of it anything beyond the momentary signification which it confers upon it. The player uses his playthings only as means to reach his ends, as symbols on which to hook up his intentions. The intrinsic nature of his objects matters little to him; it is enough that they be transfigured by the action and the theme of the play" (p. 44); and also: "Play has disclosed itself to us as an activity exercising itself outside the constraint of reality and which creates, according to the interests and the mental level of the player, the themes and the objects necessary to its exercise" (p. 42).

[21] As already noted Croce correctly perceives that the copying in perceptual stuff of something already existing in image stuff is not art. His error, as it seems to me, is in not recognizing that art may and often does create as *directly* in perceptual stuff as in image stuff.

which in a unique way corresponds *to something that was not an object at all,* viz., to a feeling.

In bringing to an end these remarks with regard to the mutual relations of play, art, and work, it may further be noted with regard to play that, especially in the plays of youth, the biological function of play is doubtless what Groos asserts, namely, to prepare, educate, or develop the powers involved. But in other cases, such as many of the plays of adults, the biological function of play is rather to be thought of as the keeping from atrophy of powers already developed; and in other cases yet, as that of harmlessly sublimating surplus energy. This, however, does not necessarily imply (although it admits as a possibility more or less often realized) that in such cases the pressure of accumulated surplus energy itself occasions the play; nor does it imply that the surplus energy expended was stored up in the particular organs used in the play. Fitness of a given organ to function, and surplus of energy in the organism as a whole, seem to be rather distinct things. It is worth noting also that it is not of the essence of play not to be directly productive of valuable external results. A useful activity in which one has attained considerable virtuosity may come to be engaged in independently of the fact that its result possesses utility. That is, it may be engaged in for the fun of it, — with the mere pleasure of the performance as end, — and thus be play, although useful. Thus, we hear it said that some expert surgeons at times remove appendices for the pleasure of the operation, i.e., in play. Supposing this true, the possibility that the appendix in a given such case really needed to be removed, so that the surgeon's act in that case turned out to have a directly useful objective result, would not rob that act of its character of play from his standpoint.

Lastly, in addition to work, play and art, mention must

also be made of activities which are carried on automatically, and to which the teleological categories of means and end are inapplicable. Such activities may therefore be called *atelic*. Automatic activities are the reflex, instinctive, and habitual activities, such as swallowing, breathing, undressing, shifting one's position in a chair, scratching oneself, and many others. Such activities, when truly describable as automatic, take place without conscious attention either to them or to their results, and therefore cannot be characterized either as means or as ends, from the standpoint of the performer of them at the time. Automatic activities of some sorts may well, as Groos contends, be preliminary to play, but they themselves are not properly called play.

CHAPTER VIII

WHAT IS ART? THE ANSWER PROPOSED

The preceding chapters have been to a considerable extent critical and controversial in character. They nevertheless constitute an indispensable part of the formulation of the philosophy of art to which the present volume is dedicated, serving as they do partly to state it positively; partly to show the existing doctrines upon which it leans or from which it borrows; partly to contrast it with other doctrines with which it has more or less superficial or accidental resemblances; and partly to clear out of its way various doctrines, or portions of them, which seem to me in some cases simply false and in others possibly true but irrelevant.

The point has now been reached, however, where the essential features of the answer which the present work proposes to the question, What is Art? must be stated in positive terms, and as clearly and explicitly as possible. To do this is the aim of the present chapter; and in those following it, various important questions which in one way or another connect themselves closely with the doctrine here advocated, will be considered and discussed in detail.

§ 1

Art in general; Endotelic art; Aesthetic art. Art, in the broadest sense of the term, is activity which is consciously so controlled as to produce a result satisfying some speci-

fied condition. On the basis of the classification of telic activities made in the last chapter, we may divide art as so defined into *ectotelic* art (the utilitarian arts, — skilled work, or engineering in the widest sense), *autotelic* art (skill in games and play), and *endotelic* art (skilled self-objectification), of which "art" in the most common sense of the term (and that with which this volume is essentially concerned), is one species.

Endotelic art resembles play in that the end aimed at is not imposed from without, as in work, but is imposed by oneself. In play, however, the ostensible end which one adopts or sets to oneself, is not really valued; its true status is that of a means to or condition of the pleasure of pursuit, which is what is really wanted or valued. Play is thus an activity, *telic in form only,* which is performed for its own sake. In this sense it may properly be called autotelic activity. Endotelic art differs from play in that the self-imposed end which it aims at is really wanted; it is not trumped up for the pleasure of pursuing it but is considered as something that *ought* to be achieved. In this respect, endotelic art resembles work; but it differs from work in that the "ought" of work is conditional, imposed from without, whereas the "ought" of endotelic art is categorical, imposed by the artist's own being; or, as we may therefore say, endotelic art is a free activity, and work as such and directly, is not.

The end which endotelic art seeks, is objectification of the artist's self, i.e., of his feelings, meanings, or volitions. The art which is endotelic may then be said to consist in *conscious or critically controlled objectification of self;* or, equivalently, in *consciously objective self-expression.* Endotelic art then is of three sorts, according as what it seeks to objectify is feeling, meaning, or will. *Aesthetic art,* which is what usually is referred to when the word Art

is used without qualification, is the conscious objectification of one's feelings. As distinguished from it, the conscious objectification of one's meanings, usually in words, may be called *lectical art;* and the conscious objectification of one's volitions, *heuretic art.* Something will be said in a later section of this chapter concerning these last two species of endotelic art, and the reasons for designating them by the above names. Since the present work will not deal with them further than that, the reader need not fear that this multiplication of technical terms will burden the text of the remaining chapters.

§ 2

Meaning of "objectification." The definition of endotelic art in general, given above, is highly compact, and, to make its meaning fully clear it is necessary to consider next some of the terms that enter into it. After that, we shall limit our discussion to the one species of endotelic art with which we are essentially concerned in these pages, namely, aesthetic art.

The first thing that needs to be made clear is the meaning attached in the definition of endotelic art to the words Objectification, or Objective Expression. They are not intended to imply that the feeling, meaning, or volition which is expressed is necessarily expressed in perceptual material, i.e., in material rendering observation by others than the artist possible. Objectification, indeed, is usually partially at least in perceptual stuff, but it might take place wholly in image-stuff, and thus remain private to the artist. The limitations of image-stuff as medium of expression have already been pointed out; they are empirical only. Theoretically, therefore, image-stuff is possible stuff for any expression. This is recalled at this point only to

make clear that objectivity does not necessarily mean perceptual objectivity.

What is meant here by speaking of objectification, or of expression as objective, is that the act of expression is (in such a case) creative of something (1) capable of being contemplated by the artist at least, and (2) such that *in contemplation that thing yields back to him the feeling, meaning, or volition of which it was the attempted expression.* Thus, one would be said to have objectified or expressed objectively one's meaning if, in reading the words which one wrote, one obtains back from them the very meaning which one attempted to express, so that one is then able to say, "Yes, that is exactly what I meant." If on the contrary one finds oneself forced to say in reading or listening to one's own words: "No, this is not just what I meant," then one's attempt to objectify one's meaning has failed. Such an unsuccessful attempt constitutes expression only in the subjective sense of the term. That is, although it may rid us, at least for the time being, of the impulse to express our given meaning, it does not rid us of it by objectifying it. But as noted in an earlier chapter, unsuccessful attempts at objective self-expression cannot be distinguished from successful by the way they feel at the time, but only by contemplating their products and noting whether or not the latter mirror back to us accurately what we attempted to express. It should be noted, however, that this obtaining back from the object created, of what we tried to express, is *only the proof* of the success of the attempt at objective expression. It is not an end, other than objective self-expression, to which the object is intended as means and for the sake of which it is created. Or, if it is that, then our creative activity was essentially not endotelic art, but ectotelic, viz., skilled work, as when we construct a physical mirror to the end of examining ourselves.

However, even in cases where the attempt at objective self-expression is, upon contemplation of its product, judged to have been wholly successful, one might question whether the feeling, meaning, or volition reflected to us in such contemplation can be said to be truly *the same* as that which originally we had to express. As to this, it must of course be admitted that something happens as a result of objectification. But what happens is not a change in the intrinsic nature — in the "what" — of the feeling, meaning, or volition; it is only a gain in the clearness or the steadiness with which we experience or live it. Unless qualitative identity were preserved in the process of clarification, (described in detail in § 7 of ch. IV), there would be nothing of which we could say that *it* has been clarified. Ever since the early days of Greek philosophy, it has been recognized that if anything is to be described as a change, and not as an outright substitution, something must remain identical through the process.

§ 3

In what sense objectification is conscious. Acts of self-expression are blind and irresponsible whenever they have not been rehearsed, that is to say, whenever the expression is of something original, new, not expressed before. Although one's every feeling, thought, or volition is somewhat like some other or others, yet it is usually also somewhat different from others, and to that extent new. To that extent the expression of it is therefore blind. Such blind self-expression might nevertheless possess objectivity in the sense of that term specified above, but even then it would not yet constitute art, for it is of the essence of art to be not blind like automatic action, but conscious and responsible. That is, art is not merely self-expression, nor

even merely objective self-expression, but *consciously* objective self-expression; its product must not only be capable of passing the test of objectivity described, but must have actually passed it. This means that art can objectify the new only by a process of "trial and error," or more accurately, of trial and criticism, and if need be, correction. There may very well be, and often there is, but a single trial, completely successful by itself. But whether there be but one, or more than one, every trial at the moment it occurs is itself blind as to whether or not it has achieved objectivity of expression. Consciousness of this has to be gained, and is gained immediately afterwards, by contemplation of the product of the trial, and critical judgment of it, i.e., judgment either that it does, or does not, truly mirror back the inner state to which we wished to give expression. To say that the objective self-expression which is (endotelic) art, is conscious, — or, which is the same thing, that the self-expression which is (endotelic) art is expression critically controlled in such manner as to achieve objectivity, — therefore does not mean that it need be conscious or so controlled either antecedently to or contemporaneously with the expressive act. Only rehearsal would make this possible. But it does mean that *a critical judgment is an intrinsic, essential constituent of the productive activity called art;* and indeed, not merely a critical judgment, but a *favorable* one. That is to say, the art has failed, — there has been not skill but rather blundering, — unless one has not merely judged the product of one's activity in respect to its objectivity, but judged it actually to have attained to objectivity. One must be able to acknowledge the product as an adequate statement of oneself.

The activity in which a new feeling, meaning, or volition expresses itself proceeds from an impulse which at the

moment is blind, and as such cannot strictly be said to be *aiming* at anything, but only manifesting itself. It is therefore only in terms of the later observation of the sort of product which it tends to have, that it is describable as impulse to self-objectification. Thus, the telic character, which truly belongs to art since a critical moment is an intrinsic part of it, may be said to accrue to the expressive activity which is its first moment, *ex post facto*. That activity is telically construed and criticized, *after* it has occurred. And the work of art is not the product of that activity simply, but of that activity telically construed and criticized, and if need be repeated until correction of the product results, i.e., until objectivity of the expression is obtained.

§ 4

Correction of the product of attempted objectification, vs. correction of the self first objectified. The process of correction (if any) which culminates in the acknowledgment of the product as adequate statement of oneself is, however, susceptible of two different interpretations. It may mean that the earlier attempt at objective self-expression was not completely successful; but it may also mean that it was a successful objectification of a self which, when it confronted us clearly, we disowned and repudiated in favor of another, namely, of the self which found adequate objectification in the "corrected" product, — the product being then better describable as objectification of a corrected self.

§ 5

Two things which objectification makes possible. This observation points to two functions which (endotelic) art may discharge more or less automatically in the life of the

artist as an individual, and as a member of society. Such art, which as we have just seen is an "official," i.e., an acknowledged objective registering of oneself, is at the same time self-exhibition, to oneself primarily, and usually to others also. This self-exhibition to oneself makes possible the self-editing just mentioned. Art holds a mirror to the self, and with it therefore comes the possibility of emendation of the appearance of that self, whether by real change or by spiritual *maquillage* — and possibly the mere *maquillage* may there be the very means of real change. For one tends to live up to what one has officially declared oneself to be. That which originally was a part to be played may become one's true nature; for a part which is played thoroughly, consistently, and spontaneously owing to ingrained habit, is a part no longer. It has been said that shams are the illegitimate offspring of idealism; but the illegitimacy belongs only to the shams that are not thorough enough. Man, it may be said, is the being for whom to be natural is to play a part. However, what once was a living up to the best part he could think of, may in time come to constitute a living down to a part which is no longer that, and to which he is kept by habit or by the "foolish consistency" which Emerson condemns. A book which, when written, constituted a high-water mark up to which the author then endeavored to maintain his thought, may in the course of time turn into a tight seal which henceforth keeps his mental tide from mounting higher.

In registering us objectively, art may and usually does reveal us not only to ourselves but also to others; and then attracts or repels them according both to the sort of self it displays to them, and to the sorts of selves that they themselves are. As pointed out in connection with the discussion of Dr. Marshall's view of the social function of art in an earlier chapter, that function is guidance

in certain relations with our fellow-man; for instance, recognition of those belonging to one's own inner kind, and to inner kinds not one's own; and effecting the cohesion of the potentially coherent, and, no less, the dishesion of the latently disherent.

§ 6

In what sense ulterior ends may coexist with endotelic art-creation. The endotelic character of the activity which has been described as conscious objectification of self, involves, as we have seen, that it is a free or autonomous activity. This autonomy of endotelic art does not, however, exclude the possibility that ulterior purposes should be at the same time served by it. What it forbids is that such ulterior purposes should govern, or even have any voice in, the critical process mentioned above as constituting an intrinsic part of art-creation. The fact is often brought forward that many lyrical poems, for instance, have actually been composed to win the favor of a lady. One may, however, seek to win the favor of a lady by revealing to her one's inmost self, such as it may be; or, on the other hand, by displaying to her such a self as one thinks she will like, pretending it to be one's own.

In the first case, the composing of the poem that bares one's soul is (aesthetic) art. It is an autonomous activity, in the sense that the only consideration in the light of which the critical process involved is exercised, is that of the adequacy with which what was done objectifies *oneself*. That is, such corrections as may be made, are made not so that the product may objectify something more adequate to the end of winning the lady, but so that it may more adequately objectify that which is *oneself*. The burden of winning the lady is left to the nature and quality of that

self, such as it is; and the concern of art in the whole affair is only to reveal it truly. The art-activity even here determines and contains within itself its own end, and is responsible only to itself. Such ulterior purposes as its product may then be turned to, remain irrelevant to that activity. The man as a whole may have such ulterior purposes, but the man as artist has not.

In the second case, on the other hand, where verses are written displaying whatever sort of self one thinks the lady will like, — which self one passes off as one's own, — what we have is not aesthetic nor even endotelic art at all. It is only beautiful lying skilfully adapted to the end of seduction. It is angling with spiritual bait, amatory engineering, i.e., an instance of ectotelic art, skilled work.

§ 7

Lectical art. Of the two species of endotelic art other than aesthetic, viz., lectical and heuretic art, only enough need be said here to sharpen by contrast the conception of aesthetic art already formulated. The language of meaning has already been discussed at some length in earlier chapters. Although words are not the only sort of material that it uses, they are the principal and most adequate; and for this reason the term *lectical* is here proposed to designate the species of endotelic art concerned with the objective expression of meanings. The term "logical," which naturally suggests itself for this, is already in common use in a somewhat different sense, from which it cannot be wrenched. Lectical art would be what Véron proposed to call "prose," giving to that term the very broad sense in which "prose" would be contrasted with all aesthetic art, — the latter being designated "poetry" in an equally broad sense.

§ 8

Heuretic art. Heuretic art is the conscious objectification of will, and is so designated because that is what *invention* essentially consists in. This becomes evident when the meaning given to the term Objectification is recalled. To objectify a volition is not to carry it out in action, but to create a state of affairs in the contemplation of which that volition is reflected back, reimparted to one. The volition which is actually carried out in such creation is another, namely, the volition to objectify the given volition. The mere will-to-objectify-consciously is what we may call the (endotelic) art-impulse in general, and it is present not only or peculiarly in heuretic art, but equally in aesthetic and lectical art. Thus without some other and particular volition as content to be objectified, the general will-to-objectify would in heuretic art remain barrenly general, and futile. It would have nothing in particular to objectify and could not manifest itself at all.

The product of the conscious objectification of a volition, i.e., the product of the inventive process, is what we commonly call an instrument, which may be a tool, an institution, an organization, etc. Inventing is means-creating, made an end; and it is a very different thing from means-using. For the heuretic artist, i.e., for the inventor as such, the putting of his invention to work is not the beginning of the reaping of something which he wanted, and to which he devised the means, but only the final step in the construction of the invention. It is not a using of the invention but only a testing of it.

To make clearer the fact that conscious objectification of a volition consists in invention, i.e., in instrument-creation, reference may be made to Schopenhauer's state-

ment that the steer does not butt because it has horns, but has horns because it (unconsciously) wills to butt. The horns, according to his view, would thus be describable as the (unconscious) objectification of the will-to-butt. Because of the unconscious character of the objectification of the assumed will-to-butt, there is here of course no question of art; but if we consider instead the inventing of something, for instance, of the telephone, then conscious control of the process is present throughout, and we have therefore a true case of heuretic art, for the telephone can evidently be correctly described as the consciously achieved objectification by its inventor, of the will-to-speak-far. Thus, to objectify (as distinguished from carrying out) a volition, is to create the means or possibility of its being carried out. The volition which the inventing of the telephone actually *carried out* was not the volition-to-speak-far, but the volition-that-it-be-possible-to-speak-far.

According to the definition of objectification formulated, the test of success of any attempt to objectify a volition would be the fact of its product being such as to reflect back or reimpart in contemplation the volition which one attempted to objectify. In a later chapter it will be shown that the state called Contemplation is to one's capacity for feeling, for meaning, or for willing, essentially what listening is to one's capacity for hearing. The contemplation of a work of heuretic art may thus be described as a "listening" to it with one's capacity for willing, — a throwing open of one's will to such invitations as may come to it from the object. Now, an instrument constitutes just such a (determinate) invitation to the will; it is a temptation to do a particular sort of willing. Contemplation of an instrument considered as product of heuretic art (and not as aesthetic object) therefore consists in "listening" for

the characteristic temptation which it constitutes and obeying it, that is to say *trying out* the instrument, whether in imagination only, or actually. If the sort of thing which we find ourselves thus induced to do, is exactly the sort of thing which we had willed that it should become possible to do, then we say that our creative attempt has been successful.

By way of *a posteriori* confirmation of the correctness of the foregoing analyses of the three species of endotelic art, attention may be called to the kinship which common sense recognizes between the artist in the ordinary sense of the term, the writer, and the inventive thinker. They represent three species of the same queer genus, which the "practical," i.e., the ectotelic man, finds equally impossible to understand.

§ 9

Aesthetic art. The conscious objectification of one's feelings was designated above, *aesthetic art.* The reason for not calling it "fine art," is the implication which this term carries that the art so referred to is an activity essentially concerned with the production of something beautiful. That this is a fundamentally false and a pernicious view of the nature of Art, has already been argued in an earlier chapter. Any activity of which the deliberate aim is to produce something beautiful, is ectotelic art, i.e., skilled work. It is exactly analogous to the activity of the confectioner, for instance.

The definition of aesthetic art given is wholly independent of the notion of beauty, and the term Aesthetic Art itself, at least as a matter of etymology, is free from any implication of beauty, since it means simply art the prod-

ucts of which are things to be perceived.[1] A word which in itself might have been better than "aesthetic art" to designate the art which objectifies feeling, would be "pathematic art," but owing to the fact that the denotation of the term "aesthetic art" is likely to be obvious to everybody without recourse to a dictionary, it is probably the best term to use.

The word "aesthetic" to-day is ambiguous. Sometimes it is used in its etymological sense of "perceptible," or having to do with perception; for instance, in the title "Transcendental Aesthetic" given by Kant to the first part of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is also used to designate several more or less distinct sorts of inquiries, such as the philosophy of art and of beauty; empirical investigations of the characters possessed by the things judged beautiful by certain persons (e.g., statistical investigations of color-preferences, of preferred proportions in rectangles, etc.); and also, art-criticism. The term Aesthetic is also loosely used as more or less synonymous with Beautiful. And again it is used by some as an adjective intended to differentiate feelings obtained in the contemplation of things which are meant to be *mere designs*, from feelings obtained in the contemplation of other things, such as dramatic entities (so that a drama could not then, by definition, be an aesthetic object or a source of aesthetic feelings!).

Since there is thus no one firmly established sense in which the word Aesthetic is used in the language of the plain man, I feel not only free to use my own discretion in defining it, but also called upon to say explicitly in what sense the word is employed throughout the present

[1] Lalo's proposal to make aesthetic mean beautiful; inaesthetic, ugly; and anaesthetic, neutral, i.e., neither beautiful nor ugly, has to recommend it neither etymology nor necessity since we have already the three unambiguous and perfectly good words, Beautiful, Ugly, and Neutral.

volume. The word *Aesthetic,* then, in these pages, is used to mean, *having to do with feelings obtained through contemplation.* This departs from the etymological sense, and the word Pathematic would have been better in this respect, involving as it does a reference to feeling, although not to contemplation. But it seemed advisable to keep the word Aesthetic, and the sense assigned to it above does not radically depart from the ways in which it is actually used. Rather, I think, it mediates between them, being related as it is to a comprehensive and definite philosophy of art, instead of, as usually, to a fragmentary and more or less indefinite one.

Since works of aesthetic art, in spite of the essential independence of art from beauty, nevertheless usually have more or less of beauty, a brief statement of what beauty is (if the doctrine of the present work is correct), may be introduced here parenthetically to indicate in a general way what relation beauty has, and does not have, to aesthetic art. Any object is to be called beautiful when, or in so far as, the feelings which one obtains in the aesthetic contemplation of it are pleasurable feelings. A beautiful object therefore may be, but need not be, a work of art; and a work of art may be, but need not be, beautiful. Beauty, being purely a matter of the sort of feeling that an object gives us in contemplation, remains wholly independent of the manner (whether artificial or natural) in which the object itself came into existence. On the other hand, a work of aesthetic art, being simply the consciously achieved objectification of a feeling, will not be beautiful unless the feeling objectified in it and reflected by it in contemplation, is a pleasurable feeling. There are, however, reasons which will be stated farther on, why objects that are works of aesthetic art are more likely to be beautiful than ugly or neutral.

§ 10

The definition of Aesthetic Art proposed differentiates it from cases of expression which are not art; and also from skilled work. From this point on, we shall be concerned only with aesthetic art, and we may therefore agree for convenience and in conformity with ordinary usage, to employ simply the word Art whenever aesthetic art is meant, unless special notice is given that this convention is for the time being departed from.

Various questions to which the philosophy of art outlined in the present chapter gives rise, will be dealt with in the chapters to follow. Here it remains to show that the definition of (aesthetic) art proposed does apply to whatever is acknowledgedly so called, and at the same time excludes various things which in spite of certain likenesses to art nevertheless are not art. It may be pointed out in the first place that the definition given distinguishes expressions of feeling which are art from those which, like yawning, laughing, stretching, etc., are not art. The character which truly distinguishes art from such other expressions of feeling is the critical control in respect to objectivity, which is an intrinsic part of art; and not (for reasons already stated) the deliberate intention to infect others with feeling, proposed as specific difference by Tolstoi. As to Croce's proposed *differentia* for the expression which is art, viz., being "aesthetic" as distinguished from "naturalistic," it is useless because virtually but verbal. That is, it does little except give a name to the distinction sought, since the terms "spiritual" and "active" by which he further describes the sort of expression which is "aesthetic," are themselves left far too ambiguous and vague to separate clearly the "aesthetic" sheep of expression from its "naturalistic" goats.

Critical control, again, is what distinguishes art from expressions of feeling which achieve objectivity but do so unconsciously. There are probably, for instance, cases where a feeling is expressed spontaneously and naturally in an action, and where the action at the same time happens to constitute as objective an expression of the feeling as it could if it were not action but acting. However, because no critical control is involved in such cases, they do not constitute art. Still farther, of course, are we from having art in the much more numerous cases where the spontaneous, natural expression of feeling does not have objectivity as defined above.

It is to be noted also that a work of art would not be sufficiently characterized as an artificial thing embodying a feeling. That the creative process shall be critically controlled *in the particular manner described,* viz., so that it shall exactly objectify the creator's feeling, is a specification necessary to rule out processes by which an object embodying a feeling is created, but which do not constitute art. An instance of such would be the technical processes of color-photography, printing, and so on, by which are produced accurate copies of original paintings. The critical control involved in such processes is directed not as in aesthetic art to the end that the thing created shall adequately objectify the creator's feeling, but to the end that it shall discharge as effectively as possible the function of substitute for an already existing object, namely, the original. If the copy is faithful, it will indeed constitute an embodiment of the same feeling as the original; but the process which brought the copy into existence is nevertheless not to be called aesthetic art, for it does not constitute an attempt by the performer to objectify a feeling present in himself. He is not expressing a feeling but copying an object, whether mechanically or

otherwise; and he need never have himself so much as experienced the feeling which is objective in the product of his work. What we have in such a case is only skilled work, — ectotelic art.

§ 11

Expression of meanings or ideas is no part of aesthetic art. A certain doubt might well arise when the essence of aesthetic art is declared to consist in conscious objectification of feeling, — the doubt, namely, whether this is indeed the whole of what art does, or whether on the contrary it does not also express meanings, thoughts. That art does this also, seems at first obviously to be the case; but on closer examination the truth I think is perceived to be that not all feelings by far can be objectified in exclusively perceptual stuff; that is to say, the range of feelings that can be expressed in pure design, which makes no use of representation but directly presents to perception the whole aesthetic object, is extremely limited. The entities which objectify most of the feelings that human beings experience and desire to express in art, are entities that cannot be presented directly, but only indirectly, that is to say, represented. For instance, most of the feelings with which the drama deals can be expressed only in an object consisting of some scheme of human relationships; and these are not to any considerable extent directly perceptual entities. Such things as human relationships can be presented to consciousness only by being thought, meant, signified through some perceptual fact (such as words, raiment, etc.). The objectification, let us say in words, of a particular scheme of human relationships meant, is not performed with objectification of meaning as its essential end, but as a means to the objectification *of feelings* not embodiable otherwise than in an object con-

sisting of human relationships. We have therefore here to distinguish clearly between the objectification of feeling in or by the scheme of human relationships meant, and the objectification of the latter in words, which mean it and at the same time lend it the permanence and exactness which can be borrowed from perceptual stuff. The artist sets up before consciousness the object which expresses his feelings, by whatever devices he needs in the particular case, e.g., by meaning that object, representing it, if it is not one capable of direct perceptual presentation. But such presence of representation within the work of art leaves wholly untouched the radical difference between objectification of meaning in perceptual or imaginal stuff, e.g., words; and objectification of feeling in the object or situation which the words mean.

§ 12

The feeling which an elaborate work of art finally objectifies is not usually present ab initio; *but develops step by step.* There is another matter concerning which misunderstanding might arise when a work of art is characterized as the objective expression of a feeling. This might be taken to imply that the rich and highly determinate feeling which contemplation of an elaborate completed work of art reveals as embodied therein was present in its fullness from the very outset in the artist. But as already pointed out, the presence there *ab initio* of the feeling that the work finally objectifies is on the contrary likely to be a fact only in simple, elementary expressions of feeling. The usual state of affairs is rather that the feeling which the work of art finally comes to embody is born in the artist only gradually, its growth preceding by but little the process of its objectification. What generally is present in

the artist at the outset is a feeling which, in its relation to the feeling which the finished elaborate work will embody, may be characterized both as germinal and as general. It is the *germ* out of which gradually grows the feeling finally embodied, — the steps in its growth following contemplation of the object already created at any given moment. The original feeling is at the same time *general* in the sense that it provides a test of the relevance of the multifarious other feelings which, as the artist works, crowd into his consciousness and clamor for expression; the original feeling thus being, in relation to the later ones, analogous in function to a framework or rough sketch, into which the later must either fit or be ruled out. As already insisted upon in an earlier passage where this step-by-step process was described, it does not essentially belong to the nature of the art-creative activity. It only constitutes the history of the psychological genesis of the feeling which certain works of art, (viz., complicated, elaborate ones), objectify when they are called finished. The art-creative act, whether it be one of a series or not, and whether it be itself performed not at one stroke but in several, (i.e., with correcting strokes), nevertheless always consists in an attempt to express objectively such feeling as exists at the time; and the act is complete when this is judged to have been done adequately.

There are exceptional cases on record, where, in highly gifted artists, even the feeling which a completed elaborate work of art objectifies appears to have been present in its fullness and vigor at the very start. For instance there is the case referred to by Stewart,[2] of a girl, a talented musician, who speaks of an "absolute music," "music in her head," "music with a sound which she cannot quite hear," music which it often "annoys her to have to embody

[2] *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, Oxford U. Press, pp. 152 ff.

(so imperfectly!) in the actual sounds of voice or instrument." Or again, the case of Mozart: "The piece, he tells us, came to him as a whole, often in bed, or when he was walking. It articulated itself in his head, till he 'heard' it, not as a succession of sounds, but, as it were, 'all together' " (p. 153). This, so far as the description permits of judging, might be either the feeling that the piece as a whole embodies as eventually played; or else perhaps an adequate objectification of that feeling purely in imagined terms, and of which the actual playing would then be in this particular case for Mozart, mere copying.

§ 13

Interpretative and autogenous art; pure, and decorative or applied art. Something must be said, lastly, concerning certain possible, although not very important distinctions within aesthetic art, namely, between interpretative and what may be called autogenous art; and between pure and applied or decorative art.

Interpretative art consists in objectification of a feeling which we previously extracted by means of aesthetic contemplation from a work of art or a natural object that embodied it. Art, the feeling objectified by which was not so obtained, may be termed autogenous. Art of both of these sorts is equally creative; and one cannot be said to be intrinsically more meritorious or praiseworthy than the other. Moreover, a given work of art can seldom be said to be a case of one to the entire exclusion of the other.

A typical example of interpretative art, already mentioned in a different connection, would be the playing of a musical composition not our own but already known to us. The first reading of it, however (whether on an instrument or purely in auditory images) would not constitute art

because it would not be expression at all, but its very inverse, namely, impression, i.e., the extracting from the score of the feeling it embodies. But when this feeling has been obtained by us, and made our own, we may then proceed to express it for ourselves; just as when we have read a page of a book and gathered such meaning as it has for us, we may then proceed to express it for ourselves. The result constitutes what is properly called our interpretation of its meaning. Interpreting is thus something wholly distinct from copying, whether of an author's work or of a composer's music.

Other instances of typically interpretative art would be landscape painting and in general painting "from a model"; acting; the dance; in literature, character delineation more or less from observations; etc. All this, in so far as it is truly art, is also obviously quite another sort of process than copying. Copying may *enter into* the process, i.e., be used here and there as a *means of creating* the objectification of what we feel, if we find that nature has already partially done it for us. But this only means that the artist has the utmost freedom as regards the processes by which he brings into existence the object which embodies his feeling. That process may be direct, as when creation is wholly in image-stuff (directness, incidentally, not in the least implying automatic success); or it may be very indirect. That is a matter of no theoretical importance. For this reason, a painter may perfectly well without ceasing to be genuinely an artist, use photographs, or an air-brush, or a pantograph, or even a whisk-broom if he wants to. Any restrictions in this respect would merely turn the whole matter into a form of sport, i.e., into play, which by means of arbitrary rules, puts the emphasis upon the exercise of skill of some sort for the sake of the enjoyment found therein, instead of upon the

success of the product in objectifying the artist's feeling. On the other hand, a man who with the most orthodox paints and brushes were to set himself the task of simply copying the landscape in front of him with the utmost accuracy, — and succeeded in doing it, — would be not an artist at all, but only a walking and breathing camera.

The other distinction to be considered here, namely, that between pure and applied or decorative art, may be stated as follows: In decorative art, the raw material in which the expressive process is carried out, consists of an object already having some practical function. That is, it consists of an object intended primarily to be used, and only incidentally to be contemplated. The use to which the object is to be put requires in it certain characteristics of shape, size, weight, material, or what not, which limit the scope of freedom of the art that takes it as raw material, but at the same time provide that art with a clear opportunity. Pure art, on the other hand, is art which, eschewing such association with things of practical use, procures for itself the maximum of freedom — thereby, however, taking upon itself the maximum of responsibility. A statue, for instance, unless it be intended to function perhaps as a memorial, would thus usually be a work of pure art. But book-ends, or a paper-weight, are objects of practical utility that a sculptor may well take as raw material for a statuette, which will then be termed a work of decorative art. Although the scope within which that sculptor's freedom could exercise itself in this case will have been restricted by certain requirements of size, stability, etc., imposed by the practical function of the object, the creating of the statuette will not on this account be any the less truly art. There is thus no warrant for regarding decorative art, when it is really art, i.e., self-expression by its creator (and not mere "embellishment," which is only skilled

work), as in any way inferior in merit or dignity to pure art. To make this evident, one need only mention the extraordinary achievements of Japanese decorative art, for instance, and compare them with the stuff that some of our devotees of pure art exhibit.

§ 14

Synoptic table of species of art. The classification of the varieties and subvarieties of art in general, set forth in the present chapter, may in conclusion be synoptically exhibited in the following table:



CHAPTER IX

THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE

In the last chapter, the contention was set forth that art essentially consists in consciously objective expression of feeling; and expression was defined as being objective when its product is such that, *in contemplation,* it reflects back accurately the feeling which was to be expressed. The notion of aesthetic contemplation being thus involved in the conception of art formulated, it is necessary to inquire next more particularly what aesthetic contemplation is.

§ 1

The receptive, effective, and judgmental attitudes. Three fundamental possible orientations, directions of interest, or attitudes in respect to any given object of attention may be distinguished, — the receptive, the effective or practical, and the judgmental. These three sorts of orientation may be discerned not only in the life of man as artist, but also in his life as a worker, as a playing being, and as a being carrying on various automatic activities. The characters differentiating from one another, play, art, work, and automatism, have been discussed in the last two chapters, and the conclusions reached summarily expressed in respect to the notion of telism, by describing automatic activities as such as atelic, play as autotelic, work as ectotelic, and art as endotelic. It is no part of the task of the present volume to discuss the forms under which the receptive, effective, and judgmental orientations appear in play,

in work, and in the automatic life; but only to consider the phenomena to which they give rise in the endotelic life.

§ 2

Art-creation is the effective aspect of the endotelic life; which, however, has also a judgmental aspect, viz., Criticism; and a receptive, viz., Contemplation. As to this, we must now note that art-creation is not the whole of endotelic life, but constitutes only its effective or practical aspect. Contemplation and Criticism are the other two aspects of it, corresponding to the receptive and the judgmental orientations in it. These three aspects of the endotelic life are not, indeed, mutually insulated. We have already seen that in art-creation, a contemplative and a critical moment are involved, although they are not there the central thing. Each, however, is capable of being made central: Contemplation is made central in the life of the "consumer" of works of art and other aesthetic objects; and Criticism, naturally, in the life of the critic, — the other two aspects in these cases, being not absent, but present as necessary means or conditions only, as were contemplation and criticism in art-creation.

The word Practical is somewhat ambiguous, and owing to this it may sound strange to hear the artist's activity referred to as practical. It is not practical in the sense of attempting to create something "useful"; but it is practical in the sense of *effective,* i.e., it produces effects in or upon things: the painter effects changes in the surface of his canvas, the sculptor in the shape of his marble, the musician in the audible environment, etc. This is so whether the stuff in which creation takes place be perceptual or purely imaginal stuff. But it is not so when one's orientation is, instead of the effective, the receptive or the

judgmental. Effectiveness, although, as stated, present then also, does not then consist in creativeness.

§ 3

Aesthetic contemplation is endotelic receptivity to feeling. In the light of the foregoing considerations, contemplation, or the contemplative attitude, may be defined as *the receptive orientation in the endotelic life.* But that to which one holds oneself receptive may, as we have seen, be either will-impulse, meaning, or feeling. Therefore *endotelic receptivity to feeling,* constitutes an accurate definition of what is called *aesthetic contemplation,* or the aesthetic attitude. That aesthetic contemplation actually has the endotelic character will be shown later on. It is enough here to point out that, like art-creation, it *contains* a true end, which is not as in play the mere pleasure of the process going on, nor, as in work, external and useful to something beyond.

Inasmuch as aesthetic contemplation alone is directly connected with aesthetic art, with which primarily we are here occupied, I shall from the present point on claim the privilege of using for short the single words Contemplation, Contemplative, etc., instead of the longer Aesthetic Contemplation, Aesthetically Contemplative, etc., whenever it is convenient, — giving on the contrary some special indication if occasion arises to use the word Contemplation in the generic or in one of its other two specific senses.

§ 4

Some empirical descriptions of aesthetic contemplation. From this brief outline of the setting of aesthetic contemplation in a theory of art in general, we may now pass to

an empirical examination of that much-discussed state. One of the best accounts of it in the classical literature is that given by Schopenhauer. Divested of technical terminology and of references to particular doctrines of that philosopher's system, it would read substantially as follows: If a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things, which is always ultimately concerned with their relations to desires and purposes; if he thus ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the *what;* if, further, he does not allow himself to think of them conceptually (e.g., as things to be recognized, distinguished, classified, etc.), but instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and so yields himself to the quiet contemplation of the object present that he loses himself in this object, — then his state is that of aesthetic contemplation, and the object of it is the aesthetic object.[1]

The following passage from Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*[2] is rather differently worded but is more or less to the same effect: "Throughout the whole range of sensations, perceptions, and emotions which we do not class as aesthetic, the states of consciousness serve simply as aids and stimuli to guidance and action. They are transitory, or if they persist in consciousness some time, they do not monopolize the attention: that which monopolizes the attention is something ulterior, to the effecting of which they are instrumental. But in the states of mind we class as aesthetic, the opposite attitude is maintained towards the sensations, perceptions, and emotions. These are no longer links in the chain of states which prompt and

[1] *The World as Will and Idea.* Trans. Haldane and Kemp, vol. I, p. 231.

[2] Vol. II, pp. 646/7.

guide conduct. Instead of being allowed to disappear with merely passing recognitions, they are kept in consciousness and dwelt upon."

A more recent writer, Vernon Lee,[3] effectively contrasts the contemplative attitude with the practical and the scientific by reporting an imaginary conversation between three persons on the top of a hill, one of whom dwells on the economic possibilities of what lies before them, and another on its geological and geographical aspects, while the third on the contrary is intent only on beholding it and letting its aesthetic aspect affect him as it may.

The contrast between contemplation and the ectotelic life is dwelt upon also in the following passage from a recent French work: [4] "Its essence is always to set aside useful signs, conventional appearances, all that masks the reality itself, in order to set before us the existence of the object of art, wholly concrete and nevertheless devoid of empirical existence." [5]

§ 5

Comments on the terminology of these descriptions. In the light of the careful distinctions made in this and earlier chapters and embodied in technical terms having exact meanings, it is obvious that such accounts as the foregoing, of the contrast between the contemplative, the practical, and the scientific attitudes, although essentially

[3] *The Beautiful,* Ch. II.

[4] H. Delacroix, *Psychologie de l'Art,* p. 67.

[5] The documents by which Professor Delacroix endeavors to support his contention that there are several varieties of aesthetic contemplation, seem to me to show only that the response of some people to works of art is not aesthetic contemplation but something else. For instance, he himself says that the enjoyment derived from reading novels is usually that of giving us the illusion of living through the adventures described. But obviously then, this enjoyment is that of vicarious adventure, which is no more aesthetic than the precisely similar pleasure of watching a football game, a thrilling rescue, or a dramatic escape. (loc. cit. p. 118.)

sound, nevertheless leave room for a good deal of confusion. This is largely owing to the ambiguity pointed out above, of the word Practical, which, as most commonly used, means having an end (usually economic), external to the process that seeks it, i.e., being what we have called Ectotelic; but which means also very properly, simply *Effective,*[6] without implication as to whether the effectiveness is connected with the ectotelic life, or with life of one of the other sorts distinguished. Owing to this ambiguity of the word Practical, we may agree here to use it as a rule for the more popular of the two senses, whenever the technical term Ectotelic would be merely pedantic; and to use the word Effective for the other sense whenever there might be any doubt as to what is meant if Practical were used.

If now, for the sake of theoretical precision, the reader will forgive a very brief indulgence in technical terminology, the "practical" man of Vernon Lee's account will have to be described as ectotelically judgmental, for as she represents him to us he is not *effecting* anything, but *judging* with reference to certain external (and economic) ends. The word "scientific," on the other hand, when used to describe an orientation contrasted with the effective and the receptive, means only *judgmental,* i.e., judgment-forming, cognitive, but it does not indicate that the judging activity has the endotelic character usually thought of when the "scientific interest" or "pure science" are spoken of, rather than the ectotelic character which on the contrary belongs to the judging activity of the engineer as such.

§ 6

Aesthetic contemplation is a "listening" with our capacity for feeling. Let us now pass to a direct empirical ex-

[6] The word Practical being from πράσσειν, to do, to effect.

amination of the state of aesthetic contemplation. It is, we may note first, a *throwing oneself open* to the advent of something, and in this respect it resembles the endeavor to understand. But whereas in the latter it is to the advent of meaning, that one throws oneself open, in aesthetic contemplation it is to the advent *of feeling.* What takes place is something analogous to listening. That is, the attention is withdrawn from everything other than the object of aesthetic contemplation, and inwardly the ground is cleared for the reception of the import of feeling of that object. This clearing of the ground means the elimination, as complete as possible, of any antecedent feeling. Aesthetic contemplation may thus be described as (*endotelic*) *"listening," or "looking," with our capacity for feeling.* The words "listening," or "looking," are of course figurative, but they are nevertheless perfectly accurate if only so much of their meaning is kept as remains after leaving out their special reference to the faculties of hearing and seeing and to impressions of sound and light. There is no general term in the language (other than the term Contemplation) to denote without special reference to kind of impression and kind of faculty, the attitude of *directed but contentless receptiveness;* but if the present explanation is kept in mind, the use of the word, "listening," to designate that attitude, is adequately descriptive without being misleading.

§ 7

Aesthetic contemplation is not attention, but presupposes it. To this account of the nature of aesthetic contemplation, it is, however, necessary to add that the "listening" with our capacity for feeling, is a "listening" *for,* not a "listening" *to.* That is, it is not to be confused with merely attending, for *it presupposes a content*

of attention, towards which it is that the aesthetic attitude is taken. It is *to* that content that our attention is directed, but it is *for* the feeling import of it that we "listen," i.e., make ourselves receptive. This essential point is made clearer still if we note that, given attention to the very same content, we might have "listened" not for feeling, but instead for meaning or for will-impulse. The fact of rapt attention is thus not peculiar to the aesthetic attitude. What differentiates the latter, is what we "listen" for and with, (viz., feeling and our capacity for feeling), when we attend (endotelically) to the given content. That contemplation is something more than attention is obvious in the case of reading. Attention to the words on the page is necessary, but in addition, a throwing oneself open to their meaning has to take place (and constitutes lectical or logical contemplation of them, as distinguished from aesthetic).

To say, however, that in the sort of "listening" which constitutes aesthetic contemplation, we "listen" *for* a feeling, is not to be taken as meaning that our attitude is describable as contemplative *only up to* the advent of the aesthetic feeling to be obtained through it. It means only that it is then that the aesthetic attitude, as distinguished from its fruit, can best be studied introspectively. But the feeling that we obtain is aesthetic feeling only so long as our attitude remains the aesthetic; and this means, only so long as our interest, our aim, is in feeling itself as such. "What we are interested in," and "What we attend to," cannot therefore here be regarded as synonymous expressions. Spinoza pointed out that emotional states cannot be attended to without being destroyed, and modern psychologists, e.g., Titchener, having confirmed this. But it is possible to make feelings or emotional states as such, what one aims at; it is possible to make them the center

of one's *interest*, i.e., to treat them not scientifically, as states to be compared, studied, etc., but as states to be simply "tasted" to the full and in all their most subtle nuances. And this is precisely what occurs in successful aesthetic contemplation. Our *attention* is, say, on the pattern and color of a fabric, but our *interest* is in its feeling-import to us. And if our interest at the moment is on the contrary in the origin, or history of that pattern, and such feelings as we have in the presence of it are then merely by the way, (incidents but not ends), then our attitude is not the aesthetic, and the feelings are not aesthetic feelings.

§ 8

Aesthetic contemplation has the endotelic character. Lastly, the "listening" with our capacity for feeling, which constitutes aesthetic contemplation, is endotelic; that is, this throwing oneself open to the advent of feeling is for the sake of the feeling to be obtained, which is treated not as something to be recognized or compared; nor as something leading to or furnishing a drive for some act; but solely as something to be tasted, and as it were, rolled under one's emotional tongue. In aesthetic contemplation, feeling is then the end, and the occurrence of it constitutes the completion, the success, of the contemplation, which is thus truly endotelic.

§ 9

Aesthetic contemplation is not a rare, esoteric state, but a common and familiar one. Almost any attempt to give an analysis of the nature of aesthetic contemplation is likely to convey the impression that it is some strange state, difficult of attainment, and, like the mystic trance, accessible only to the elect. It is therefore not amiss to emphasize the fact that, on the contrary, it is a state in

which every normal person has entered countless times, even if only for brief moments; and that only a little introspection is needed to render him aware of that fact, and to place him in position to decide for himself as to the accuracy of the description of it given above. The occasions upon which the persons who have any doubt concerning their own acquaintance with that state are most likely to have truly entered it, are not so much visits to art galleries, as cases where they have had to formulate some simple but genuine judgment of taste. To judge, for instance, whether the color of a given necktie "goes with" that of the suit with which it is to be worn, is to judge whether the feeling obtained in the aesthetic contemplation of the color combination is pleasant or not. But virtually everyone is aware of having made judgments of this sort, which would have been impossible had one been incapable of aesthetic contemplation. To observe for oneself the nature of that state, one but needs to report oneself to the moment when one was giving one's attention to the color combination, but had not yet obtained from it the inner experience, (viz., the feeling) which, when obtained, was judged, as the case may have been, pleasant or unpleasant.

Aesthetic contemplation is an attitude which would seem to have little if any biological utility; and it is therefore natural that our capacity for it should be far less developed than for the attitudes connected with the ectotelic, so-called practical, life. The immediate consequence of this is that it is only in the absence of any temptation to take those other, more practiced attitudes, that aesthetic contemplation becomes possible. As Spencer justly observes, before the sort of action of our faculties can arise, which is characteristic of the states of mind we class as aesthetic, "it is necessary that the needs to be satisfied

through the agency of sensational, perceptional, and emotional excitements shall not be urgent. So long as there exist strong cravings arising from bodily wants and unsatisfied lower instincts, consciousness is not allowed to dwell on these states that accompany the actions of the higher faculties: the cravings continually exclude them." [7]

The taking of so-called practical dispositions, the satisfying of so-called practical and to some extent of "idle" curiosity, occupy most persons most of the time. Ordinary life is for the most part lived among objects which we do not contemplate but merely use, or, to some extent, study for use, whether as themselves instruments or as signs informing us of matters of practical concern that we cannot at the time directly perceive. It is thus that we may paradoxically say of a town, for instance, that the more we see of it, the less we see it. On the other hand, when we travel and first come to a town new to us, a given building in it cannot be treated by us as mere sign of the nearness of the shoe-store around its corner, for we do not yet know that one is there. And because there is thus little temptation, and if we be in funds, little need to take the town practically, it is correspondingly easy to take it aesthetically. As Schopenhauer and others have pointed out, this absence of practical relation of the object to us is one of the chief sources of the pleasure of travel, of the glamour of distant times and places or other objects from which we are in some way insulated for any practical purpose. Such interest as we take in things of this sort can then hardly be other than of the endotelic sort, whether contemplative, (i.e., receptive), or judgmental; with the consequence that, for the time being, we find ourselves free from the specter of fear which ever more or less discreetly lurks through the so-called practical life.

[7] *Principles of Psychology.* Vol. II, p. 647.

The fact that the possibility of taking the aesthetic attitude depends to so great an extent upon the absence of practical relation between ourselves and the object, explains why the terms "detachment" and "psychical distance" are sometimes used in accounts of the nature of the aesthetic attitude.[8] Distance in time or space is the typical bar to action upon us by a thing or upon a thing by us, and is the typical factor which discourages or inhibits the practical interest. It is therefore natural that the word "distance," and for analogous reasons the word "detachment," should have come to be used figuratively in attempted characterizations of the aesthetic attitude, which is fundamentally non-practical. These words, however, do not point in the aesthetic attitude to anything additional to what has been said in the account of it given above; nor do they stand for either the whole or any part of the *positive* description of the attitude. Their import is essentially negative, since all they really say is that the aesthetic attitude is fundamentally non-practical.

In addition to the negative conditions facilitating aesthetic contemplation, already considered, there exist also certain possible positive inducements to prolong it. The chief of them is to be found in beauty of the object offered to contemplation, i.e., in pleasantness of the feelings obtained in contemplating the object. That the beautiful is so much easier to contemplate at any length than the ugly, which on the contrary requires of us an effort, is one reason for the fact that, on the whole, beauty is expected in works of art by almost everyone in spite of its being, as we have seen, not in the least implied by art. Therefore, as already remarked, it would be very nearly true to say

[8] Respectively, by Münsterberg in his *Principles of Art Education*, and by Bullough in an article on Psychical Distance, in the British Journal of Psychology, vol. V. pp. 87/118.

that, for most people, beauty is the condition of the "aesthetic visibility" of anything. For the ugly does not, like the beautiful, bribe and encourage contemplation, but immediately punishes and discourages it, and thus tends to become aesthetically quasi-nonexistent.

On the other hand, so far as the artist is concerned, the fact that on the whole his works have beauty rather than ugliness is due partly to the selection exercised, among the feelings he might attempt to express, by the extraneous desire that his work shall be thus aesthetically visible to the public; and partly to the fact that unpleasant feelings, by themselves, (i.e., when not somehow tied up with others that are pleasant), tempt one to ectotelically effective action, that is, to interference with their real or fancied external occasion, rather than to objectification by art. But when for any reason remedy by practical action is impossible and the unpleasant feeling yet cannot be dismissed, it may then receive expression through art by the creation of the ugly. Examples of art thus predominantly ugly are at times to be found in propagandist art, which, whatever the merits of the cause it is used to promote, often in the very nature of the case springs from rebellious, harsh, bitter feeling.

The negative aids to contemplation, so far as artificial, consist of all the devices which make difficult or impossible the actual establishment of a practical relation to the object; or which inhibit practical or idle curiosity concerning it. Thus, the frame of a picture sharply differentiates it from the objects of practical moment that surround it. The framing and raising of the stage in the theater achieves the same result, and as other writers have noted, the separation of it from the audience contributes to the inhibiting of such impulses as might arise in its members to rescue the heroine in distress. Again, the requirement that a

work of art must be a self-sufficient whole implies among other things that one's curiosity must not be tempted to supply missing elements. Nor must the work of art, for the same reason, contain anything in the nature of a puzzle. If it is representative, it should be so unambiguously. If the representative element, on the contrary, is either absent or merely incidental, the giving to the work a title that invites the beholder to perform an act of recognition or identification only hinders his taking towards it the aesthetic attitude. The name of a painting, therefore, should either be a mere identification tag, for instance, as in music, "Opus No. —", or else, if descriptive at all, it should be such as immediately to focus the beholder's attention on the essential aspect of the work. "Landscape," "Woman seated," "Portrait of a Young Man," would be good titles for such subjects. But something which is intended to be primarily a woman seated, but includes say a red cigarette box, should not just for oddity be called "The red cigarette box." For a wholly or partly "abstract" picture, on the contrary, such titles would be bad, inasmuch as their effect would be to present the picture to us not as an object for aesthetic contemplation, but as a picture-puzzle challenging us for instance to "find the young man." For abstract or semi-abstract pictures, titles such as "synchromy," "composition," "study in blue and green," "arrangement of solids," etc., would be appropriate in that they would at once force the beholder's attention to the aspect which the artist means him to contemplate. The title of a work of art, in short, should not pique our curiosity, but on the contrary anticipate it and set it at rest from the very start, so that nothing remains for us to do but to contemplate the work aesthetically.

§ 10

Professor Langfeld's discussion of the aesthetic attitude. A detailed account of aids for the aesthetic attitude in the various realms of art is to be found in the fourth chapter of Professor Langfeld's book *The Aesthetic Attitude.* The third chapter of it contains a review of the principal recent opinions concerning the essence of the aesthetic attitude. Absence of utility and purpose; [9] non-practicalness; detachment of self and isolation of object; [10] repose in the object and loss of sense of personality; [11] psychical distance; [12] and the feeling of unreality,[13] are considered and criticized. But in empirical problems, such as that of the nature of the aesthetic attitude, the only sort of criticism of errors which can be consistently rather than only accidentally significant, is criticism based upon a clear perception of the positive truth in regard to the matter considered; and Professor Langfeld's criticisms, keen as they often are, do not seem to me to be so based. For one thing, his book like most other works on aesthetics, assumes throughout an essential connection between art and beauty, and I have already given the reasons which force me to regard such an assumption as incorrect and fatally confusing. It is responsible, for instance, for such a passage as the following: "Not only should the work of art touch our wishes and in that way interest us, but it must provide the means for the complete fulfillment of the wish within the object itself, if it is to remain art for the observer," — in which "to remain art" is improperly used instead of "to remain beautiful."

[9] Kant, *Critique of Judgment.*
[10] Münsterberg, *Principles of Art Education.*
[11] Puffer, *Psychology of Beauty.*
[12] Bullough, *loc. cit.*
[13] Konrad Lange, *Das Wesen der Kunst.*

But, — and this is more directly to the point, — Professor Langfeld apparently identifies the aesthetic attitude with empathy, whereas the truth seems to me to be that the two are quite distinct and very different. The nature of empathy and its relation to the aesthetic attitude will be considered in detail in the next chapter, but the opinion there to be set forth must at least be mentioned here since it constitutes the positive ground for regarding Professor Langfeld's view of the nature of the aesthetic attitude as incorrect.

§ 11

Empathy is not Aesthetic Contemplation, but simply the process by which doing and undergoing are perceived as such in others. Empathy, I submit, is nothing more nor less than the particular psycho-physical process by which conscious doing and undergoing (and not mere motion, or shape, or relation) are perceived where they are present in others, or imagined in things where they are not actual facts. Empathy, in other words, is simply the process by which dramatic [14] agents or patients are perceived or imagined as such. But to perceive or imagine action is one thing, and to contemplate aesthetically the action perceived or imagined is quite another, and an additional, thing. There can be no aesthetic contemplation *of another's action* without empathy, because it is empathy which enables us to perceive action as such, in another; and this is the reason why the cases of the taking and the losing of the aesthetic attitude given by Professor Langfeld on pp. 57/65 are all good. They are all cases of the aesthetic attitude *towards action,* and therefore when empathy in these cases ceases, so, *a*

[14] From δραω to do, to perform.

fortiori, does aesthetic contemplation of the action which empathy presented. But there can be aesthetic contemplation without empathy; for instance of colors, tastes and odors, which are little if at all susceptible of being empathized, i.e., interpreted as doing or undergoing anything. Moreover shapes, lines, motions, and so on, can also be aesthetically contemplated without being empathized, although it is not as easy for us to do so since the dramatic interpretation of things is the most natural to us. On the other hand, there can be (and in the vast majority of cases of empathy there is) empathy without aesthetic contemplation of the fact of which it makes us aware, since we attend to and apprehend what others are doing or undergoing, not usually for aesthetic but for practical or for sportive purposes.

It may be noted further that, no matter what motor phenomena may be found in empathy when studied, empathy when performed is for the performer not an effective but a perceptive process,[15] and thus, like contemplation, entails "psychic distance." This is one reason for the soundness of Professor Langfeld's observations concerning "distance" in the last section of his third chapter, in spite of his (as it seems to me) fundamentally mistaken identification of empathy and aesthetic contemplation. Another reason for the soundness of those observations is that, in them, he considers cases where not merely empathy, but also aesthetic contemplation of what is perceived by emjathy, is occurring.

[15] Professor Langfeld brings this out very clearly. *Op. cit.,* pp. 117/121.

CHAPTER X

EMPATHIC AND PERIPATHIC PERCEPTION

§ 1

Empathy. Empathy is the word coined by Professor Titchener [1] to translate the German *einfuehlung,* a term probably most closely associated with the name of Lipps, but used before him and since by others. *Sich in etwas einfuehlen* means, to feel oneself into something; and the best examples of what this would designate are furnished by sculpture, figure-painting, the dance, the drama. An illustration would be as follows: If, on entering a room, we find ourselves faced by a statue with extended hand, we may react in one or two typical ways, viz., either *toward* it, with the impulse to grasp the hand; or else *with* it, i.e., *as* it acts,[2] identifying ourselves for the moment with the man represented by the marble. Through the doing so, we apprehend more or less distinctly his particular mode of action, as action. This way of reacting in the presence of the statue constitutes the empathic way, and its result is empathic perception.

§ 2

Empathy is interpretation of a thing as dramatic agent or patient. Its mechanism. It is distinct from aesthetic

[1] *A Text Book of Psychology,* p. 417.

[2] I borrow this excellent example, and the account of it up to this point only, from Professor Langfeld's *The Aesthetic Attitude,* p. 64.

contemplation and from sympathy. Concerning this mode of response it may be noted first that "feeling ourselves into" the statue does not constitute a correct description of what we do; and therefore that the words *Einfuehlung,* Empathy, although by now too well established to be changed, are etymologically inappropriate to that which they are used to denote. What we actually do in the so-called empathic response to the statue, is not to "feel ourselves into" it (which strictly speaking is nonsense), but to *suppose* ourselves into it, or identify ourselves with it. This we do by inwardly imitating the mode of action of the man represented by the statue, at least to the extent of establishing the "motor set" which constitutes the tendency to the performance of that action. To do this while our attention remains on the statue, is *to perceive that action as action, and as action of the object attended to.* To say that it is perceived as action, means that what we perceive is not mere motion, or a mere snap-shot of motion; or not mere relative position of parts in space; but action or posture properly so-called, — *the conscious doing or undergoing of something by a (really or supposititiously) living being.*

The action *perceived* through the process of inner imitation may be then aesthetically *contemplated,* and the aesthetic feelings which it objectifies thus obtained. This inner imitation, as Groos maintains,[3] is probably in most cases not merely a matter of motor brain-set, but to a not inconsiderable extent also one of actual even if usually minimal innervation of muscles, constituting a partly literal but mainly a symbolical imitation of the action performed by or imputed to the object. In pointing out that there is such a thing as symbolical imitation, and that most of the imitation in the empathic response is of this sym-

[3] K. Groos *The Play of Man,* pp. 322-333.

bolical character, Groos has contributed a valuable point to the theory of the subject.

Much mystery has hovered about Empathy, largely owing to the failure to distinguish it clearly from aesthetic contemplation. But if the word Empathy denotes any real fact, it is simply that *by supposing ourselves being some given other (e.g.) person, we do intuit the nature of the action or experience of that other (person) in the same direct way as we do the nature of our own.* This should have been designated by some such term as *homoeotropic perception,* as distinguished from prostropic, which is perception of the ordinary sort; and the confusion of aesthetic contemplation with Empathy is partly due to the misleading character of that term. To this also is in part due the failure of some French writers [4] to distinguish clearly Empathy from sympathy. Someone, I forget who, has pointed out that in empathy we enter into another, whereas in sympathy another is received by us into ourselves. To this it may be added that sympathy is truly and directly a phenomenon of the realm of feeling; whereas the phenomenon (inappropriately) called Empathy is not this but is, directly, a phenomenon of *knowing.*

§ 3

Shape-perception is not empathy. In the presence of the statue, it is likely that more is done by us than has so far been described. For instance, we may perceive also the external outline of the statue in two dimensions, and its surface in three. But we do this *not by imitating or entering into or identifying ourselves with the action of the man which the statue represents,* but by following the outline or surface of the statue with the eye, or even, mini-

[4] For instance, De Gramont-Lesparre, in his *Essai sur le Sentiment Esthétique.*

mally, with the hand, head, etc. Such actual or incipient movements are the response by means of which the *shape* of the statue is perceived; and from the aesthetic contemplation of the shape as such, so perceived, we can also get aesthetic feelings. But in this perception of mere shape, there is no longer any imitation of what the statue represents, viz., the action of a human being; nor imitation of anything else. And it is not at all a case of Empathy. For if we go to the statue and *actually* pass our hand over the outline or the surface of it, that obviously does not in any sense constitute any imitation of the action of anything. We are not in so doing identifying ourselves with the man which the statue represents and acting out his posture or action. And there is therefore no empathy either, i.e., no imitation of represented action, when the exploring movements of the hand, instead of being overt, are only imagined or minimal movements or tendencies to movements. The mere fact that perception of shape and of motion has, like perception of action, a partly motor basis, is no reason for overlooking the essential difference between them, and applying to the former the term Empathy which, if it is to be used at all, is descriptive only of the latter. Perception of shape and of motion as such, is not empathy at all. If we want a special name for it, we must call it *Design Perception.*

§ 4

But shapes may be empathized, i.e., interpreted as dramatic agents or patients. The fact should be clearly realized, however, that we can if we wish, and indeed generally do, perceive empathically also lines, surfaces, motions, or, in general things supposed to be, or supposedly considered as, pure designs or design-elements. But this is to dramatize them, i.e., to substitute for, or add to, shape- or de-

sign-perception, something else quite different, viz., empathic interpretation.

Thus, empathy is no part or condition of the process of mere shape-perception, nor any part or condition of the process of aesthetic contemplation of the shape perceived. The empathy of lines and surfaces (as of anything else), is *the interpretation of them as dramatic agents or patients;* and it becomes possible only if we regard the line or surface *as representative of an action,* e.g., the line as representing the act of flowing, darting, turning, or what not. Such action can be and is then spontaneously performed by us imaginally or minimally and in more or less symbolic manner, just as was the action that the statue represents.

§ 5

Colors as well as shapes can be aesthetically contemplated, but colors cannot be empathized. Another thing which we may perceive in the presence of the statue is its color; and in the case of paintings color becomes one of the important constituents of the aesthetic object. But, still more than in the case of shape-perception, it is obvious that color-perception is not empathy at all; and that the aesthetic contemplation of color is not empathy. A well-known English protagonist of a Lippsian view of empathy, Vernon Lee, apparently does, like Professor Langfeld, think that empathy and aesthetic contemplation are the same thing. This opinion, which has a certain plausibility so long as the only objects considered are *shapes,* becomes much more difficult to hold when colors are the objects considered, for empathy is generally regarded as a phenomenon having a motor basis; but color-perception is not that.[5] Vernon Lee realizes the difficulty thus in-

[5] I am arguing here *ex concessis.* Reasons will be given later to show that empathy is not always a motor phenomenon; but the cases where it

volved in the idea of empathizing colors, but instead of giving up empathy at this point, and admitting that aesthetic contemplation, which is perfectly possible with colors, is therefore something else than empathy, she on the contrary attempts to trim down the facts to the point where they might fit into her view of empathy. This she does by arbitrarily restricting the meaning of Contemplation to contemplation of *shapes,* for she writes: "It is Shape which we contemplate; and it is only because they enter into shapes that colours and sounds, as distinguished from temperatures, textures, tastes and smells, can be said to be contemplated at all." [6] That only shapes can be contemplated is a proposition quite fundamental to her aesthetic theory; but there is no reason to regard it as anything but a wholly arbitrary dogma. For I submit that the word "contemplation" carries no such limitation in ordinary good English; and I, for one, find no difficulty in taking the aesthetically contemplative attitude not only towards colors in abstraction from shape, or out of shape, (e.g., the blue of the sky, looking straight up), but also towards odors and textures, and even temperatures and tastes. Moreover, the assertion also made in Vernon Lee's pages, that *things* cannot be contemplated, but only aspects of things, appears equally arbitrary. The truth, as it seems to me, is on the contrary that there is no entity whatever towards which it is *a priori* impossible to take the aesthetically contemplative attitude.

§ 6

Vernon Lee's account of empathy. Vernon Lee's most accessible account of empathy is built around an analysis

is not motor, are facts very different in kind from color-perception, which therefore could not be regarded as a case of even non-motor empathy.

[6] *The Beautiful,* p. 76.

of the meaning of the phrase "the mountain rises." [7] She points out that, literally, the mountain does not move at all; the only rising or raising actually occurring on the occasion when we so speak, is that of our own eyes and head. What then takes place is that the experiencing of the latter releases in us the general idea of rising, as built up by all our previous experience; and that this consciousness of rising-in-general, together with that of the particular rising actually going on in us at the moment, gets transferred and ascribed to the shape of the mountain which is the object of our attention, in accordance with our natural tendency to "merge the activities of the perceiving subject with the qualities of the perceived object" (pp. 62/65). Vernon Lee goes on to observe quite correctly that this merging is not to be thought of as a projection of the ego-consciousness into the object attended to, for in so far as we identify ourselves with the object, our own customary ego-consciousness no longer exists. She argues, moreover, that empathy does not consist of mimicry, inner or outer; for such mimicking as occurs is "of movements and actions which, like the *rising* of the mountain, take place only in our imagination" (p. 67); so that the mimicking of the really inanimate object does not explain but on the contrary presupposes the animation of the object by empathy as just described.

§ 7

Vernon Lee's objection that inner imitation presupposes empathy, unfounded. This objection to the "inner imitation" view of empathy would be an important one if it were

[7] In her book *The Beautiful*, Ch. II. See also *Beauty and Ugliness* by V. Lee and Anstruther Thompson, an earlier and much more technical work.

well founded, for in the light of it we might well ask ourselves whether, even in the case of the statue, i.e., of a carved block of marble (which is no more really active than is the mountain), we are after all entitled, with Groos, to regard empathy as a process of minimal automatic imitation.

But to see that we may properly so regard it, it is only necessary to remember that a statue is not a carved block of marble *as such,* but a carved block *in so far as representative* of a human being doing something. And it is the human action represented, and not the stone which represents it, that we can and do imitate. The same thing is true of the mountain. If there is empathy of it, it is only because and in so far as the mountain too is considered as representative of action. We empathize it by performing, minimally, an action more or less like that which attention to the mountain makes us think of; and to perform even only symbolically and only to the extent of establishing its motor-set, an action resembling one which we conceive, is truly to *imitate* the latter. It should be borne in mind in this connection that the perceiving, and likewise the imaging of an action as action, (i.e., distinguished from mere motion), require the inner performance of it; but the mere thinking of the action, conceptually, does not require it. Vernon Lee's objection is valid only to the extent that it is not the mountain, or the line, or marble, that we imitate, but the actions which they make us think of. It is also true that ordinarily, the thinking of the action and the inner performance of it are virtually synchronous. But this is not of the essence of the situation since it is quite possible to refrain from the inner imitating, and yet to be clearly aware (conceptually) of what it is that we are then *not* inwardly imitating.

§ 8

Difference between empathy of a statue and of a mountain. Although empathy of the statue and of the mountain are alike in the respects described above, there is between them a difference without the stating of which the analysis would remain incomplete. This difference concerns the representative character of each. In the case of the mountain, its representativeness to us of such an act as that of *rising* is largely fortuitous, i.e., it is a matter of our individual psychology.[8] To another person what it will suggest is as likely to be *descending*. A third will conceive the mountain as *protruding*, hard and tooth-like, through the tender landscape, etc. There are, however, other dramatic characters which the mountain connotes not as a matter of psychological accident, but because they are a more or less inseparable part of any attempt at a literal description of a mountain, or of the particular mountain. For instance, apart from the peculiarities of any given person's psychology, it may truly be said that the mountain is heavy, stable, hard, massive, space-occupying, etc. Such characters (which living beings too may possess), are also capable of being more or less literally acted out inwardly by us; and when we so act them out we are empathizing the mountain as "realistically" conceived.[9] We are thus led to distinguish among the various dramatic characters, (viz., characters suscepti-

[8] Cf. Langfeld. *The Aesthetic Attitude*, p. 133.

[9] I.e., conceived as a being resisting various physical forces such as winds, rains, gravitational pull, etc. Characters of this sort constitute "what the mountain really is" only from the standpoint of its own physical preservation. But from the standpoint of the aesthetically contemplative beholder of the mountain such characters do not, rather than any others, constitute *a priori* "what the mountain really is." *That* is purely a matter of the particular characters which he finds his individual aesthetic experience in the presence of the mountain, springing from.

ble of being acted out) which the mountain connotes to us those which are, as we may say, intrinsic to it, and those which on the contrary are quite adventitious to it, and of which it is representative for a particular mind only as a matter of psychological accident, (e.g., sternness, protrusion, rising or falling, etc.).

If now we turn to the statue and compare its representative character with that of the mountain, we find that both the statue and the mountain make us think of certain actions or attitudes of living beings; but the mountain does not have the form of a living being, whereas the statue has; and therefore the statue suggests *inevitably* to us the particular modes of action intrinsically present in a living being having its form; whereas the mountain suggests to us only *by accident* the modes of living action which it does suggest. This explains why empathy of the statue is so much easier, more complete, more definite; and why it is less variable in content in the case of the statue than in that of the mountain.

§ 9

Essential features of the theory of empathy of the present chapter. The essential features and relations of the conception of Empathy set forth in the present chapter may now be restated without admixture of controversy, and more explicitly, as follows:

Empathy is nothing more nor less than the interpretation of a thing as dramatic agent or patient. The "real" nature of the thing so interpreted is of no importance so long as we find ourselves able to interpret it in the manner stated. This interpretation as dramatic agent or patient is moreover not an intellectual and discursive process, but a more or less automatic and intuitive process like any

other case of *perception*, e.g., perception of the third dimension of space. A dramatic agent or patient, as such, is doing or undergoing something consciously; and the mechanism of the empathic interpretation of a thing, i.e., of the perceiving it as dramatic agent or patient, consists in inner (i.e., imagined or minimal or incipient) and more or less symbolic imitation of the action or experience which we regard the thing as performing or undergoing. This inner imitation is not a process that we watch and control as we perform it; we are not conscious of performing it at the time we do so. Usually it takes place spontaneously, without intent. We can, however, deliberately attempt to embark upon it. Such attempt consists in simply supposing oneself into the thing or into what it represents; in identifying oneself with it, in supposing oneself being it. If one effectually does this, one thereby ceases to be conscious of one's own customary self as such, and one intuits the action or experience of the empathized agent or patient as *in* and *of* that agent or patient. That is to say, one intuits it with the same sort of immediacy as that with which one ordinarily intuits one's own doings and undergoings. Empathy thus effects not a "thought transference," but a virtual, i.e., a pseudo-transference, of conscious action or experience.

Empathy was characterized above as the interpretation of a thing as *dramatic* agent or patient. The word Dramatic is derived from the Greek δραω which means to do, to perform, to act. The word Drama is however not synonymous with the word action. On the one hand it implies the presence of consciousness, whereas the word Action might be held not to do so necessarily. On the other hand, the word Drama refers not only to action and doing, but also to their passive correlates, — experience and undergoing. It is therefore proper that we should

use the word Dramatic to qualify the terms Agent and Patient, thereby signifying beings consciously doing or undergoing something. After these explanations, however, the single word *Action* may safely be used in the present connection for the sake of brevity, instead of the precise but clumsier expression "the conscious doings and undergoings (experiences) of agents and patients." A list of what the word Action as so used denotes, would thus include, for instance, straining, standing, sitting, lying, keeping still, sleeping, reclining, resting, jumping, languishing, longing, triumphing, raging, comforting, worshipping, crying, speaking, listening, acquiescing, thinking, perceiving, imagining, etc. It would also include many modes of behavior which, for various reasons, have no names of their own in the language, and are designated only in terms of the sorts of feeling that go with them, and of which they are merely labelled the appearances, e.g., looking or seeming sad, comfortable, hungry, tired, joyous, hopeful, doubtful, defeated, convinced, etc. The list would include beside these also countless modes of behavior which, because neither they nor their accompanying feelings are standard or typical, have received no names at all. Lastly, the list would include all the cases of what living beings may consciously undergo, for instance, being pushed, praised, blamed, compelled, insulted, struck, comforted, teased, etc. Such a sample list and the explanations preceding it indicate what is meant by Action in the present connection, clearly enough not to require burdening the exposition with an attempt to give a technical logical analysis of the meaning of the term.

If Empathy is the interpretation of a thing as dramatic agent *or patient,* it then becomes obvious that empathy is not always a motor phenomenon, as commonly assumed. One can perceive another man empathically not only in

so far as the experiences he is undergoing are kinaesthetic in nature, but also when they are auditory, olfactory, visual, etc., if only adequate clues are provided. The clues in such cases will be of a different sort, but they will still be clues to empathy *of him*, i.e., to imaginal imitation of what takes place in him.

Empathy may be perception, or it may be illusion. It is truly and literally *perception*, (viz., of action as characterized above) when two conditions are fulfilled. The first is that the object empathized should in fact be a conscious (not necessarily self-conscious) being, consciously doing or undergoing something; and the second is that the nature of what that being is doing or undergoing should, through the empathic process, be intuited correctly. If it is incorrectly intuited, the result of the process then constitutes an error of (empathic) perception.

When on the contrary the thing empathized is an inanimate or unconscious one, then the empathic interpretation of it does not constitute either correct or incorrect perception, but illusion or hallucination, namely, the intuition of conscious action, as action of a thing in which actually no conscious action at all exists.

It is not possible to say definitely where empathy ceases to be perception and begins to be illusive invention. When the empathized objects are human beings and higher animals, empathy (for anyone but a solipsist) is certainly perception, correct or incorrect. When on the other hand the objects are low forms of animal life, then if the empathy remains typically anthropic in kind, it is doubtless illusive; but if not so anthropic, it may still truly constitute perception. With regard to plants and minerals most people, who are not panpsychists, would doubtless regard empathy of them as a gratuitous intuitive ascription to them of a consciousness they do not have. Panpsy-

chists however may think otherwise, and I shall not here attempt to decide whether or not they are right. The empathic interpretation even of objects belonging to the lower kingdoms is, in any case, of constant occurrence in literature and poetry, where the aesthetic values to be experienced in the contemplation of the aesthetic object set up by means of such empathic interpretation are the sufficient measure of its justification. In the case of such things as the lines and shapes of a design, no one would think of regarding the empathic interpretation of them as other than gratuitous, i.e., it is empathic illusion, animating and dramatizing the certainly inanimate. Empathy thus enables us to perceive conscious action where it is and also to imagine it, and have the vivid illusion of it, where it is not.

Empathy is the process through which alone modes of conscious doing and undergoing are perceived or imagined; but to perceive or imagine these is not *ipso facto* to contemplate them aesthetically. Empathy as such is not, and does not involve, aesthetic contemplation. On the other hand aesthetic contemplation presupposes empathy whenever the object of aesthetic contemplation is Action, (i.e., is something that a conscious being is doing or undergoing) since empathy is the very process by which alone *that sort* of object is set before the aesthetically contemplative attention. Through the intuitive apprehension, by empathy, of what a conscious being is doing or experiencing, one indeed automatically obtains the sort of feeling which goes with that sort of doing or experiencing. But this is not an aesthetic feeling, and the process of obtaining it is not aesthetic contemplation, unless the feeling obtained was being "listened for"; i.e., unless the empathy was *for the sake of the feeling* to be so obtained; or at all events, unless at the moment the feeling is experi-

enced, the interest comes to be essentially *in the feeling itself, as such.* In other words, the attitude in the approaching or at least in the obtaining of the feeling, *must have the endotelic character.* If it has, it constitutes aesthetic contemplation, whether or not the object contemplated be of a sort perceptible only through empathy. If on the other hand the endotelic character is absent, then the attitude is not that of aesthetic contemplation and such feeling as may be experienced is not aesthetic feeling, even though empathy be the process through which perception is taking place. The action which empathy reveals in such a case is adjusted-to practically, or is judged about; instead of being just *tasted,* i.e., the emotional "taste" of it noticed and made end. And the feelings that may be experienced in the course of practical adjustment to or judgment about the action revealed, are not aesthetic feelings, but *passions,* whether mild or strong.

Thus, to intuit, by empathy, the actions or experiences, e.g., the feelings, of the participants in a tragedy, is not *ipso facto* to have an aesthetic experience. That the process of intuiting them is endotelic *in addition* to being empathic, is precisely what makes the vast difference between the beholding of a tragedy represented on the stage, and, on the other hand, the beholding of an actual tragedy in practical life. In the latter case, the empathy is present, but not the endotelism.

Incidentally, however, it is probably safe to assert that many if not most people witness the tragedy on the stage not with the attitude of aesthetic contemplation, but in essentially the same spirit as they do some actual tragedy, or else, some game. Therefore what they get from it is not aesthetic pleasure, but either the pleasure that accompanies the acquisition of wisdom without the customary price; or the pleasure that goes with excitement and ad-

venture without the otherwise attendant risks, i.e., the pleasure of play.

Similar remarks would apply to literature, e.g., to the novel. The writing of a novel may be (endotelic) art activity; but with most readers the reading of the novel constitutes anything but aesthetic contemplation. It is not, usually, even endotelic activity at all but autotelic, i.e., it is a case of play, and not a case of the consumption or appreciation of art as such. This fact is not usually recognized, and is therefore worth stressing. The assumption that novel-readers and theater-goers are seekers of aesthetic enjoyment, which is the one commonly made, has caused endless misunderstandings, for it is true of only a small minority of them. For most people, the only way to get to the *aesthetic* perception and appreciation of a drama would be first to exhaust that drama's possibilities as source of play-enjoyment, or as source of wisdom. But how many persons would wish to see it performed, or to read it, the two or more times at short intervals, needed by them to reach that point? They would meet the proposal with the declaration that, until enough time had elapsed to make them forget, *their* enjoyment of it would be gone. That another sort of enjoyment might however then come, most of them do not suspect. These remarks, I may add, are not to be taken to imply that the aesthetic enjoyment of something, e.g., a drama, is necessarily "better," or "higher" than the enjoyment of it as a play or game. I only mean to point out that it may be and I think usually is in fact enjoyed in the latter way, rather than the former.

That empathy does not necessarily involve aesthetic contemplation is something which is obscured by the fact that for the most part we empathize inanimate things only in so far as we are interested in them aesthetically, inasmuch as empathy of them generally has little practical or

scientific utility. But in the case of animate beings, human beings and animals, it is otherwise, for empathy of them, yielding as it does an intuition of what they are doing and undergoing, is in practice a valuable help in coöperating with them or thwarting them intelligently. To say this is to say that the facts which empathy reveals are, in such cases, often treated not aesthetically at all but practically. Or they may be simply noted, compared with others, etc., i.e., treated scientifically. Whether in fact true or not, the story according to which Campanella, while in prison, was able through inner imitation of the behavior of his visitors, to apprehend their secret intent, testifies that empathy has no necessary connection with aesthetic contemplation, but may have and very commonly does have a purely practical rôle.

The fact that empathy admittedly takes place on all sorts of occasions where aesthetic appreciation or interest are very far indeed from our consciousness, remains strangely unnoticed by the authors who identify aesthetic contemplation with empathy, even when they themselves mention cases of that very fact. Professor Langfeld, for instance, who certainly does seem to identify the aesthetic attitude with empathy,[10] writes: "In watching a football game, we suddenly realize that in the excitement of following our team, we have been unconsciously pushing against our neighbor on the bench" (p. 112). This is, I take it, intended as an illustration of particularly vigorous empathy, and beyond question it is such. But, no less obviously, the attitude of the typical, empathically-neighbor-pushing spectator of football games, is anything but the aesthetic attitude, which by this alone would be proved to be something quite distinct from mere empathy.

[10] See for instance p. 113 of *The Aesthetic Attitude*.

§ 10

Peripathic Perception. It was stated earlier in this chapter that although empathic perception may be added to the perception of design merely as such, the perception of the design aspect of things neither constitutes nor requires empathy. That is, to perceive it, we do not in the least need to identify ourselves with the things and inwardly imitate their real or supposititious action.

This is true also of another mode of perception which, for the purposes of aesthetics, it is important to distinguish clearly both from Design-perception and from Empathic perception. It is the mode of perception which is the most familiar and natural to virtually all of us, and for which, therefore, no special name exists. It is the mode which, when reflectively analyzed, is seen to regard things as elaborate complexes of possibilities and impossibilities; such a complex being what any given "thing" or sort of thing, most usually is for us. Thus, a knife is a possibility of (for instance) cutting; and, being solid, it is also the impossibility of having something else at the time in the place it occupies, etc.

However the possibilities and impossibilities of which things are complexes may either be or not be related to living human interests, to human hopes and fears. Almost any given thing embodies many possibilities which have, as one would commonly say, only a scientific interest, this sort of interest being precisely that which, abstracting from existing human hopes and fears, needs and desires, notes impersonally all the properties that things do have, or, which is the same thing, the possibilities which they embody. Whether or not these possibilities are such that any body has, or ever will have, any use for them is, from the point of view of pure science, irrelevant.

The perception of things in this impersonal way, as complexes of essentially *theoretical* possibilities, is obviously not the common way. The common way is that which views things as complexes of possibilities that are on the contrary essentially *living,* in the sense of *related in some evident manner to needs, purposes, interests, hopes, fears, etc.,* that human beings considered otherwise than in their possible capacity as pure scientists, commonly have. That is to say, the common way views things in terms only of such of their possibilities as have some *dramatic import.* Things, as perceived in the ordinary way, may thus be described as *dramatic instruments.*

The dramatic interpretation of things is then *of two possible sorts.* One of them is the empathic, which is homeotropic and altrocentric. That is, it proceeds by imitating the orientation or behavior of its object; and, as one does this, another self, — that of the object, — virtually replaces one's own for the moment. In terms of this mode of dramatic interpretation, the object is perceived as essentially *dramatic agent or patient.* The other mode, which we are now considering, is on the contrary prostropic and egocentric. That is, it proceeds by (also inner and largely symbolic) orientation or behavior *towards* the object, on the part of *our own* ego. In terms of it the thing is perceived as essentially *dramatic instrument* (positive or negative). This perception of it as instrument, however, may be either from the standpoint of our own customary ego, or from that of another ego which we have empathically identified ourselves with, and, for the moment only, made our own.

As stated above, no special name exists for this perceiving of things as dramatic instruments, for it is the ordinary mode of perception and is that which we usually have in mind when we speak merely of *perceiving.* A special name

for it would have the disadvantage of hiding the familiar under strange garb, and of giving the impression that some unfamiliar process is in question. Nevertheless, for our present purpose, which is to contrast sharply this mode of dramatic interpretation with the empathic mode, it is very desirable to give it an appropriately descriptive name. The term *Peripathy* is now proposed for this, as having the advantage of suggesting very clearly the relation of the mode of perception so described, to the mode designated by the established term *Empathy*. The disadvantage of the term Peripathy, on the other hand, is the same as that of the term Empathy, namely, the disadvantage already pointed out, that in strictness it constitutes a misdescription of what it denotes, viz., it is not a "feeling oneself about," but a *supposing* oneself about, i.e., in relation with, the object said to be *"peripathized."* The really important thing, however, is that the nature of that process, and its contrast with the empathic process, should be very clear; and a concrete case will help to make it so at this point.

I have before me a picture representing a mountainside meadow dotted with flowers, with a curved path through it which disappears between two clumps of fir trees in the middle distance. Between them high in the background is a dark fir-grown mountain with a snow cap and snow fields. Now, I can interpret this landscape dramatically in the *empathic* way if I wish. I then intuit the path as perhaps *cutting* the meadow, or *stretching itself* lazily among the flowers; the *sharp* treetops as *stabbing* the clear sky; the branches as *reaching out* from the mass for light and air; the mountain as *thrusting up* powerful *shoulders* under its mantle of verdure and snow, etc. But on the other hand I can interpret the various parts of the represented landscape in the *peripathic* way, i.e., view them not

in terms of what they are *to themselves* as dramatic agents or patients, but in terms of what they are as dramatic instruments *to me,* or to some dramatic agent or patient among them with which I have empathically identified myself. The path will then be perceived by me as something to be walked on and leading to imaginable other mountain scenes; the flowers as things to be picked, smelled, looked at closely, put into one's buttonhole, etc.; the forest as a cool shady place carpeted with dry pine-needles pleasant to the feet, or as a lurking-place for bears, chipmunks, or mosquitoes, or as a shelter from showers, etc.; the mountain as something to be climbed, or as something dangerous, or inconvenient, etc. In other words, I can inwardly, i.e., supposititiously and more or less symbolically also here, act the part which the various objects suggest *for me* in external relation to them, — using them according to their natures; or letting myself be affected by them, or by their dramatic relations to one another, in such manner as to undergo the various experiences which their presence will provide. This too is to view the landscape dramatically (i.e., not as design merely); but it is not to empathize it.

Peripathy obviously is not any more than empathy an exclusively motor phenomenon, for to regard a thing as dramatic instrument is not to regard it as instrument of operation exclusively, but quite as much as instrument of passive experience, e.g., sensation.

It is next to be noted that peripathy does not any more than empathy, either constitute or of necessity lead to aesthetic contemplation. Our attitude in peripathy and towards the facts perceived by means of it, is undoubtedly practical in the vast majority of cases. Peripathy, moreover, again like empathy, may be not only truly or falsely perceptive, but also arbitrarily illusive. This is the case

when we regard entities *not* having certain (instrumental) dramatic properties as if they had them, for instance when we regard a line as if it had impenetrability like a wall, or tension like a string, or weight like a rod; or again a color as if it were warm or cool, a cloud as if it had the properties of a mattress, etc.

Lastly, it is to be remembered that peripathic perception or invention is not a discursive, analytical or inferential process, but (like the perception of depth in space) an automatic process, yielding a direct intuition of the nature of its object. Peripathic perception, let me say again, is not something new or strange, but is only what ordinarily is called simply perception (viz., dramatic perception other than empathic). However, between ordinary peripathic perception, and peripathic perception for aesthetic contemplation there is this difference. The former, being usually for some practical purpose, is made very partial by that purpose, which blinds it to any non-relevant aspects of the object. Ordinary peripathic perception thus usually apprehends its objects not as individuals, but as cases-of-a-kind. On the other hand, where the attitude is the aesthetically contemplative, peripathic perception is freed from the service of any narrow, external and pressing purpose, and it can then be more fully hospitable and approach the individuality of its object more closely (although still from the outside, i.e., still as instrument).

CHAPTER XI

ECPATHY, OBJECTIFICATION, AND THE AESTHETIC OBJECT

In the last chapter, the attempt was made to show that the phenomenon called Empathy is something quite distinct from aesthetic contemplation, and is simply the process by which are perceived (whether for aesthetic or other purposes) dramatic entities of the sort called Actions and Experiences. Dramatic entities of the sort called Instruments, on the other hand, are perceived by a process which was designated Peripathy.

That discussion of Empathy was necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, it served to free the conception of Aesthetic Contemplation from any obscurity which, owing to the prevailing confusion of it with Empathy, might still have clung to it after the account that was given of it in Ch. IX. On the other hand, it served to bring out a fact which we shall find to be of considerable importance when we come to discuss the kinds, or aspects, of aesthetic objects, — the fact namely, that the aesthetic objects that are dramatic entities are of two possible sorts: dramatic agents or patients, and dramatic instruments.

§ 1

Ecpathy or aesthetic "reading." With the mists of Empathy out of the way, we may now return to aesthetic contemplation, and the aesthetic experience in which it

culminates. Contemplation was described as a "listening" with our capacity for feeling, — a "listening" for the feeling-import of some content of attention. In proportion to the blankness and intentness of such "listening," we gather from the object contemplated its import of aesthetic feeling if that import lies at all within the range of our emotional capacities. This constitutes the aesthetic experience. As already pointed out, the process of getting a feeling from the object embodying it, by aesthetic contemplation of that object, is the exact analogue in the language of feeling, of what we call reading or deciphering in the language of meaning. If we desire a technical term which is accurately descriptive of the process just mentioned, we must call it *Ecpathy,* for ecpathizing of the object is precisely what occurs: an extracting from it of the feeling which it embodies. To make the propriety of the term fully evident, something may be added here to what has already been said concerning the objectification of feeling by art.

§ 2

The feeling-import of aesthetic objects. The objectification of feeling, i.e., the putting of a feeling into an object created *ad hoc,* is no more mysterious a process than that of putting our meanings into words. Just as the words of the language have each its own import of meaning to the reader or hearer of them, so does every line, color, shape, sound, thing, etc., have its own import of feeling to the aesthetically contemplative observer of it. To bring home this fact the best examples are things so simple and devoid of meaning, that little can be done with them except contemplate them aesthetically. Let the reader for instance take pen or pencil and draw on a sheet of paper any simple nonrepresentative line that, after collecting himself for

a moment, he may feel like drawing. It may turn out to be a curve, a zigzag line, a combination of straight and curved lines, or anything else. Then let him contemplate it and ask himself whether it exactly corresponds to the feeling that impelled him. He will then possibly become aware that the line does not *feel* quite right, and if so he will correct it here or there.[1] Each discernible correction, no matter how slight, results in a line which not only looks different, but also *feels* different. That is, the line is not only *describably* different (i.e., different in a manner statable in geometrical terms) from its predecessors; but it is also different from them in a purely *emotional* way, quite immediate, unique, and therefore strictly speaking indescribable, since the emotional adjectives which alone would be relevant only indicate its relation to general emotional kinds, but never reach its emotional *individuality*. This individual emotional import of each line can be expressed by nothing else whatever than the individual line itself.

Through the simple experiment suggested, the reader will have created something which, although very humble, is no less truly a work of art than are the pictures of Rembrandt. He will himself actually have had an art-inspiring feeling, and have gone through the process of objectifying it. Moreover, he will have entered into the state of aesthetic contemplation in so far as he will have experienced the emotional feel of the line drawn; and he will have become an art-critic in so far as he will have judged that emotional feel to correspond, or not, to the particular feeling which originally moved him to draw that sort of line rather than some other.

[1] Such corrections may render the line more graceful, or on the other hand, less so. A change towards ugliness will nevertheless constitute a correction if it makes the line correspond more accurately to the feeling that impelled him, and of which the line drawn is an attempted expression.

Now just such a unique emotional import in contemplation as is possessed by each line that he drew, is possessed also by every distinguishable color, sound, shape, motion, taste, odor, etc., and also by every distinguishable thing, action, etc., and by every distinguishable combination and relation of any of these. And just as a given meaning is objectively expressed by writing or uttering the words which constitute its proper symbol, — out of which it can be extracted by reading; so is a given feeling expressed by constructing its own peculiar external symbol, from which, by aesthetic contemplation, it can likewise be extracted.

§ 3

Propriety of the term Ecpathy. What occurs through the aesthetic contemplation of an object may therefore fittingly be called the *ecpathizing of* the object. It is true that the feeling-import of an object (or the meaning-import of a word), is not *in* it and to be taken *out of* it, in the same literal sense that water is in and may be taken out of a bucket. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of human beings, it is pragmatically true to say that a thought or a meaning can be put into words, and can be extracted from words; and in a similar sense it is likewise true to say that a feeling can be put into an object constructed *ad hoc*, and that by aesthetic contemplation, a feeling can be extracted from an object. In this pragmatic sense of the words "into" and "out of" (which is the only one of importance here), it is then obvious that the term Ecpathy is perfectly proper, and accurately descriptive of what aesthetic contemplation performs.

It is true also that the feeling-import of an object blends with it even more closely and intimately, than does the meaning of a word with the word; and therefore that in

ecpathy the object is not apprehended as out of us and the feeling as in us, any more explicitly than are respectively in reading, the word and the thought which it means. The feeling is apprehended as if it were a quality of the object. Nevertheless, when we are not actually going through the ecpathizing process, but describing it, we are well aware of the duality of object and subject, and of the fact that the feeling is experienced by the subject. From this descriptive standpoint, then, it is correct to say that *we* get the feeling out of the object.

§ 4

An aesthetic object is any content of contemplative attention, as such. It should be clearly understood that when a feeling is spoken of as objectified by or as embodied in an object, the word object then means *aesthetic object*, and that an aesthetic object is simply *a content of attention (both focal and marginal), aesthetically contemplated.* The aesthetic object and the physical object thus need not be and usually are not the same, although they may be the same since it is possible to take as content of attention a physical object considered as such, and contemplate aesthetically just that. When we speak of contemplating a line, however, we almost invariably mean the perceptual, or the imaged line, i.e., the phenomenal line, and not the line as physics regards it. Again, it must be clearly realized that the aesthetic object usually consists of much more than the actual, literal content of *sense* observation; for many elements of the total content of attention are present not sensuously but imaginally or conceptually. The essential import of the assertion that the aesthetic object is the content of attention aesthetically contemplated, is then that whatever is not part of the content of

attention, whether marginal or focal, does not for aesthetic purposes exist at all, no matter how truly it may have physical existence, or perceptible existence; and that, *vice versa*, whatever is part of the content of attention, marginal or focal (and whether sensuous, imaginal, or conceptual), has all the existence it needs for aesthetic purposes, no matter what other sorts of existence, for instance physical, it may lack.

§ 5

The relation of aesthetic object to aesthetic feeling is not causal. Once it is clearly understood that the aesthetic object is neither more nor less than the content of attention considered as matter for aesthetic contemplation, it becomes evident enough that the relation between the aesthetic object and its import of asthetic feeling is no more one of cause and effect, or of stimulus and response, than is the relation between a word and its meaning.[2] A causal relation, on the contrary, does exist between the behavior of the *physical* object beheld, and that of the beholder's visual organs. The physical object reflects light, thereby causing a train of psycho-physical processes beginning in

[2] Ogden and Richards (*The Meaning of Meaning*) regard the relation between a word and its meaning as causal, and describe their theory of objective references as a causal theory. To do so, however, they find themselves forced to substitute for the word "caused" something which they call "an expanded account" of its meaning, but which is, I should say, only an arbitrary and erroneous account of that meaning, namely, essentially Hume's account, with its complete confusion of the two notions of cause and law. As they themselves declare, every right-minded person will be shocked by the assertion that to say "I am thinking of A," is the same thing as to say "My thought is being caused by A." But this shock is evidence enough that an account of the meaning of the word "caused" which makes these two statements mean the same thing, is not an empirical analysis but (unconsciously) only a fanciful invention. What the term "cause" actually does mean, I have attempted to show in a monograph entitled *"Causation and the types of Necessity.* Univ. of Washington Press, 1924, and more briefly in a paper *On the Nature and the observability of the Causal Relation,* Jour. of Phil., Vol. XXIII. No. 3.

the eye. Much obscurity is likely to pervade the question of the relation between aesthetic object and aesthetic feeling, unless one distinguishes sharply a number of things which, with careless language, might easily pass as but one. These diverse things are the cause of a feeling, the reason for a feeling, the object of a feeling, the evidences of a feeling, and lastly the aesthetic symbol of a feeling, i.e. the aesthetic object. Taking as a concrete case the feeling called anger, the *cause* of it (as distinguished from the reason) would be, for instance, the air-vibrations impinging upon our ear-drums when somebody utters insulting words. The *reason* for anger, on the other hand, would be some dramatic fact present to consciousness such as a blow, an insult, a betrayal of trust, etc. The *object* of the anger (in the common, not the aesthetic sense of the word object), would be the person or thing whose mode of behavior was the reason for anger. The *evidences* of anger would be any mode of behavior of a person, that makes us realize that that person is angry, for instance, his cursing and stamping, or his striking another, of his vehement assertion that he is angry, etc. An *aesthetic symbol* of anger, on the other hand, i.e., an aesthetic object embodying anger, would be, among the sorts of things which are evidences of anger, any situation allowing, or still better, inviting aesthetic contemplation, and such as to yield through it to us the "taste" of anger, — not the mere intellectual information of inference *that* some one is angry. Such a situation might consist merely in the *representation* of behavior empathically evidencing anger (rather than in the actual *presentation* of such behavior, which might make impossible the contemplative attitude); for instance, it might consist in the representation of a scowling face, or of the speeches of an angry man, such as those of Achilles in his quarrel with Agamemnon over Briseis in the first

book of the Iliad. Or again, the situation aesthetically objectifying anger might consist in the representation, in terms of Achilles' point of view, to be empathically taken, of the reasons for his anger; and so forth. In the case of such a feeling-quality as that called anger, the aesthetic object objectifying it must obviously be dramatic; but in the case of numberless other feelings (which have no names) the aesthetic objects yielding them in contemplation are neither dramatic in fact, nor dramatized. Patches of colors, many odors and tastes, many nonrepresentative designs, etc. would be instances of entities that may constitute such aesthetic objects.

§ 6

The aesthetic object is the natural, immediate, and unique symbol of an aesthetic feeling. The relation between the aesthetic object, viz., the content of attention aesthetically contemplated, and aesthetic feeling, is a relation much more intimate than the causal, and very different from it. That relation is *Symbolization,* but it is symbolization of a particular sort, which must now be precisely differentiated from the other and more familiar sort naturally thought of when symbolization is mentioned. The two sorts may be designated respectively, *aesthetic symbolization,* and *logical symbolization.*

The symbolizing of aesthetic feelings by aesthetic objects is not ultimately arbitrary and conventional, as is the symbolizing of meanings by words. One can make a given word mean what one pleases, by simply laying down a definition or stipulation to that effect.[3] But one cannot

[3] Such a definition or stipulation, let it be well noted, is itself possible only by means of words that are *already* understood. It *presupposes* a language, with its terms and its logic. This is a point overlooked, I think, by people who maintain that "other logics than ours" are possible. The

in any such manner make a given object the "aesthetic symbol" of any feeling one pleases. The import of aesthetic feeling which a given aesthetic object has for a given person at a given time is a bare matter of psychological fact, — a fact hard and impervious to stipulation in the same sense as, let us say, the fact of the overtones which I shall distinguish if a given note is struck just now on the piano. Such facts are not indeed immutable but they are not to be changed simply by laying down a stipulation. The changes that occur in the feeling-import of a given aesthetic object for any given person are psychological effects of experiences of various sorts, and occur in their own good time. Associations, of course, affect the feeling experienced, and are variable. But associations are *internal to the aesthetic object,* not external; and this means that when the associations of some entity change, the aesthetic object (consisting as it does of the entity *and* its associations) itself has changed. The fact that a given meaning is symbolized by a given word is, in all but onomatopoeic words and a few others, ultimately a matter of pure chance, or of arbitrary stipulation. That is, any other word would have served just as well; there is no intrinsic psychological appropriateness of just that word to just that meaning. In aesthetic symbolization, on the contrary, arbitrary stipulation plays no rôle, or virtually none. For this reason, in the language of feeling, there is nothing corresponding to what a *definition* is in the lan-

ordinary language, by means of which we are given the fundamentals of these other logics, is a sort of "transformation formula," which relates them to ours. What could anybody make of *Principia Mathematica,* if the Introduction to it in plain English, were left out? The so-called "Laws of Thought" are, I believe, primarily the rules of the game of "Saying something." The game "Talking Nonsense," which is not bound by them, may sometimes be more fun; but it is not the same game. Therefore, whoever says anything at all whether about a new logic or about anything else, has already assumed these "laws of thought."

guage of meaning, viz., a pair of sets of symbols having exactly the same import, and therefore always strictly interchangeable for logical purposes. In the language of feeling, no symbol or set of symbols is ever completely interchangeable with any other which is discernibly different from it.

Another fundamental difference between aesthetic and logical symbolization is that in the former, only *two* terms are involved, viz., the aesthetic object and the aesthetic feeling which it *directly* symbolizes; whereas, in the latter, *three* terms are involved, viz., the word, the meaning (the thought), and the (possible) thing meant, i.e., the logical object. The word symbolizes the meaning directly, but the logical object only *indirectly,* through the meaning.[4]

The relation between the aesthetic object and the aesthetic feeling that "corresponds" to it, may, after these explanations, be summarily described by saying that *the aesthetic object is the natural, immediate, and unique symbol of the feeling.* These qualifications accurately differentiate aesthetic symbolization, i.e., symbolization of feeling, from logical symbolization, which is what usually is meant when the word Symbolization is used alone.

In spite of what has been said above concerning the internality to the aesthetic object, of all associations or meanings, the objection that the same person gets different feelings at different times in the contemplation of the same object, might still be felt to have some force. It

[4] The essentially mediate character (viz., through thoughts) of the symbolization of things by words is perceived and rightly emphasized by Ogden and Richards, in their valuable work, *The Meaning of Meaning.* That there is a language of feeling, however, as well as of meaning, and that matters stand otherwise there, has not I believe been noticed by them. For a discussion of immediate as well as of mediate symbolization, and of the sorts of entities constituting the terms of such symbolization, see the writer's *Causation and the Types of Necessity,* pp. 103 ff.

will therefore be well to state explicitly here in which various ways (as the case may be) is to be explained the fact which that objection purports to describe.

First, it may be that the "object" referred to is not the aesthetic object as defined, but only some part of it, — perhaps the part of it only which is sensuously present, or perhaps even only a part of that, in a different sensuous context. This would mean, of course, that the *aesthetic object* contemplated at the different times by the given person, is not the same; and its import of feeling therefore cannot be the same either.

Or, second, it may be that the emotional blankness required in aesthetic contemplation was imperfectly achieved on the earlier or the later occasion, or both, and that the blending of the feeling-import of the aesthetic object with the residuum of feeling then present in us, permitted us to experience only a mixture or compound of the two, different on the various occasions.[5]

Or, third, it may be that the meaning, i.e., the representative power, of certain entities which are parts of the aesthetic object, has changed for us as a result of the growth of our information or understanding, so that the parts of the total aesthetic object which these representative entities set before our attention are now other than before. If so the total aesthetic object is also different and naturally has a different import of feeling.

Lastly, it may be that through the establishment of hid-

[5] Such imperfection, to a varying extent, in the attainment of the emotional blankness or passivity required in contemplation, is obviously the normal state of affairs. The state of *perfect* emotional blankness demanded is an ideal, only approximated more or less, in practice. But it is nevertheless indispensable as a defining postulate, in characterizing the state of aesthetic contemplation (and, by implication, the aesthetic object, and aesthetic feeling). The defining of aesthetic contemplation in terms of a condition probably never exactly realized, is thus not objectionable nor futile any more than the analogous defining of gravitation in terms of conditions never actually realized.

den, subconscious associations and dissociations, our own emotional nature has itself so changed that (at least in respect to certain sides of it) we are hardly any longer the same person. This process, in varying degrees, is a normal one in all of us. The difference between this case and the previous one is only that the associations or meanings which have changed are *unconscious,* instead of conscious. That is, they are not part of the content of attention, even marginal. And this is to say that the aesthetic object (which is the actual content of attention) has not then changed. The difference in the feeling-import of it is due to the fact that in this case, the person who contemplates it is, in essentials, a different person.

§ 7

Origin of the feeling-import of any specified thing. These considerations lead to the question how it happens to be that in the presence of some specified thing, we, as aesthetically contemplative beholders, experience such particular aesthetic feeling as we then do. There are three possibilities.

It may be that the aesthetic feeling we experience is the *native feeling-import* of the thing as literally present to us, which feeling-import is a function jointly of our individual psychological constitution, and of the nature of the thing. An example of a connection native in this sense would be that between the odor of decaying organic matter and the feeling of disgust.

Or it may be that the feeling we experience is the native feeling-import of what the thing literally present *represents* to us explicitly. That may itself be either the thing's proper meaning, i.e., something *intrinsically connected* with it (as when the noise of an automobile represents to

us the proximity of the latter); or else it may be something of which the thing is able to make us think only by accident, i.e., owing to a purely *chance connection* (as when a certain melody brings up for us the image of a particular person).

Or, lastly, the feeling we experience may be the native feeling-import of something which the thing literally present before us can be said to represent to us *only virtually, or potentially* (and which again may be either essentially or only accidentally connected with the thing). To speak of the representation in such a case as only potential and virtual, is to say that it does not actually occur at all to consciousness, but *that we feel what we would feel if it did so occur.* But in such a case the feeling is experienced by us as feeling-import *of the thing directly present to us.* We may call it the thing's *aesthetic connotation,* or the aesthetic feeling connoted by the thing, as distinguished from the thing's truly native feeling-import.

This account of the origin of the feeling-import of things in contemplation shows, incidentally, that the language of feeling is ultimately rooted throughout in *native* feeling-import. But in the language of meaning, there is no such thing as a native meaning-import of words; so that it is throughout ultimately rooted in arbitrary convention or adventitious association.

§ 8

Santayana's doctrine of "Expression." The aesthetic connotation of things, as just described, is what Santayana calls their *expression,* a term which, in spite of the clear statement he gives of the meaning he attaches to it, has confused many of his readers. There are several reasons for this. One of them is that there are other and more

familiar meanings in which the term Expression is used. Another is Santayana's threefold division of beauties, as of Material, of Form, and of Expression, which suggests that Expression denotes, like "Material" and "Form," an *aspect* of aesthetic objects, instead of referring as it does for him to the *history* of the aesthetic powers which they have for the beholder.[6] Another is the fact that the term Expression seems at times to be so used by him as to include the aesthetic import of what has been described above as the *actually* represented, and proper meaning of a thing, as well as the *only virtually* represented and *accidental* meaning of a thing.

The conditions under which "expression," or (to use the term suggested above), aesthetic connotation, comes to be acquired by anything, are analyzed by Santayana with such insight and set forth by him so lucidly, that I can do no better here than to reproduce the substance of his account. "In all expression," he writes, "we may thus distinguish two terms: the first is the object actually presented, the word, the image, the expressive thing; the second is the object suggested, the further thought, emotion, or image evoked, the thing expressed." [7] There must be an association in our minds between the two terms, but the first term will not by virtue of it possess expression if such an analysis into a first and second term is at the time explicitly present to the mind. The two terms must be so confounded in consciousness that the first term becomes suffused with the emotions attaching to the second (p. 197). Lastly, in order that there be *beauty*

[6] "Expression then differs from material or formal value only as habit differs from instinct — in its origin. . . . An observer, looking at the mind historically, sees in the one case [viz. that of Expression] the survival of an experience, in the other the reaction of our innate disposition" (p. 195 — *Sense of Beauty*).

[7] *Sense of Beauty*, p. 195.

of expression, the second term must possess positive value, i.e., pleasurableness. This and the preceding requirement are stated together in the single sentence: "The value of the second term must be incorporated in the first." This incorporation means that "the beauty of expression is as inherent in the object as that of material or form, only it accrues to that object not from the bare act of perception, but from the association with it of further processes due to the existence of former impressions" (p. 197).

§ 9

Relations between Santayana's terminology, and that used here. It may be worth while at this point to give as precise a statement as possible of what seems to me to be the relations between the terminology in these pages and that of Santayana's doctrine of Expression.

(a) Santayana's discussion is throughout essentially concerned with beauty, while mine is concerned with aesthetic emotion or feeling, and abstracts in most places from its value aspect (i.e., from its pleasantness or unpleasantness, and from the corresponding beauty or ugliness of the object).

(b) Santayana accordingly means by the expression of an object, both the acquired feeling-import of that object, and the pleasant or unpleasant tone of that feeling. On the other hand, when I speak of the Aesthetic Connotation of an object, I refer essentially to its acquired feeling-import due to associations (whether essential or accidental) not at the time present to consciousness either imaginally or conceptually; and while I do not deny that such feeling always has some value (positive, negative, or neutral), I abstract from that value unless particular occasion arises to talk about it. In such a case, I refer to

it specifically as the value, or the algedonic tone, of the aesthetic connotation of the object, or of the aesthetic feeling connoted by the object.

(c) Santayana used the word "expressiveness" to mean "all the capacity of suggestion possessed by a thing," and reserves "expression" for "the aesthetic modification which that expressiveness may cause in the thing" (p. 197). As it seems to me, his term "expressiveness" then denotes indifferently four things which, although they are indeed all cases of "what a thing suggests," I have felt the need of distinguishing rather than assimilating. The first and second are explicit representativeness (proper, or accidental); and the third and fourth are merely virtual representativeness (again proper, or accidental).

CHAPTER XII

THE AESTHETIC FEELINGS

§ 1

Aesthetic feeling is any feeling obtained in contemplation. The question how aesthetic feelings differ from others has received considerable attention from writers on aesthetics. Some have attempted to differentiate the aesthetic feelings from the non-aesthetic on the basis of the sense organs through which the objects yielding the feelings are perceived, — the eye and the ear alone being considered "aesthetic senses." Others have proposed disinterestedness and universality, as distinguishing marks of the feelings called aesthetic and of aesthetic pleasure. These attempts to formulate the distinction between aesthetic and other feelings, however, have all been effectively criticized by various writers,[1] and need not be reviewed in detail here. On the basis of what has now been said concerning the nature of the state of aesthetic contemplation, aesthetic feelings may be defined simply as follows: *Any feeling whatever which is obtained in aesthetic contemplation, is aesthetic feeling;* and no feeling is aesthetic feeling, which we experience while our attitude is other than the aesthetically contemplative. In other words, feeling is aesthetic feeling whenever its status is neither that of a mere incitement to or accompaniment or result of practical activity, nor that of an accessory or by-product of cog-

[1] See for instance, Santayana, *Sense of Beauty*, part I.

nition, but is on the contrary the status of something being sought or entertained for itself, and simply *"tasted."*

§ 2

Under certain conditions, any feeling-quality may acquire the aesthetic status. The aesthetic feelings are thus not qualitatively different from the non-aesthetic, and this involves that there is no sort of feeling which may not on occasion acquire the aesthetic status, or which art may not attempt to objectify. Spencer rightly observes that "The aesthetic feelings and sentiments are not, as our words and phrases lead us to suppose, feelings and sentiments that essentially differ in origin and nature from the rest. . . . The same agencies are in action; and the only difference is in the attitude of consciousness towards its resulting states."[2]

As concerns intensity rather than kind, it is obvious that feeling of a given sort may without losing the aesthetic status have any degree of intensity which will not preclude the maintaining of the aesthetic attitude towards the object; for it is one and the same thing to say that the feeling is experienced in that attitude, and that the feeling is aesthetic feeling.

To say that feelings of any sort may, at least theoretically, be aesthetic, is of course also to say that any subject may be treated by the artist, if he is able to present it in a manner which will invite, or at least permit aesthetic contemplation. Thus the problem of the conditions of aesthetic contemplation, that of the restrictions of subject-matter in art, and that of the possible kinds and degrees of aesthetic feeling are virtually but three aspects of one and the same problem. That problem arises from the fact that in each of us other interests, such as the practical, the

[2] *Principles of Psychology,* Vol. II, p. 646.

scientific, the sportive, etc., compete with that which manifests itself in aesthetic contemplation. The various interests of man have but limited independence, and usually they are not equally strong. In most of us, probably, the practical man is the strongest and the aesthetic man the weakest. As already pointed out, the aesthetic man is therefore allowed by the others to appear, only when there is no temptation or no great temptation for those others to come forward. But in this respect individuals differ greatly both by nature and by training. In artists the capacity to take the contemplative attitude is usually much more highly developed than in other persons. Unfortunately, artists often overlook this and leave in or about their work handicaps to contemplation that cannot be overcome by the public to whom they exhibit it.

§ 3

The nature of the conditions of aesthetic feeling. If we ask for the conditions, in terms of kind and degree of feeling, which facilitate the taking or the maintaining of the aesthetic attitude, i.e., the obtaining of aesthetic feelings, we note that any of the feelings which by instinct or by habit are intimately connected with an important practical reaction may not be aroused in any but a mild degree if the contemplative attitude is not at once to be displaced by the practical. Examples of such feelings would be fear, disgust, horror, lust, greed, hunger, and so on. The temptation to give up contemplation, which the arousing of such feelings furnishes, can, as already pointed out, to some extent be counteracted by the introduction of positive inducements to maintain it. Tragedy is the outstanding example of this possibility. The tragic emotions are unpleasant and therefore closely connected with the practical reac-

tions of avoidance of, or interference with, the situation from the presence of which those emotions arise. If in spite of this temptation to practical action, contemplation is maintained, it is because the positive values present at the same time in contemplation are sufficient to overcome that temptation. As Santayana points out in his excellent discussion of tragedy, these positive values are found not only in beauty of form and in the nobility of characters and setting, but also and perhaps chiefly in the felt value of the wisdom which may be garnered from the presentation of a case of some typical problem of human life. As he says, "However unpleasant truth may prove, we long to know it, partly because experience has shown us the prudence of this kind of intellectual courage, and chiefly because the consciousness of ignorance and the dread of the unknown is more tormenting than any possible discovery" (*Sense of Beauty*, p. 230).

It is not to be forgotten in the present connection, however, that while some measure of beauty is as we have seen almost a condition of the aesthetic "visibility" of works of art to most persons, such "visibility" and therefore such beauty nevertheless are no necessary constituents of the work of art. The importance which they undoubtedly have, concerns not the nature of art, but its social services and rewards. As already stated, no contradiction is involved in speaking of something as being both a work of art and irredeemably ugly. But aesthetic contemplation of such a work of art, though possible, and indeed necessary to the apprehension of its ugliness, would under normal circumstances be abandoned at once.

§ 4

"Feeling" does not mean merely pleasure and displeasure. Feeling, whether aesthetic or not, does not con-

sist of mere pleasure or displeasure. Most feelings, indeed, are either pleasurable or the reverse, but there is much to a feeling beside pleasure or displeasure. Each feeling has its essence in a unique qualitative residuum which differentiates it from all others; whereas, in respect to pleasurableness or the reverse, it is like numberless others. Therefore the nature of love, fear, hatred, jealousy, or of any other feeling whether named or nameless, is something that no description can impart. Just because a feeling is, as already pointed out, not a resultant but an emergent, one necessarily has to experience it either at first hand, or not at all.

If there were to a feeling nothing more than its pleasantness or unpleasantness, then, since the beauty of an object consists in the pleasantness of it to contemplation, any two equally beautiful objects would be interchangeable as modes of expression for the artist and as objects of contemplation for the beholder. But obviously this is not the case. Casanova says that "Love is not like some merchandise that one desires, and for which one substitutes another more or less similar when one cannot get that which one covets. Love is a sentiment or caprice of sympathy; only the object which inspires it can extinguish it or make it burn.[3] It is the same in art. Painting a landscape, or a figure, is not for the artist a possible substitute for the painting of a bowl of pansies, even though the beauty of the landscape or the figure be in its way as great as that of the pansies, or greater. His endeavor is to express objectively the particular feeling he happens to have, and this can be done only by the constructing of the one particular object which is for him the aesthetic symbol of that feeling. From the standpoint of the beholder instead of the creator, the same unsub-

[3] *Mémoires,* Vol. V, p. 273.

stitutability holds. To suppose otherwise would be much like supposing that any piece of information can be substituted for any other if only both are equally true.[4]

It is interesting, however, to ask why this unsubstitutability is a fact even from the standpoint of a merely hedonistic "consumer." The answer is that it is a matter of context. We speak of exchanging one beauty, or one experience of beauty, for another; but this can be done only indirectly. What we do directly is to exchange one beautiful *thing* for another. And a beautiful thing, is almost invariably only a part of the total aesthetic object contemplated, which includes more or less of the context in which the thing is. When we declare the things exchanged to be equally beautiful, we probably assume a context appropriate to each; and therefore if we exchange the things without the contexts, we destroy the equality. The case is the same here as with the pleasures of eating. The most delicious soup ceases to be such if served after dessert. And if the attempt were made to substitute the pleasure of a symphony for that of our dinner, the pangs of hunger would prevent the pleasure which otherwise we should find in the music.

However, if the matter of contexts is eliminated by speaking not of equally beautiful *things*, but of equally beautiful *aesthetic objects* (which, by definition, have no contexts); and by supposing the emotional blankness specified in the definition of the aesthetic attitude, to be attained *perfectly*, — then, for a purely hedonistic "consumer," equally beautiful aesthetic objects *are* strictly interchangeable. Different but equally true pieces of information are not interchangeable for any purpose except that of having equally true propositions. But

[4] This should not be taken to imply a complete analogy between beauty and truth, in their respective realms.

Beauty (unlike truth), being an *immediate* value, can involve no differences of ulterior purposes; and a consistently hedonistic theory of values must insist on the fact that, not pleasant feelings, but the feeling called pleasure, always remains qualitatively the same whatever the object that gives it (e.g., whether a piece of candy or a sonata); and is susceptible only of quantitative variations, for instance, of volume, intensity, and duration.[5]

§ 5

The feelings experienced by human beings are endlessly various, and only a very few, such as love, fear, anger, etc., have received names. There is a fact which it is most important to realize clearly and to bear constantly in mind throughout the present volume, for otherwise the philosophy of art set forth in its pages is bound to be completely misunderstood. The fact referred to is that *the feelings experienced by human beings are endlessly numerous and various, and that the immense majority of them cannot be referred to by name because they have received none.*

Only a very few feelings, such as those already alluded to, — love, anger, fear, jealousy, anxiety, etc., — have names. They are feelings which are closely connected with typical, recurrent situations in life, and are usually ac-

[5] Although I am convinced that none but a hedonistic theory of values is sound, I am also convinced that any hedonistic calculus that involves the notion of sums of pleasures, is nonsense because that notion is itself nonsense. Pleasures are what logicians call "intensive" quantities, not "extensive"; that is to say, there is no known operation by means of which any two pleasures uniquely determine a third greater than either, — which is what summation means. Pleasures can be compared as to intensity and duration, but we cannot *add* them any more than, to use one of Royce's examples, we can "add' together the excellence of Byron's poetry and the excellence of Shelley's and get thereby a third factual excellence greater than either. The additive "program," in such cases, remains but empty words. It denotes no actual operation yielding facts.

companied by overt and easily recognizable modes of behavior. The terms "the emotions," and "the passions," designate principally those standard, labelled feelings, and indeed those feelings primarily as out of the aesthetic status, that is to say, as mere accompaniments or incidents of practical endeavor of one sort or another. But to one such named feeling, there are a thousand that have received no name, but which are none the less real experiences of the very same general sort, viz., emotional.

Unfortunately, in our inner experience still more than in outer, what is not labelled commonly escapes our notice. As La Rochefoucauld almost says, some people would never have known love, had they not heard of it. Those of our feelings for which no names exist are so easy to overlook that when much is made of them, as in these pages, many persons are likely to be somewhat bewildered, and, as with the aesthetic attitude, to think that some quasi-mystical sort of experience must be in question, which they themselves do not have. But this is not so. Almost every one has feeling-responses, i.e., experiences emotional in kind but quite distinct from love, fear, anger, or other namable emotions, in the presence of such things as patches of colors, bits of lines, single tones, the patterns of rugs, lace, wall-paper, and so on. These emotional experiences are not merely experiences of pleasure or displeasure. Each of them has, in addition to its pleasurableness or the reverse, its individual feeling-tang, or emotional "taste," different with each color, tone, line, etc. For the purpose of bringing to awareness the often unsuspected abundance and variety of the emotional states we experience, such simple sources of unlabelled feelings as just suggested are better than more elaborate objects; for the latter, although even more fertile of such feelings, also in many cases touch off to some extent one or another of the

labelled feelings, which, because of its familiarity and its label, we at once notice to the probable exclusion of the unlabelled.

The feelings which are unlabelled, are so for various reasons. They are commonly of lower intensity than "the passions"; they do not last so long; and do not recur so often. They have no immediate and obvious practical manifestations. The chief reason, however, is probably that they are *individuals without a kind.* The names Anger, Love, Anxiety, etc., are not proper names but names of kinds, and the cases of those kinds are not noticed by us as individuals but as cases-of-a-kind. The *individuality* of each is overlooked by us as generally as are the unlabelled feelings. This overlooking is due to the fact that most of the time we are living practically, ectotelically, and that for this sort of living, *kinds,* which have laws that we can apply (while individuals as such have not), are alone important, alone noticed, and alone given names.

The deliberate aesthetic contemplation of the objects of the unlabelled feelings, makes the noticing of those feelings very much easier. Even then, however, one is usually not to expect an experience comparable in intensity to the experiences we spontaneously think of when "the emotions" are mentioned. Moreover, the unlabelled feelings (or indeed any feeling), in so far as then having the aesthetic status, will not, like "the emotions," be apprehended as *in us;* but will on the contrary be objectified, i.e., apprehended as emotional qualities of the aesthetic objects contemplated.

Failure to recognize that the realm of feeling contains not merely love, fear, anger, and so on, but a vast wealth of other unnamed but just as truly emotional experiences, is I believe the principal explanation of such opposition

as there has been to "emotionalist" theories of art. The so-called formalists, like Hanslick,[6] seem wholly blind to the fact that form is important in aesthetic objects for the very reason that it itself, in contemplation, is the source of certain aesthetic *emotions* which nothing else can objectify. And they are blind also to the fact that *contents* as well as forms, and in abstraction from forms, e.g., single tones and stray patches of color, are *also* sources of certain aesthetic emotions, which nothing else can yield. A statement such as that "A tone becomes musical material only by association with other tones," [7] should therefore be recognized for what it is, namely, a piece of sheer formalistic dogmatism, and not at all a report of empirical fact.

§ 6

Aesthetic feeling distinguished from sensation. It is important not to confuse aesthetic feeling with sensation. When a content of attention is referred to as "a sensation," it is usually then being regarded as an object *of cognition.* An object of cognition is essentially something which comes to us, as it were, with an introduction. Thus if the color blue is at a given time for us an object of cognition, it is so in virtue of its coming introduced, for instance, as "the color of the sky," or as "a color like or unlike the color of this or that," or as "something we desired to see," etc. In short, we meet it as *object of a reference of some sort,* past or about to come, i.e., as answering, or forestalling, a question; or satisfying or anticipating a perhaps unformulated curiosity. It thus functions as an element in a judgment whether explicit or not, and belongs to the realm of information.

[6] *The Beautiful in Music.*
[7] *How to Listen to Music,* by H. E. Krebiehl, 2nd Ed., p. 17.

But if on the contrary a patch of blue is out of relation to our curiosity, and constitutes only a content of attention from which in aesthetic contemplation a feeling is obtained, then the patch of blue is no longer object of knowledge, but aesthetic object. It functions as aesthetic symbol of a certain feeling, — of a somewhat different one with each distinguishable shade of blue. Since such a feeling has no proper name, we are able to refer to it when occasion arises to do so, only by either pointing to its aesthetic symbol or by naming that symbol when it has a name, saying, for instance, *the feeling of* cerulean blue. But a source of confusion is latent in this mode of speech, due to the ambiguous manner in which the word Feeling has been used, viz., sometimes, as by William James, to denote any psychological state, and sometimes to denote only states of the nature of emotion. As already stated, it is in the latter sense that the word Feeling is used in these pages, so that by "the feeling of cerulean blue" is not here meant the *color,* cerulean blue, but the *emotion* of which we become conscious when, attending to that color, we take toward it the attitude which we have called the aesthetically contemplative. That emotion or feeling is a fact distinct from and additional to the mere blueness, for at least in the case of so trivial a content of attention as a mere patch of color, no noticeable feeling usually arises unless we deliberately "listen" for it, i.e., unless we take the aesthetic attitude towards the blue attended to.

§ 7

Aesthetic feeling, passion, and artistic feeling or inspiration. A question which presents itself here is how to describe, not the feeling that the spectator obtains in contemplation, but the feeling which possesses an artist at the

time he is attempting to create an objective expression of it. We cannot speak of it as aesthetic feeling, since aesthetic feeling, by definition, presupposes the contemplative attitude, and what we are now considering is the feeling at the moment when the artist's attitude is creative, viz. effective. We may designate it *Artistic feeling,* remembering that, as with passion and aesthetic feeling, the term refers not to a qualitative difference, but to a difference in external relations. Artistic feeling, which is what most often is called *artistic inspiration,* is like passion in that both express themselves in action, i.e., in the case of each, the attitude is effective; but in the case of passion it is ectotelically effective, and in that of artistic feeling on the contrary, endotelically so. Passion expresses itself by dealing with the facts that constitute the reason for its existence, destroying or preserving them. Artistic feeling or inspiration does nothing of the sort, but expresses itself by creating what we may call a mirror of itself.

It might be objected, however, that in some cases the distinction above between aesthetic feeling and artistic feeling cannot be maintained. One might urge, for instance, that in painting the artist almost always has a model, from the contemplation of which, or of some aspect of which, arises the feeling he attempts to express, which is therefore aesthetic feeling. But it must be remembered that the distinction between aesthetic and artistic feeling is not based on any internal difference between the two, but solely on a fact external to the feeling itself, viz., on the attitude at the time, of the person having the feeling. And it is obvious that when the artist's attitude changes from the contemplative to the effective, the *status* of his feeling automatically changes also from the "aesthetic" to the "artistic," even if the feeling happens to

remain wholly unchanged in point of intrinsic quality. Thus, from the standpoint of the feeling itself, the distinction between aesthetic and artistic feeling is factitious and of no importance. But from the standpoint of the total state constituted by the feeling *and* the attitude at the time, it is on the contrary a very real and necessary one: the state of aesthetic receptiveness is a very different state from that of artistic inspiration.

CHAPTER XIII

AESTHETIC OBJECTS. FORM AND CONTENT IN DESIGN AND IN DRAMATIC ENTITIES

The aesthetic object was defined earlier as the content of attention (marginal as well as focal), aesthetically contemplated. Something must now be said concerning certain questions which arise in connection with aesthetic objects, for instance, the distinction in them between Form and Content; the distinction between Dramatic Entities and Designs; and the relation which Representation has to these.

§ 1

Aesthetic objects have both Content and Form. In any aesthetic object it is possible to distinguish two fundamental aspects: *Form,* and *Content* (or Material). By form is meant simply *arrangement* or order; and by content or matter, whatever it happens to be that is arranged, ordered. A landscape in black and white, and the same landscape in colors, illustrate partial sameness of form and diversity of content. On the other hand, the numberless patterns in which the same bits of colored glass in a kaleidoscope arrange themselves as it is revolved, illustrate diversity of form with sameness of content. Content and form, although thus sharply distinguishable, are nevertheless inseparable. No existing content is wholly formless, and all existing form is form of some content. The

terms are thus correlatives, as are Genus and Species in logic, and Uncle and Nephew in the realm of family relationships among males. And just as the same man may be, but need not be, both uncle and nephew, though of different persons, so a thing which in reference to its elements is form or arrangement, may itself be, but need not be, an element of the content of a larger arrangement. Thus a circle which is an arrangement of points may itself be one of many similar circles which together are arranged in a pattern.

Although form and content are inseparable in fact, our attention may focus on one of the two and relegate the other to the margin of consciousness, thereby subordinating that other to a condition sometimes approaching that of nonexistence. The possibility of thus "giving the center of the stage" to the form-aspect of the object, and of then apprehending in contemplation its import of aesthetic feeling, is well recognized by the formalists. But they overlook the fact that in a precisely similar way the *content,* instead of the form, may be made to occupy the focus of attention and be contemplated; and, that it too is then found to have a definite feeling-import of its own. Normally, however, the attention tends to take in both form and content rather than to center upon one to the virtual exclusion of the other.

§ 2

Aesthetic objects are Dramatic Entities, and Designs. There are two other fundamental aspects which may be discerned in almost any aesthetic object, namely the *design aspect,* and the *dramatic.* As to these, the usual thing is that one of the two is more prominent than the other; and when the object is a work of art rather than of nature,

one of the two aspects just mentioned is almost invariably intended to be preëminent, and is made so. In such cases we might then better speak not so much of two *aspects*, as of two *sorts* of aesthetic objects, viz. *Designs* and *Dramatic Entities.*

It is important to note that the duality of Form and Content considered above is present within each of these two sorts of aesthetic objects. Dramatic entities as such exhibit it no less than Designs, and the tendency in some quarters to regard Form as something identical with, or possessed only by Design is completely indefensible. To make this evident it is enough to call attention to the kinds of relations that constitute respectively design-form and dramatic form. By doing so we shall at the same time be stating in a precise manner the difference between Dramatic Entities and Designs; and the clear recognition of the existence of these two sorts of aesthetic objects, and of the essential nature of each, is of the utmost importance if a one-sided and merely doctrinaire theory of the aesthetic object is to be avoided.

§ 3

Form and Content in Designs. In *Designs,* the formal aspect consists primarily of relations of space, or time, or both; and in addition, of the relations (such as those of pitch, intensity, and volume in the realm of sounds; and of hue, saturation, and tint or "value" in the realm of colors), which are peculiar to the nature of the content, and permit of establishing in it a variety of order patterns.

The content-aspect of designs, on the other hand, consists of whatever entities are capable of entering into evident relations of space, or time, or both. The commonest

are sounds and colors. Odors, tastes, temperatures, and the other sense-qualities cannot to anywhere near the same extent (when at all) be arranged in space or time orders; nor (with unimportant exceptions in the case of odors) do they seem to permit of any ordering on any basis analogous to hue and pitch. They therefore are not design-materials, or only to a negligible extent.[1] Their place for aesthetic purposes is that of qualities of things, — experiences which dramatic instruments can procure to us.

As examples of designs, or of entities in which the design aspect rather than the dramatic, is preëminent, may be mentioned arabesques, fabric patterns, kaleidoscope patterns, lace, and other systems of shapes, space relations, and colors in a plane. There are also three-dimensional design-entities, for instance the crystals of various substances, as viewed by the mineralogically ignorant visitor of museums. Flowers too (and of course any three-dimensional objects) can be viewed as design-entities, although their aspect as dramatic instruments is for various reasons likely to be more prominent than in the case of crystals. As examples of design-entities in three dimensions that are products of art, may be mentioned some modern pictures, which are deliberately intended to represent nothing but arrangements of volumes in three dimensions. Design in time is, at its barest, rhythm, whether simple or complex. When the elements entering into the time-rhythm are sounds, then variations of pitch, intensity, volume, duration, and tone-color, give us musical compositions. When the elements in the time-rhythm are colors, spatial relations are added to the temporal, and we get such silent "color-music" as that of the Aurora Borealis, and of Mr.

[1] The idea of using them as design-materials has occurred to some, but leads to nothing. Huysmans, in his *A Rebours*, has played with the notion. The hero (?) of the book is represented as entertaining himself with olfactory and gustatory "music."

Wilfred's Clavilux. If the third dimension is added, we have an arrangement of colored volumes in time as well as space. An example of this would be furnished by the (non-pantomimic) dance, if it is not empathized but is considered as a purely visual event. "Designs," of course, can be empathized, and normally are so in varying degrees; but obviously so far as this is done they are not being viewed as designs but as (fictitious) dramatic entities.

§ 4

The dividing of works of art into designs and representations springs from confusion of thought. It is well to note at this point that the opposition which some writers [2] would set up between Design and Representation in art is an impossible one, and that the attempt at establishing it proceeds only from confusion of thought. For designs can be and are represented, no less than dramatic entities. Thus, music, even when considered purely as design, is represented by the customary symbols of musical notation just as truly as are the happenings constituting a romance, by the novelist's words. And when designs in the three dimensions of space are in question, it is obvious that only a representative process can bring them before consciousness. Depth in space is perceived only as the result of a process of interpretation of clues of various sorts (linear perspective, occlusion, disparity of double images, etc.), which, although automatically car-

[2] For instance Mr. Ralph Pearson in his book *How to See Modern Pictures*. The fourth chapter of it is one which people who do not suspect that there is such a thing as design, may read with much profit. But unfortunately the author is so intoxicated with design that he is apparently rendered completely blind to the aesthetic import of anything but design, — or indeed of anything but design-form. And practically every confusion and extravagance against which the present chapter would give warning, is to be found in his pages.

ried out, is none the less a process of representation. And when the arrangement of volumes in space, which constitutes a three-dimensional design, is given us by means of the painted *flat* surface of a canvas, it is still more clearly evident that the depth dimension, — the volume, — is only *represented* by what actually is on the canvas.

§ 5

Form and Content in Dramatic Entities. The opposition which people who thus mistakenly contrast design and representation really have in mind, is that between Designs and Dramatic Entities. What constitutes design has been stated above, in terms of the sorts of relations upon which design-form depends, viz., primarily relations of time and space, as such, and secondarily other relations which (somewhat ambiguously) may be described as mathematical in kind. Dramatic entities may now be characterized in a similar way in terms of the sorts of relations they essentially involve, — and thereby be sharply differentiated from Designs. All dramatic relations are relations of actual or potential causation or causal dependence, — considered, however, not in their merely ecbatic or mechanical aspect, but on the contrary *in so far as having bearings on desires and aversions.* That is to say, the essence of dramatic relations lies in their *telic* character, positive or negative (and telism presupposes causation[3]). Spatial and temporal relations are thus not *as such* dramatic relations, but only so far as they constitute means or obstacles to, or conditions of, action or experience of some sort.[4]

[3] In a paper entitled *Explanation, Mechanism and Teleology* (Journal of Philos. Vol. XXII, No. 6.) I have attempted to define the exact relation of telism to causation.

[4] The question then arises, where causal relations merely as such, i.e., out of telic interpretation, belong. I am inclined to think that, theoreti-

Dramatic entities, as we have seen, are of two sorts, — dramatic agents (and patients) in action of one sort or another, and dramatic instruments (positive and negative). The form and content aspects are discernible in the dramatic entities of each of these two sorts. The formal aspect is constituted by the kind or type to which the entity belongs, e.g., the kind "man," or "house," etc., and the content aspect by the particular exemplification of it in the concrete case. Whereas in designs the form is more difficult to perceive than the content, but, when once perceived, is likely to be deemed the more important of the two as a source of aesthetic value, the opposite seems to be the case where dramatic entities are concerned. In them the kind is generally easy to perceive, and the varieties of kinds are comparatively few. The contents, on the other hand, viz., the modes of individuation of the kind, are endlessly various, and the perception of their varieties and nuances, — which requires much sensitivity in the observer, — is when perceived usually found to be more fertile in aesthetic values than the kind.[5]

Many examples to illustrate what is to be understood by the actions and experiences of dramatic agents and patients, were given in the course of the discussion of Empathy, and no more are needed at this point. As to dra-

cally, they would belong (for aesthetics) to the realm of design. The sorts of designs of which they constitute the form-aspect, however, can become contents of attention only by conceptual representation (through the concepts of the sciences), and are therefore possible aesthetic objects only for persons who are equipped with these concepts, and these persons, as a rule, are not I believe much given to aesthetic contemplation. Designs of this sort, therefore, do not constitute an important class of aesthetic objects. The same would be true of designs in which the relations fundamentally involved are not causal, but implicational. That abstract mathematical and logistical structures have a design-aspect has long been recognized; but it is accessible, even among mathematicians, only to those who have an unusually long and thorough acquaintance with any such given structure.

[5] Cf. Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 115.

matic instruments, however, it may further be said that all the familiar objects around us, tables, chairs, pencils, watches, books, trees, food, light, wind, rain, clouds, etc., are cases of dramatic instruments. Each such entity constitutes a constellation of means or obstacles, conditions or opportunities, with respect to all sorts of possible human ends. And it is to be noted that these dramatic instruments constantly combine, in actual or potential causal interrelations, to form more complex dramatic instruments of more or less well-recognized dramatic type. Dramatic instruments also include animals and human beings in so far as they are interpreted not empathically, but functionally, in terms of their various possible rôles in relation to someone else, e.g., policeman, husband, baker, king, friend, sweetheart, teacher, etc. Institutions, such as the Church, the State, the Family, etc., and indeed any other entity whether abstract or concrete, which is viewed as having some actual or potential function, positive or negative in respect to human ends, is also a dramatic instrument.

The present work not being intended to constitute a manual of art-criticism, but only aiming to set forth fundamental principles of the philosophy of art, no more detailed consideration of particular art-forms and materials in the various arts will be attempted here. However, by way of making clear the bearings of the distinctions formulated in the preceding sections of this chapter, something will now be said concerning the dramatic and the design-interpretation of paintings, and the rôle in them of Representation.

§ 6

Paintings interpreted as designs in two dimensions literally presented. For most paintings we may distinguish

three typical modes of interpretation. In the first, the attention is given solely to that which is actually presented, as distinguished from represented, namely, to the colors, lines, and shapes which cover the flat surface of the canvas. Thus, when we interpret for instance a portrait or a landscape in this first manner, we abstract not only from the particular nature of the objects depicted, i.e., from their character as dramatic agents or instruments, but also from the fact that the flat lines, colors, and shapes, on the two-dimensional surface of the canvas represent volumes and the relations of volumes in a three-dimensional space world having *depth,* in addition to length and breadth. That which in a painting we should ordinarily describe at once as "a head," will therefore not, in this first manner of interpretation, be perceived at all as such, nor will it even be perceived as a roughly spherical solid. The content of attention will simply be an irregularly shaped, flat patchwork of certain colors. Any painting or other visual entity, for this first mode of interpretation, will then be nothing whatever but *a flat design in colors,* to be appraised on precisely the same sort of grounds as for instance the pattern and color arrangement of a rug, a fabric, or a piece of lace. In all cases considered in this first manner, the aesthetic object is directly and completely presented to aesthetic contemplation by sensory attention, and by attention to the lines and the shapes and spatial relations of the color areas in the plane of the canvas.

It is to be noted, however, that when a design is perceived as having or lacking symmetry or balance, empathy generally occurs, although I do not think that the perception of symmetry necessarily requires empathy any more than does the perception of shape. As we have seen, however, empathy is a representative process in the sense in which perception (or equally, illusion), as dis-

tinguished from mere sensation, is representative; that is, it is an (automatic, not a reasoned) interpretation of clues. The perception even of entities which are intended to be essentially designs, or which are supposedly being viewed purely as designs literally presented, thus usually as a matter of fact includes dramatic elements, imported into it by a representative process. In the perception of music, which is generally said to be a nonrepresentative art, empathic interpretation plays a most important rôle, so that music can be truly be said to be nonrepresentative only in the sense that it does not represent dramatic *instruments*. As empathically interpreted, however, it certainly represents most vividly (of course not through visual but through auditory clues) a variety of unlabelled *acts*, corresponding in contemplation to a range of dramatic aesthetic feeling vastly greater than that which visual designs can objectify even in the case of the persons who are most richly gifted to interpret them empathically.

§ 7

Paintings interpreted as designs in three dimensions, represented. The second mode of interpretation of a painting is that in which the lines, colors, and shapes on the flat canvas are taken as representing volumes and the relations of volumes in three-dimensional space, while at the same time the dramatic nature of the entities of which these are the volumes is still abstracted from and ignored. According to this second mode of interpretation, then, a head and a cabbage will not be perceived as such, but only as space-occupiers of approximately the same size and shape. They will thus, apart from color and details of shape, be roughly equivalent for this mode of interpretation, as regards essentials; whereas, considered dramati-

cally, they would on the contrary be essentially different. When the flat varicolored surface of the canvas is thus interpreted as representing a number of meaningless colored volumes of certain shapes in certain relative positions, the object of aesthetic contemplation may again be characterized as pure design. This time, however, what we have is not two- but three-dimensional design.

Here again, however, the perception of the presence or absence of symmetry, or of balance, whether in the lateral dimensions or in the depth dimension of the space represented, will normally either be accompanied by empathy, or take place through empathy. But the representation of dramatic characters hardly stops there, even if we deliberately neglect to note whether a given colored volume is a head, or a cabbage; for we can hardly help considering that volume as having some dramatic qualities, — as being, for instance, light or heavy, rough or smooth, solid or tenuous, etc. It is therefore evident that although a visual design, whether in two or three dimensions, consists of colored space-occupiers in spatial relations and color-relations, this does not normally constitute the whole story of the perception of it. Dramatic interpretation almost invariably is introduced to a greater or less extent.

§ 8

Paintings interpreted as dramatic entities, represented. The third typical mode of interpretation of a painting, and the most natural to the majority of persons, is that in which the attention is focused not on the design aspect of it, but upon what is usually called the *subject-matter* represented. The varicolored pattern on the flat canvas is now interpreted as representative not only of volumes of certain shapes having certain relations in deep space, but

of dramatic entities of familiar kinds, having individual traits of their own differentiating them from other entities of the same kinds. An orange, for instance, as a dramatic entity (instrument), is something of vastly different aesthetic import from a bomb, which in size, shape and color might conceivably be much like the orange, and would therefore as design-element have essentially the same aesthetic import. Again, from the design standpoint, a live dog, and the same dog in the same place and posture but dead and stuffed, are strictly equivalent and interchangeable. But from the dramatic standpoint they are so far from being equivalent that they even have hardly any resemblance at all. Once more, from the design standpoint, an old shoe in a bowl of fruit on a dinner table, might in color and shape and position have exactly the proper relation to the colors and patterns and volumes of that context, but from the dramatic standpoint it would on the contrary be shockingly incongruous, and would therefore be justified only if the feeling of shocking incongruity were the very one to which the artist intended to give objective expression.

§ 9

The dramatic and design aspects can hardly be fully isolated. It was pointed out above that the contemplation of supposedly pure designs is in fact hardly ever free from dramatic elements of one sort or another. That in the contemplation of dramatic entities, design elements also inject themselves, is true in still larger measure, for in perceptual and imaginal dramatic entities, at least, the design-aspect is actually there; it does not need to be invented, as on the contrary must be, through empathic imagination, the dramatic character of lines. And just

as in the field of ordinary vision we perceive, although not clearly, many things which we do not directly look at, so in the field of attention in general we find a margin as well as a focus, — a region of blurred or vague awareness, and one of sharp and clear. When we focus on one aspect of a painting we are marginally somewhat aware of the others. This means that the painter has to watch several things at once, as he criticises his work. For instance, the view of a picture as a three-dimentional design does not include but rather potentially competes with the view of it as a two-dimensional design. In a given case something which the composition of the three-dimensional design is felt to require may upset that of the two-dimensional; and yet neither can be ignored, for although attention may be focused on the one, we nevertheless remain marginally aware of the other, and, for good or ill, it contributes its aesthetic import whether we wish it to or not. The same sort of complication, but in more acute form, arises when the dramatic aspect of the entities represented by a painting is taken into consideration. For when the lines, shapes, etc., represent things, they not only become in contemplation the source of aesthetic feelings additional to and different in kind from those which they yield as design elements, but, as Mr. Roger Fry has pointed out, they also acquire a different weight as design elements.

§ 10

Remarks on Design vs. the representation of Dramatic Entities in modern art. The possibility of abstracting more or less from the dramatic nature of the objects depicted in a painting, and of viewing the painting essentially as a design, whether flat or deep, is one which some artists have always recognized. Or at least they have

been conscious that the design aspect of a painting was an important factor in the total aesthetic effect of the painting. But in modern times the design aspect seems to have been so violently rediscovered by some artists and critics as wholly to monopolize their attention, — with the result that they became totally blind to the fact that the dramatic aspect of the objects represented also has aesthetic import, and indeed taps a realm of aesthetic feelings fully as vast as that touched by design, or vaster, and of probably greater significance in the lives of human beings as such. If painting were to leave out the representation of dramatic entities and confine itself to color and pattern, it would thus enormously and quite wantonly restrict the range of feelings that it is capable of expressing. We hear it said, of course, that the "proper" elements of effect for painting are color, shape, and the representation of plastic form. But this is nothing but a pious opinion or personal preference arbitrarily erected into a dogma by faddists in the realm of aesthetics. It only illustrates the danger in which the craftsman ever is, particularly if he has not very much to express, of coming to think that the tools and tricks and technical devices which he must of course have and constantly practice himself in, are not made to be used but only to be played with and displayed. Common sense, however, tells us that any element of effect is proper for painting, which painting can successfully use; and there are hundreds of years of the successful use in painting of the representation of dramatic entities as sources of aesthetic feeling, to vindicate the practice. Schopenhauer, indeed, went so far as to say that the human countenance was the peculiarly proper subject-matter for painting. Without accepting this statement as it stands, it is pertinent to inquire how else than by the means which actually were used could the feelings

objectified for instance in the "Old woman cutting her nails" of Rembrandt (or Nicholas Maes?), have been expressed.

To hear some of our "moderns" one would think that if only a picture is well composed nothing else matters, and that looking at pictures is only the latest form of dancing! Hands have come after feet, then hips, stomach and knees, but now come eyes. They enter the picture here, we are told, then follow this line, turn here and return there. They dart this way, zigzag, wiggle, cavort and caper. Indeed, the only thing lacking is the music, and, in default of road signs, perhaps a critic or two with a go-go tree at the crossings to steer eye traffic on the canvas! The good public, which has no inkling of all this, naturally is bewildered by what it sees, and still more by what it hears about it. The public is, truly, blind in one eye, perceiving (with luck) the dramatic entities represented, and nothing else. But the addicts of composition are no less blind in the other eye, perceiving as they do everything except what the picture represents. People who have the use of both eyes, however, can only deplore that where pure design effects are aimed at, recognizable and horribly ugly objects should so often be used as elements, instead of more or less meaningless space-occupiers, which would not draw the attention from the design to themselves.

We are it is true instructed to disregard the nature and the ugliness of the objects represented, and to consider only the design. But this is like placing a steel trap in a public passage, and, when a man gets his foot caught in it, telling him that that object was not meant to be used as a trap, but only admired as an instance of fine mechanism. As we have seen, it is psychologically hardly possible to ignore the dramatic nature of the entities represented. Or at least, it is not possible to do it to a sufficient extent,

without a long course of deliberate psychological perversion for the undergoing of which there is no good reason, since it would confer on us only the dubious blessing of becoming able to enjoy pictures painted by the half-blind for the half-blind. Blindness to subject would be a desirable infirmity only if the subjects of pictures had of necessity to be ugly. But that this, fortunately, is very far from being the case is abundantly shown by the very pictures of old masters, of which the excellent design is trumpeted as if it were the whole by the moderns who claim to carry on their traditions. As well might the cabbage, because of its general shape, claim to carry on the traditions of the rose! In those old masters there is invariably, for those who can see, much beside the design, the chief rôle of which, indeed, is not to attract the attention to itself, but to lead it automatically to the rest. But the modern *nouveaux riches* of design, who think they emulate but in truth only ape the old masters, may be compared to perverse hosts, who bid us to a beautifully appointed table, and on it then serve refuse.

That which has given to the products of the art of painting the significant place which they have occupied in human life throughout the centuries, is very obviously their dramatic aspect, and not their design aspect, of which as such but a negligible number of persons outside of those who painted them have ever been explicitly conscious. The design, of course, makes its own contribution, which is far from being unimportant, to the total aesthetic effect. But on the whole, the design is like a household servant: it becomes conspicuous through its faults but not through its merits. Its business is not to attract attention to itself, but to serve the attention — to guide it to and hold it on the various objects represented, according to their dramatic significance. It is primarily a

psychological instrument of visual attention. To praise a picture for its composition is thus the same as to praise a book for its grammar or its arrangement. That sort of praise, in each case, is appropriate when the work is a school exercise; but it is only pedantic and silly, or at most, of only secondary relevance, when the work came to be because its maker really had something to express.

Of course, the design of a picture could not be functionally good if it were intrinsically bad, for it would, as such, attract attention to itself. But it would not be functionally good either, if it were to force itself upon the attention through the striking character of its intrinsic merit. Any design which fulfills well its task of holding the attention within the picture and guiding it appropriately to the objects of essential significance therein, is *eo ipso* proved to be intrinsically as good as it should be. If, however, the work is intended as essentially a piece of design, then the representation of dramatic entities, so far as present at all, should be frankly subordinated to the design (for instance by conventionalization, or repetition, etc.), and thus be made to remain in the margin of attention, instead of the focus. In a work of this type, striking ugliness, or equally striking beauty of the represented dramatic entities will be as fatal a defect as bad design in a picture primarily dramatic, and for the same reason, viz., it will draw the focus of attention away from that on which it should remain. Repulsive ugliness in subject, in design-pictures, is thus a fault which is the exact analogue of bad design in subject-pictures. The former, however, is the more hopeless of the two, for to be conscious in a picture only of the subject-matter is but naïve; whereas to overlook or slight it is perverse. The naïve person may be educated to discern the design which he as yet does not see, and come to appreciate its aesthetic import. But blindness

to subject-matter is something which, like *delirium tremens,* is usually acquired only through deliberate and assiduous cultivation. Those who have it may therefore literally be described as addicts, and they are generally incurable for they think of themselves as on the contrary connoisseurs or initiates equipped with the only true sort of aesthetic vision. Unfortunately they often are believed such also by the innocent, who are so bewildered and impressed by technical-sounding talk that they dare not call their aesthetic souls their own.

That sort of intoxication with half-truths, although common enough among the aesthetigentsia, is perhaps less acute among painters who merely paint than among painters who teach, teachers who paint, and critics, whose daily task it is to talk about pictures and to say what "ought" or "ought not" to be done or have been done in them. For this, they need a bag of rules which, being constantly present to their minds and ever reiterated, become with fatal ease so many fetishes blindly worshipped and thereby emptied of whatever merit they otherwise might possess. Often when such people themselves attempt to create, it becomes obvious to everybody but themselves and those whom they have brought up on their pet set of rules, that their works are but aesthetic corpses, constituting not the objectification of artistic feeling, but in truth only the objectification of a recipe. Their pupils too, get the feeling of superior insight when they discover in themselves the capacity to "prove" that the work is "very fine painting" . . . by pointing out that it obeys every one of teacher's rules! This is obviously like proving that a pudding is good by showing that it was made exactly according to recipe. Some of us, however, have tongues, and can taste, and therefore insist that, as the saying is, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Rules have no authority over

facts; they only sum up past facts, and may humbly hope to anticipate some future ones. In matters of taste rules are the little dogs that lead the aesthetically blind or half-blind along paths well-worn . . . by such as did make them. When we hear much mention of "technically very fine painting," it is salutary not to forget that there can be also such a thing as a technically very fine murder.

§ 11

Painting and Illustration. It is sometimes said that paintings which attempt to represent anything more than lines, colors, and plastic form become illustrations; and this is supposed somehow to damn them beyond the possibility of aesthetic redemption. To judge of the merits of that assertion it is necessary to be quite clear as to what exactly constitutes an illustration. An illustration is essentially a translation of the import of a description into concrete visual terms. It is thus fundamentally a means of satisfying curiosity more adequately than is possible by an abstract description. In other words, to be an illustration is to be an answer to the question, What does . . . look like?

It is obvious then, both that a given design can be an illustration, and that paintings representing dramatic entities need not be illustrations. All the designs in the pages of manuals of instruction in design are intended as illustrations, and function mainly as such. If, when we see the Rembrandt picture mentioned above, we say or think: "So that is what an old woman cutting her nails looks like," then it is obviously functioning for us as an illustration. On the other hand, if we take what the picture depicts, not as a piece of information, but as an object of aesthetic contemplation, then the picture is not

for us an illustration. A picture representative of dramatic entities is thus not intrinsically either an illustration or not. Whether it is depends wholly on how we take it. Many pictures which were originally intended as illustrations by those who commissioned them if not by those who painted them, have long ceased to be used as such by most of those who look at them. As instances may be mentioned all the religious paintings in museums, and many book illustrations, such as those of Dulac, Parrish, and others, not to go back to Doré, Hogarth, William Blake, etc.

The illustrative character in a painting condemns it aesthetically only when that character is of a nature to pique our curiosity, to set us speculating, or to tempt us to action; for this means, in each case, to give up or fail to take towards the painting the aesthetic attitude. A picture that provokes us to ask, Who are these people? or, When did this happen? or, Where is that mountain? and so on, is thus aesthetically bad — or else *we* are aesthetically bad. Worse yet however, would be a picture entitled, let us say, "Man playing the violin," but which puts before us only a meaningless jumble of lines and colors, and sets us as do children's puzzle-pictures, to "find the man" who in this case is not there. As stated already, the title of a picture, if descriptive, should be such as to set at rest at the very beginning any possible curiosity of ours as to what the picture represents, so that nothing remains but to contemplate that. In the same blameworthy category as the puzzle-pictures come pictures, perhaps without any title, which are representative in a partial or indefinite way and thus again present themselves to us not as objects to be contemplated, but as riddles to be solved. Bad also are pictures of food that are such as to "make one's mouth water," and thus appeal not to one's aesthetic sense but

to one's hunger. Illustrativeness, in a picture, is aesthetically bad if it makes difficult the aesthetic contemplation of it; but in countless cases it does not do so. On the other hand, there are many things other than the illustrative character, which may make contemplation difficult.

§ 12

Representation; — through inevitable and through accidental associations. The capacity of anything literally presented, to represent something to us, depends upon the possession by us of an appropriate set of associations; or, if we wish to put the same thing in more fashionable terms, it depends upon an appropriate "conditioning" of our ideational responses. For this reason, representativeness is a very variable thing. For example, it presupposes in some cases an acquaintance with historical facts, or with the customs and conventions of a particular epoch and place, or even with those of some given individual. For when we know a person well, trifling modifications in his behavior or appearance, which to a stranger would indicate nothing, represent to us clearly his mood, attitude, or train of thought. It is therefore possible that the artist who objectifies his feeling in an object which he cannot present but must represent will, to represent it, use a "vocabulary" that will be intelligible to few people, and may indeed amount to a secret code of his own.

The associations owing to the presence of which in a person's mind, a given entity signifies or represents to him some other are then, as already pointed out, roughly of two sorts. They are either accidental, or on the other hand more or less necessary and inevitable. The associations established in our minds between the various *properties* of a thing, are associations of the "inevitable" sort. Thus

the visual appearance of fire and its capacity to burn us, to communicate itself to certain near objects, to melt others, etc., inevitably become associated in the mind of every normal human being before he has lived many years. So long as our efforts to represent what we cannot for any reason directly present, avail themselves of such inevitable associations, we speak a well-nigh universal language. But many other attempts at representation are much more precarious. The association between a certain uniform and the functions of a policeman, for example, can hardly be regarded as inevitable except at most for the inhabitants of a given town. And the capacity of some faded flower, perhaps, to represent some vivid scene, or of some rare perfume to signify the near presence of some particular person, may be called wholly accidental. The accidental character of the association owing to which an object represents another is of course no objection to the use of it by an artist, but if as generally is the case he desires not only to express his feeling objectively, but also to impress it on others, he will be unable to do so unless that which he concretely places before them has, for them too, associations which make it represent adequately the aesthetic object embodying his feeling. His case is the same as that of the creative writer, who writes, indeed, endotelically, — to express himself; but who, if he publishes, publishes for some public, and must do so in a language intelligible to that public.

§ 13

Any entity whatever may be viewed as aesthetic object. From what has now been said of the importance as constituents of many aesthetic objects, of imaginally and conceptually represented elements, it is evident that the realm of possible objects of aesthetic contemplation is

immensely wider than that of objects of direct perception, and includes every entity which in any way whatever can become a content of attention. Thus, not only colors, odors, tastes, sounds, forms and their relations; and the things-as-wholes of which these may be aspects or component parts, — and whether or not these things themselves be brought before the attention through their natural perceptual signs as, for example, in painting, or through the artificial signs we call words, as in literature; — but also movements, and the actions of living beings, and, no less, highly abstract entities such as Justice, Righteousness, Malice, Strength, Swiftness, Energy, or even the completely impersonal entities of mathematics and logic, — any and every such thing may be faced as an aesthetic object, and ecpathized, i.e., from it may be extracted in contemplation its import of aesthetic feeling. It is to be noted moreover that to view aesthetically any of these things, we need no more wait for the artist to exhibit them to us than we need wait for the painter to exhibit to us landscapes or persons. However, works of art generally do not call forth our practical or inquisitive impulses as natural objects are apt to do; they place something before our attention in a manner which invites aesthetic contemplation, and they are therefore readier and easier sources of aesthetic feeling than natural objects. Again, natural objects and situations are often transitory; or the circumstances under which they have to be viewed preclude prolonged attention; whereas works of art either have relative permanence, or in the case of the time arts (music, the dance, the drama) can be reproduced again and again. In these respects also, therefore, works of art have the advantage over natural things, as to capacity for functioning as aesthetic objects. And lastly, although the resources of art in some cases fall short of those of nature,

(the painter's pigments, for instance, not possessing the range of lights and darks found in nature), it may nevertheless safely be said that more often art can do much that nature nowhere attempts. This is true, for instance, in the case of music, to compare with which the best that nature offers is the song of birds.

§ 14

Knowledge of art forms and aesthetic appreciation. It is often held that a knowledge of art forms is indispensable to the aesthetic appreciation of works of art, and, with this belief as a basis, numerous courses in music appreciation, the appreciation of painting and sculpture, the appreciation of poetry and literature, etc., are given in colleges, schools, and women's clubs. In these courses, one is told about and more or less successfully taught to recognize, for instance, the distinguishing features of the sonata form and other musical forms; of literary forms such as the short story; of poetical forms such as various sorts of verse, the sonnet, the ode, etc.; of various types of pictorial composition; of lines of "dynamic symmetry"; and so on.

Knowledge of this sort is indispensable to persons of one class, namely, those who desire to be able to *talk* about works of art in a manner that will be intelligible to those who are similarly equipped, and impressive to the humble who are not. To persons of another class, namely, those who desire to *create* works of art in the respective fields, such knowledge is, not indispensable, but useful within limits. It is, however, at the same time somewhat dangerous to them, inasmuch as overpreoccupation with it is likely to turn them into professional solvers of technical problems, — stuntsters instead of artists. But there is a

third class of persons, whom we may term the "consumers" of art, namely those who read stories and listen to music and look at pictures simply for the enjoyment they find therein; and it is a serious question whether, for such persons, knowledge of the sort described is not more likely to be fatal than useful.

This is not to be taken as denying that there is such a thing as beauty of form, or as refusing to admit that form is a most important contributor to beauty. It is also here freely admitted that in designs at least the perception of form is generally more difficult than the perception of content, and therefore that, as Santayana points out, form does not appeal to the inattentive. If one is form-blind or form-deaf, as nine-tenths of mankind may well be said to be to any but simple forms, then obviously one is cut off from the possibility of enjoying beauty of form. My quarrel with "art-appreciation" courses turns only on the question whether, or how far, the knowledge of forms which they impart is of the kind needed for aesthetic response to and aesthetic enjoyment of form; or whether on the contrary it is not of a sort that may easily destroy one's capacity for such enjoyment.

In order to obtain from the form of an aesthetic object of any sort its contribution of aesthetic feeling and aesthetic enjoyment, it is obviously necessary to be aware of that form, but it is not at all necessary to recognize it as entitled to some certain technical name, or to remember that it is like or unlike the form of some other familiar aesthetic object, or to know what are the characteristic features of that form, or to be familiar with the history of its development. All this sort of knowledge about form is as directly irrelevant to the obtaining of the form's contribution to aesthetic feeling and enjoyment, as analogous *knowledge-about* wines would be irrelevant to the enjoy-

ment of a fine wine. What is needed for that is only the capacity *to taste.* However, if we desire to enjoy not merely the taste of the wine, but also *the fineness* of it, then indeed for this we need lore and learning, since the pleasure we seek is not then sensuous pleasure merely, but also the *intellectual* pleasure of recognition, comparison, judgment, etc. That the wine he tastes is rare, old, and famous, is to the so-called "connoisseur" a source of keen pleasure, but that pleasure is one quite distinct from that of the taste of the wine, which any untutored man, if he but have a sensitive tongue, can enjoy quite as keenly as the connoisseur or possibly more so, since his attention to the taste as such runs no risk of being distracted by other considerations, as in the connoisseur.

The writer has an old friend who thinks himself a great lover of beauty, but who in fact would seem to be much rather (or, one is sometimes tempted to believe, exclusively) a lover of intellectual enjoyment of the sort just mentioned, which his lively intelligence is well fitted to procure him, and for which objects of beauty constitute merely one kind of occasion among others. In the presence of mountain scenery, for instance, his behavior indicates that his real interest is not in contemplating but in judging; for what he does is to try to decide whether the scene is more or less beautiful than some other and why so, and how much more or less so. At a concert what he appears to be essentially concerned with is, spotting all that he knows about the structures of the compositions played, and "grading" each composition as one does student's examination papers, with a mark, C+ or B— or D, etc., both as to execution and as to intrinsic merit. It might be thought that in order to do all that, the experience and enjoyment of aesthetic feeling is presupposed; but this is not necessarily the case. All such judgments concern-

ing values can be arrived at without actually experiencing much if any value oneself, and purely as inferences from signs that one has learned. It is possible to learn to recognize the sorts of "points" upon which blue ribbons are awarded to Mexican hairless dogs at the dog shows, and to decide purely on the basis of such memorized "points" that a certain dog of which, perhaps, one personally disapproves in every way, is a "good" dog. In the same way, it is possible to memorize, and learn to recognize in pictures, music, etc., the points upon which depends the approval of some certain person (or class of persons), whose judgment of aesthetic values one accepts as authoritative. One so accepts it because, if one is oneself blind, one has ultimately to trust somebody's sight, and somehow one has persuaded oneself that that person can see, that is, has a high degree of aesthetic sensitivity. Then by intelligent inferences on the basis of a well-learned system of signs, one is able to anticipate the valuations of one's authority, without any need of experiencing any values oneself — and one's audience never knows the difference! The fact that someone makes confident judgments concerning the aesthetic worth of various works of art, and supports his judgments by impressively technical reasons, is therefore no more a proof that he possesses any capacity for aesthetic feeling or aesthetic pleasure than is Helen Keller's ability to say when she is among trees a proof that she possesses the capacity to see them. That the sort of knowledge of art-forms that renders technical criticism possible, may at the same time render aesthetic feeling and enjoyment impossible, is shown by the report of a friend of the writer's, who once attended a play in the company of an actor. The actor's comments made it amply evident throughout that he was conscious not of the drama being acted, but only of the acting, considered technically, — not of the action

being represented, but only of the efficacy and nature of the means by which the dramatic effects were achieved. Another illustration is furnished by the writer's own experience with the short-story. He once took a course in short-story writing, the chief result of which was that, as he became able to recognize the structural elements of any story he read, he also became unable any longer to experience the dramatic effect of it. For years afterwards, a story remained for him not something to be read and enjoyed, but something to be dissected and technically judged. Aesthetic appreciation of a story as drama had been replaced by admiration for the cleverness of a difficult literary stunt. For aesthetic purposes, X-ray vision is a dubious blessing. People who have or cultivate this sort of interest in works of art might be called the Coroners of Art, for they are like some inveterate autopsist that has come to be interested in his friends only as material for eventual post-mortems. The counterpart of this sort of thing on the creative side is to be found in artists who paint not out of the impulse of artistic feeling experienced by them, but deductively from some theory or other. Not knowing that, as Schopenhauer long ago pointed out, concepts, in art-creation, are barren, and touch art only *a posteriori*, for criticism, such painters proceed under the illusion that the way in which art-works are created is by conducting the post-mortem backwards, beginning with the theoretical skeleton, and then upholstering it. But this produces nothing but upholstered skeletons. Art-creation is the objectification of feeling, not the objectification of a conspiracy!

It is perhaps needless to add here that "appreciation" courses in which the emphasis is placed upon the lives, personalities, and environment of the artists, are still less likely than those already described, to develop their takers'

latent capacities for aesthetic contemplation and enjoyment. Anecdotes and other biographical material of the great painters, musicians, and writers, make entertaining gossip, but have nothing directly to do with the aesthetic enjoyment of the works that such men have left behind.

For purposes of aesthetic feeling and aesthetic enjoyment, what is necessary in respect to form is not the *recognition* of it but the intuitive and functional apprehension of it. In many cases, for instance, in elaborate musical compositions, it may truly be said that for most persons the form, that is to say the relation of parts and elements, is buried in the profusion of sounds heard, almost as deeply as is the law of the inverse square in what is present to sense whenever an apple is seen to fall. This means that most persons apprehend in such compositions merely a chaotic multitude of sounds, and not, as on the contrary they do in a simple melody, an *ordered* multitude. They simply *do not hear the music;* they hear only musical elements, musical material, and perhap now and then emerging from the chaos, some bit of musical phrase. The enjoyment, if any, which they get out of such an experience, is not enjoyment of the music since they do not really hear it at all, but the enjoyment of the musical tones and fragments, and chiefly of the revery that the situation easily induces.

Now, from this state of virtual music-deafness, there are two possible ways leading to genuinely musical full enjoyment. One of them, which for the "consumer's" purposes is much the best, consists in listening to the same composition again and again at various times. If by doing this one reaches the point where one can say that one "knows every note of it," this means that one has then become able to apprehend not so much *the relations* (as such) of the musical elements, but the musical elements *in their relations,* —

which is exactly what music really is. Similarly with pictures, the best way to obtain from them their full aesthetic import is not to approach them with a conceptual scalpel and dissect them, but much rather to have them about and live with them for some time, so that they may "soak into us" of themselves.

The other way to the apprehension of the full aesthetic import of the musical composition (or other work of art) is to approach it as it were with a "map," i.e., with advance information as to its parts and structure. In this way we approach it knowing, *conceptually,* what to listen for, or how to listen to it. This is a possible help or short-cut to the hearing of the musical elements in their relations, which is the goal since the concrete musical elements in their concrete relations constitute the music, i.e., the aesthetic object to be contemplated. But this short-cut, like many others, is dangerous. The danger is that, in approaching the given musical composition with a map, our interest shall become and remain centered *in the recognizing* in the concrete, of the features on our map; whereas what we should do is to forget the map when it has guided us to and through the concrete music, and center our attention in the latter. We probably all have known people whose enjoyment of traveling is derived not from what they come upon, but from the fact of coming upon what their map or their Baedeker indicated. What they really want is not the sight of the thing, but the knowledge that they have seen it and can find it. That is what the troops of summer tourists who race through museums book in hand or in tow of a guide, quite innocently but really are after. And that is also the sort of interest which the customary courses in "art-appreciation" are in danger of fostering. The most effective way to aesthetic appreciation of the products of the various arts and of nature is abundant first hand ac-

quaintance with them, and contemplation of them without the distraction of a deluge of "explanatory" words the while, or the expectation of "words of appreciation" afterwards. As Debussy says, "Surely you know that a genuine appreciation of beauty can only result in silence. Tell me, when you see the daily wonder of the sunset have you ever thought of applauding?"

CHAPTER XIV

THE AESTHETIC VALUES

§ 1

Aesthetic valuation. Aesthetic valuation is the valuation of aesthetic objects in aesthetic terms. As we shall see when we come to consider standards of criticism, aesthetic objects may be evaluated otherwise than in aesthetic terms. It is possible, for instance, to ask, concerning an aesthetic object, i.e., concerning something considered as object of aesthetic contemplation, whether it is such that through aesthetic contemplation of it the state of soul of another person is adequately reproduced in oneself. One might ask also whether the object is such that the after-effects if any of the aesthetic contemplation of it will make one for instance a better citizen; etc. Evaluation of aesthetic objects in such terms is not aesthetic evaluation; it is evaluation of the aesthetic in non-aesthetic terms. The converse of such evaluation, namely, the aesthetic evaluation of non-aesthetic objects, is not similarly possible, for aesthetic evaluation is evaluation in terms of the immediate value, i.e., the pleasantness or unpleasantness, of the feelings obtained in aesthetic contemplation; and the aesthetic contemplation of anything automatically confers upon the thing the status of aesthetic object. Therefore nothing that is not being considered as an aesthetic object is capable of being aesthetically evaluated. The possibility of evaluating an aesthetic

object in non-aesthetic terms, on the other hand, is due to the fact that in such evaluation the aesthetic contemplation of the object, and therefore its status as aesthetic object, are prerequisite; but the values *immediately* resulting from such contemplation are disregarded, and others resulting from it *mediately* are considered instead.

§ 2

Beauty and Ugliness as inclusive and as special categories of aesthetic valuation. Aesthetic evaluation of an object is evaluation of it in terms of beauty and ugliness; and *beauty*, or *ugliness*, was defined as *the character of an object which is such that, in aesthetic contemplation, it yields to the contemplator feelings that are pleasant, or, respectively, unpleasant.* Beauty and ugliness, respectively, as so defined, are simply positive and negative aesthetic value in general. They are the names of the two inclusive categories of aesthetic value, and all others (e.g. sublime, pretty, graceful, etc.), would therefore be subsumed under them.

There is, however, a narrower and more popular meaning of the terms beauty and ugliness, according to which beauty, for instance, is not an inclusive but a special category of aesthetic value, to be distinguished from and contrasted with sublimity, prettiness, gracefulness, etc. That the terms beauty and ugliness have these two different senses has been noticed by A. C. Bradley, and very clearly pointed out by him in the excellent essay on the Sublime in his Oxford lectures on Poetry.[1] In a note on pp. 38/9 he adds that popular usage can hardly be said to recognize the wider sense at all: "Beauty" and "beautiful" in the wider sense, "are technical terms of Aesthetics. It is a

[1] 2nd Edition, pp. 37/63.

misfortune that the language of aesthetics should thus differ from the ordinary language of speech and literature; but the misfortune seems to be unavoidable, for there is no word in the ordinary language which means 'whatever gives aesthetic satisfaction,' and yet that idea *must* have a name in Aesthetics."

It is that idea which aestheticians have for the most part had in mind when discussing "Beauty" and "Ugliness"; in very many cases, however, they have not clearly realized that the terms also had another legitimate and more common sense; and not a little of the confusion concerning the meaning of "beautiful" must be ascribed to this. In these pages, the two senses are explicitly acknowledged, and the obligation admitted to give an analysis of each. It is of the terms Beauty and Ugliness in the wider of the two senses, that the definition given above purports to constitute an analysis.

§ 3

Aesthetic pleasure and "the pleasures of the senses." Before Beauty and Ugliness in the narrower sense, and the other special categories of aesthetic value, are considered, there is an important point concerning which something should be said, namely, the difference between aesthetic pleasure and the so-called pleasures of the senses. The attempt has been made without success, to define aesthetic pleasure in terms of particular sense organs which, supposedly, alone yield it. The eye and the ear have been said to be the only aesthetic senses; although sensations of smell, at least, have seemed sometimes very nearly worthy of admission to the company of the "nobler" ones of sight and hearing. With Santayana, I hold that there is no human function that is not at least theoretically capa-

ble of contributing something to aesthetic pleasure. His account of the difference between aesthetic pleasure and sense pleasure seems to me fundamentally sound. Although aesthetic pleasures like any others depend on physiological conditions and have a bodily seat, we do not, he says, connect them with their seats except in physiological studies; "the ideas with which aesthetic pleasures are associated are not the ideas of their bodily causes. The pleasures we call physical, and regard as low, on the contrary, are those which call our attention to some part of our own body, and which make no object so conspicuous to us as the organ in which they arise." [2]

§ 4

"Disinterestedness" of aesthetic pleasure. The disinterestedness which sometimes is alleged to differentiate aesthetic pleasure from sensual, is a fact in the sense that the aesthetic attitude, through which alone aesthetic feeling and aesthetic pleasure are possible, is a desireless one; that is, it does not involve as does the practical, ectotelic attitude, any antecedently conceived end lying beyond and to which means are devised. But aesthetic pleasure can be desired and aimed at in the same sense as any other, although, in the case of aesthetic pleasure, fulfillment of the desire for it requires that we shall assume for the time being the aesthetic attitude, which itself is desireless.

If on the other hand by disinterestedness is meant unselfishness, then aesthetic pleasure is no more essentially disinterested than sense pleasure. Pleasure is unselfish when it is knowingly obtained in a way which promotes the pleasure or welfare of others also, or which at least does not interfere with it. Pleasure is selfish if on the con-

[2] *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 36.

trary it is knowingly obtained in a way which deprives others of pleasure; or which does not promote the pleasure of others while some other way would; or which causes others pain. The pleasure of drinking when thirsty is a pleasure of sense, which is unselfish or selfish according as the available supply of water is known to be sufficient for everybody, or not sufficient. The pleasure of music, which is aesthetic pleasure, is likewise selfish or unselfish according to circumstances. If the number of places available in a concert hall is less than the number of those who wish for the pleasure of the music on a given occasion, then those who, knowing this, occupy the places, deprive others of that pleasure, and are in so far enjoying themselves selfishly; [3] in the opposite case their enjoyment is in so far unselfish. Thus, no pleasure, whether aesthetic or sensual, is either selfish or unselfish considered in itself.

§ 5

Sense pleasure is a special category of aesthetic pleasure. It is to be noted that when "sense pleasure" is referred to, either one of two different attitudes may be that of the person who enjoys it. He may be a person of a generally restless nature, and in whom various so-called animal impulses are strong. Such persons are often thought of as lovers of sense pleasures, but they are more truly lovers of excitement and violent sensation. The person who is fond of overindulgence in strong drink is a typical example. The drinker who drinks to get drunk and insists on a chaser after Chartreuse if he is served any, is despised by the lover of fine wines and liqueurs, who on the contrary is an example of the true sensualist.

[3] This does not necessarily mean that it is "wrong" for them to do so; other considerations which need not be gone into here, enter, and room is left for them by the qualification, "in so far," of the assertions made above.

It is in the experience of a person of the latter type that sense-pleasure properly so called is to be found, and compared with aesthetic pleasure. Now it seems to me that the attitude of the sensualist towards the objects of his pleasures is in all essentials identical with the aesthetic attitude as already described. He centers his attention on the sensations he receives from the wine he is sipping, as does the art-lover upon, say, a Tanagra statuette; and, like the latter, he "listens" with his capacity for (pleasurable) feeling to the object of his attention. But aesthetic feeling was defined above as any feeling which is obtained from a content of attention through the taking towards it the aesthetic attitude; and aesthetic pleasure is such pleasure as may attach to an aesthetic feeling. From this the necessary conclusion is that "sense-pleasure" (viz., the sensualist's sort of pleasure) is truly a species of aesthetic pleasure.

That species, however, is distinguished from what is commonly referred to when aesthetic pleasure is contrasted with sense-pleasure, by the following fact. In the case of aesthetic pleasure other than sense-pleasure, the content of attention contemplated aesthetically does not consist of our own sensations considered as such; whereas in the case of sense-pleasure the content of attention is on the contrary just that, namely, some sensation or sensations which we have, regarded by us not as qualities or aspects of a thing but as a state in ourselves. Accordingly, the sensualist could correctly and sometimes does call *the sensations* which he gets as he sips a good wine, beautiful. Usually, however, we do not speak of our sensations as such, but rather of the objects from which they proceed, and the wine, as source of beautiful sensations, would be called good. That *the wine* is beautiful would be a proper judgment only if the content of our at-

tention were not the sensations as such, which the wine causes *in us,* but the wine itself as present to us through something regarded as a quality *of it,* e.g., its color. We naturally apprehend colors as located at some place in external space, and it is not easy or perhaps possible, to apprehend them as sensations in us, located at a place in the body; but if we should succeed in doing it then the pleasure attaching to the color would become sense-pleasure. Tastes, on the other hand, we most naturally apprehend as sensations in the tongue. With regard to odors, it seems possible to locate them more or less at will either in the body or in external space. Sounds are much more easily referred to a location outside the body than to one inside; and so on. Except in the cases where the aesthetic object is a sensation in us, then, we can say that it is "object" not only in the sense that it is something towards which our (aesthetic) attitude is directed, but also in the sense that it is something not located within our bodies.

§ 6

Beauty in the narrower sense. Slang paraphrases the assertion that an object is beautiful by saying that it is "easy to look at." This four-word phrase might be said roughly to epitomize one aspect of Kant's view of the nature of Beauty, and to constitute an endorsement of it by popular common sense. To be "easy to look at," is to be *as if made for the purpose;* and the central part of Kant's view of the nature of Beauty, if divested of its elaborate terminology and theoretical scaffolding, and reduced to its simplest expression in ordinary language, might be held to amount essentially to that. This, however, is a point which has only historical interest, and I shall not insist upon it since our concern here is merely

with the truth of the matter itself. I freely admit, moreover, that the account of Beauty to be given here sharply diverges from that of Kant at a number of points which many would regard as belonging to the essence of his doctrine.

It seems to me that the conception of Beauty which is more or less roughly defined by the words "as if made for the purpose of being looked at," may be regarded as an essentially correct analysis of the meaning of the term Beautiful, when that term is used not as the inclusive but as a special category of aesthetic value, contrasted, for instance, with Sublime, Pretty, etc. To avoid misunderstandings, I shall in the remainder of this chapter indicate that this narrower sense is the one intended, by adding to the term Beauty the initial letters (n.s.); and affixing on the contrary the letters (w.s.) when the wider sense is meant.

The meaning of the term Beautiful (n.s.), if more carefully and explicitly stated than in the phrase mentioned above, is, I submit, as follows. The adjective Beautiful (n.s.) is applied by us to an object which in contemplation imparts to us pleasant feelings, *when that object is one which approaches (or reaches) perfection.* Being perfect, in general, means coming fully up to some given standard; and the particular standard in terms of which the perfection which determines Beauty (n.s.) is to be defined, consists of the *object (of the relevant kind) most agreeable in contemplation, that our past experience enables us to imagine.* This (aesthetically)-best-imaginable-by-us at any given time, is what we may call *our aesthetic ideal* at the time for the sort of object that happens to be concerned. Beautiful (n.s.), in short, means aesthetically perfect (or nearly perfect); and being aesthetically perfect means being the *most* beautiful (*w.s.*) thing (of a

given sort) that we are able to imagine, (i.e., the most agreeable in aesthetic contemplation).

Aesthetic objects, as we have seen, are of two great sorts, dramatic entities, and design-entities, the two aspects of form and content, or relations and terms, being discernible in each of the two sorts. If the object we happen to consider belongs, or is apperceived by us as belonging, to the realm of dramatic entities, the standard or ideal by reference to which we shall judge of the beauty (n.s.) of the object will be describable, in Santayana's words, as "the average modified in the direction of pleasure." [4] That is to say, our ideal will contain all the characteristics, positive and negative, which the objects of the particular sort considered have habitually possessed in our experience, for the absence of any character to which we have become accustomed would give us an unpleasant shock of disappointment, which our ideal of course does not. But among the characters which because habitual have come to be regarded by us as typical, those in the contemplation of which we found pleasure, emphasized themselves, and, in the ideal if not in the concept of kind, they are exaggerated, — or, where a choice has to be made, selected, — according to their superior agreeableness and irrespective of their mere frequency. The *ideal* at any given time is therefore not the same thing as the concept of kind. It includes the concept of kind, but it *also includes a more or less definite particular content for it,* namely, the content most pleasing in contemplation which one can at the time imagine the concept to have. The cognitional form, i.e., the concept of kind, could not by itself constitute a standard of evaluation, but only a standard of description; and conformity to it is more a necessary condition than a sufficient cause of aes-

[4] *Sense of Beauty,* § 30.

thetic pleasure. The ideal, on the contrary, i.e., what at a given time we regard as defining what (aesthetic) "perfection" means for some given sort of object, is a standard of evaluation; and an object which pleases us in aesthetic contemplation is declared by us beautiful (n.s.) when it reaches, or in proportion as it approaches that standard.

When the object of which the beauty (n.s.) is in question is not a dramatic entity, but is or is considered solely as, an entity of *pure design* (not empathized), the standard of perfection consists as before of what at the time constitutes our ideal, i.e., of what in this case we may describe as the pleasantest *comparable* aesthetic experience that we can remember or imagine. The only difference between the nature of the ideal in the case of dramatic entities and in the case of pure design-entities is that in the latter the concept involved is essentially extra-causal, or rather extra-telic, and usually plays only a minor part; so that objects which are beautiful (n.s.) as judged by a design-ideal might easily pass as being so independently of any concept.

In judging of the beauty of an entity belonging to the realm of pure design, for instance, of a given red, the ideal red which we use as standard of beauty is the red most pleasing in contemplation, that our past experience at the time enables us to imagine. A concept does enter into that ideal, but only in the sense that the ideal *has a kind,* — the same to which belongs the entity to be evaluated, — namely, the kind "being red." That is to say, the given red is evaluated by comparison with our ideal *red,* and not, for instance, by comparison with our ideal *blue.* Obviously, the question "Do you think that this (viz., a given color which actually is a red) is a beautiful blue?" would be incongruous. But that very fact shows that congruity or comparability of the ideal and the given

to be judged by it, is assumed, i.e., that a concept of kind is involved here as before. Only here, the concept of kind is unambiguously given with the case; and moreover it is not — and where pure design entities are concerned never is — a concept in any way instrumental, or functional. In dramatic entities, on the contrary, the concept involved is, *ex hypothesi* always of this sort; that is, it is always the concept of an action, or experience, or instrument, or medium, or relation of these as such. A concept is thus always involved in the judgment of beauty (n.s.); but in the case of the beauty of pure design entities, the concept is essentially extra-causal, whereas in that of dramatic entities, it always somehow involves the notion of causation.

Kant, it will be recalled, defines "free beauty" as beauty which "presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be," [5] but all the examples of free beauty that he gives, viz., flowers, parrots, sea-shells, etc., are of things which in fact are judged beautiful (n.s.) under concepts of what they ought to be (just as was the red), namely, here, the very concepts of flower, parrot, sea-shell, etc. The object is referred to a kind, and judged beautiful (n.s.) as of that kind. Only, the concept is not here a functional one, as it is for instance in the case of a building. Or at least it is not so unless the *biological* concepts of flower, sea-shell, etc., which are functional, are used instead of the common concepts, which *for these things* are mainly appearance-concepts, i.e., design-concepts. And if the biological concepts are used, the things are of course no longer being judged as design-entities or "free beauties."

Kant is right when he tells us that the judgment of perfection presupposes a concept of what the object ought to be; but he is wrong, I think, when he defines perfection

[5] *Critique of Judgt.* transl. Bernard. 2nd Ed., p. 81.

as objective internal purposiveness (pp. 77/8), thus tacitly assuming that what an object ought to be always is something having an internal purpose. "Objective internal purposiveness" is not a definition of perfection in general, but only of the perfection of dramatic entities; or rather, of dramatic entities of certain sorts, particularly the self-regulatory, such as organisms. Perfection in general, on the other hand, is what has been stated above, viz., the coming fully up to the requirements, both qualitative and quantitative, of some specified standard. Inasmuch as the standard, in the case of beauty (n.s.), is specified by us on the basis of our own pleasure in contemplation, which itself is in part conditioned by the habits which our own past experience has established in us, we might well call that standard *subjective,* and therefore call any object which is perfect as judged by it, *subjectively purposive,* meaning thereby that the object is as if it had been made to give us in contemplation the highest pleasure. Only when purposiveness is taken in this sense can it truly be said to be necessarily involved in beauty.

The various statements of Kant on purposiveness and its relation to beauty have been acutely, and as it seems to me decisively, criticized by Victor Basch in his *Essai Critique sur l'Esthétique de Kant* (2nd. Ed. pp. 183/192). With Basch's objections to the very widely held view that beauty consists in perfection, I am also in agreement, but only so long as perfection is conceived as he and the thinkers he mentions (p. 186) conceive it, which is, as I should insist, incorrectly because too narrowly. When, on the other hand, perfection in general, and aesthetic perfection, are (I think, correctly) defined as I have done, then I claim that perfection *is* the standard of beauty (n.s.). And yet I remain in complete agreement with Basch's central contention that beauty is a matter of

feeling, because I hold that a definition of perfection in terms of feeling is possible, and for the purposes of aesthetics, alone directly relevant, — such a definition constituting the basis of the very necessary distinction between beauty in the narrower sense, and in the wider.

In conclusion, it may be noted that when the pleasantness in contemplation of a given object exceeds that of the ideal which we have for objects of that sort, then judgment is for the moment paralyzed. We come with our little measuring-rod prepared to give judgment, and unexpectedly find ourselves instead receiving a bigger rod wherewith to measure and judge the one we brought. The new object is then made beautiful (n.s.) by definition, i.e., by being made the standard of perfection, rather than owing to its being found to fulfill the requirements of a pre-existing standard.

§ 7

The Pretty. If the beautiful (n.s.) is that which comes up to or approaches our ideal of positive aesthetic value for the sort of object concerned; the *pretty,* on the other hand, is that which falls measurably short of our aesthetic ideal for its kind, but nevertheless remains predominantly pleasant in contemplation. Prettiness, then, might be said to be sometimes a degree of beauty (w.s.) markedly inferior to that which we regard as constituting perfection; and sometimes to be beauty (n.s.) in some parts, or in some aspects, only, of the object, the balance of aesthetic value remaining positive.

§ 8

The Graceful. Grace is the positive aesthetic value that action or posture has in so far as it is evidently easy,

economical of effort, adequate. This means that inanimate things, e.g., lines, can be said to have grace (or awkwardness) only when empathized. The excellent account of the graceful given by Schopenhauer may well be quoted here, since his metaphysical views do not intrude in it detrimentally as they do in some other parts of his aesthetics. Grace, he writes, "is the adequate representation of will through its temporal manifestation, that is to say, the perfectly accurate and fitting expression of each act of will, through the movement and position which objectify it. . . . Grace consists . . . in every movement being performed, and every position assumed in the easiest, most appropriate and convenient way, and therefore being the pure, adequate expression of its intention, or of the act of will, without any superfluity, which [superfluity] exhibits itself as aimless, meaningless bustle, or as wooden stiffness." [6] This account of the nature of the graceful, Schopenhauer points out, explains why, for effects of grace in the human body, nakedness, in which the action is most fully evident, is virtually a necessity (p. 296).

§ 9

Ugliness in the narrower sense. It is perhaps a question whether the term Ugly is, to the same extent as the term Beautiful, used as a special category of aesthetic value, in addition to its being employed as inclusive category. At all events, an object called ugly in the narrower sense certainly could not be said (analogously to what was said of one called beautiful n.s.) to be one approaching or attaining the utmost of negative aesthetic value which we can imagine for its kind. The special name for such an

[6] *World as Will and Idea,* Eng. Transl. Vol. I., pp. 289/90.

object would, I think, be *"horrible."* But we can well say that an object is called Ugly (n.s.) in so far as its unpleasantness in contemplation is due to its pronounced failure to meet our aesthetic ideal for its kind. The object is then ugly (n.s.) when its disappointing character in the light of our ideal is considerable and insufficiently compensated, instead of (as in the pretty) minor and made up for sufficiently to leave the balance of value positive. The judgment of ugliness (n.s.) is thus not any more than that of beauty (n.s.) an aesthetically innocent and unprejudiced judgment; but both are judgments passed from the standpoint of an aesthetic ideal.

§ 10

The Sublime. Sublimity is the character of an object which pleases in aesthetic contemplation through its immense greatness. As A. C. Bradley points out in the short but excellent essay on the Sublime already referred to, the sublime object need not be infinite, i.e., beyond the possibility of measure, but only in fact unmeasured and so great that, compared with it, ordinary objects are *as nothing.* The object then appears to us *as if infinite,* whether it be so in fact or not. Bradley moreover maintains that the sublime is not merely the beautiful (w.s.) which is exceedingly great, but that it also always involves in some way the idea of power. I should prefer to say, however, that it always in one way or another generates in us a consciousness of immense power, whether active or passive.

As we have seen, there are two typical ways of approaching dramatic entities, namely, the empathic and the peripathic. If the object aesthetically contemplated has overwhelming power, — as would be the case with a vol-

cano, a great waterfall, a hurricane, etc., — and we apprehend it empathically, then by so doing we are lifted out of our ordinary puny self, and into a self of immensely great power. The feeling of exaltation obtained in this way is the source of the pleasure we find in the contemplation of such an object, which we then call sublime.

If instead of apprehending an object of this sort empathically, we were to apprehend it peripathically, its immense power would then be experienced not as power in us, but as power over us. The feeling obtained by us would then be one not of exaltation, but of depression, — that is, unpleasant. The object contemplated would accordingly be judged not sublime, but *awful*, or, if the immense power peripathically apprehended is not only over us but against us, *terrible*.

If the immense greatness of the object is not greatness of power, but greatness in some static respect, such as size or number, then contemplation of the object as empathically apprehended (assuming empathic apprehension of an object of this sort to be possible at all), would, I think, yield little if any pleasure, and the object would not be called sublime. Bradley is I believe right in holding that immense greatness, if it does not involve power somehow, is not sublime. But if an object immensely great in some static way is apprehended peripathically and is such that the contemplation of it as so interpreted is pleasurable, this means that the object's immensity has called out in us, in the peripathic apprehension of it, powers correspondingly immense. In the case first considered, the exaltation which goes with the possession of immense power resulted from empathy of an immensely powerful object. In the case now under discussion, the exaltation results from the exercise of immense powers, in the peripathic apprehension of a statically immense object. Our atti-

tude, however, being in each case that of aesthetic contemplation of what is apprehended (whether empathically or peripathically), the exaltation is not at the moment experienced as a feeling in ourselves, but as a character of the object contemplated, and it is this character which we call sublimity.

The difference between what may be termed the dynamic and the static sublime is connected in the manner just discussed with the distinction between the empathic and the peripathic modes of apprehension. There is, however, another distinction to be made within each of these, namely, that between the active and the passive rôles. Thus, in the case of a tremendous storm beating upon a rocky coast, we may empathize the mountainous waves that hurl themselves at the shore, or, on the other hand, the immensely massive cliffs withstanding impassive and unshaken the ocean's mighty fury. If we do the latter, the exaltation experienced is not that of the power to do, but of the power to withstand and pass unscathed and detached through commonly overwhelming events.

The same distinction between the active and passive rôles can be made when the manner of apprehension is peripathic instead of empathic. The exaltation will arise from the experience of passive power when, instead of putting forth immense powers in peripathic apprehension (as, e.g., in the peripathic apprehension of the universe of stars), we find ourselves capable of remaining divinely serene and unmoved in the presence of an immense opportunity. Thus, the immensity of the stellar spaces, instead of calling into imagined being in us a self capable of bridging them, may on the contrary be met in us by a self to whom even that glorious vast universe, "with all its suns and milky ways," is nothing. The experience of remaining untempted by immense kingdoms proffered to

us, is no less exalting than that of taking possession of them.[7]

§ 11

The Tragic. The predicate "tragic" is not, any more than the predicate "comic," one of aesthetic valuation. Both the tragic and the comic situations, however, are, like anything else, capable of being aesthetically contemplated, and so much of their characteristic value as clings to them during the process of aesthetic contemplation will then become transmuted into aesthetic value. Yet the actual result of such contemplation of them is paradoxical, for the tragic, perception of which is painful, may in contemplation be found beautiful, i.e., pleasant; and the comic, perception of which is on the contrary a pleasant experience is more likely in contemplation to be found ugly. The question as to the source of the pleasure to be found in tragedy, especially, is an ancient and famous one, to which we must here give some attention.

A tragedy, as represented on the stage or in literature, sometimes derives a part of such beauty as it may have, from the various "ornaments" with which the presentation is embellished; and from the fact that the characters, surroundings, and general atmosphere are noble rather than sordid.[8] The Greek tragedies are obvious examples; but many modern tragedies show that these sources of pleasure are not indispensable to the beauty of the tragedy. Indeed, even an actual, stark tragedy, where they are quite absent, may, when aesthetically contemplated (which usually it is only in retrospect), be found to have a certain somber beauty, and it is not easy to see where the pleasure which is the stuff of that beauty may come

[7] Cf. Santayana's distinction between a "Stoic" and an "Epicurean" sublime — *Sense of Beauty*, § 60.

[8] Santayana *The Sense of Beauty*, § 57.

from, since a tragic situation is one in which the dearest hopes and possessions of human beings are crushed and destroyed; and that is something painful to witness or to imagine.

Aristotle's famous statement that in the spectator of a tragedy, a catharsis of the emotions of pity and fear is effected, has led to much speculation concerning the nature of this catharsis, of which he gives no account. The most obvious construction is that which the analogy of anger suggests. When violently angry, a person may kick the furniture, or smash the china, instead of striking the person who has provoked him; and through the substitute expression, the anger is more or less dissipated, and in a relatively harmless way. In a similar way, we might suppose, the representation of a tragedy furnishes a channel of vicarious expression for the emotions of pity and fear. But the facts will not bear this interpretation. We do not come into the theater bursting with pity and fear. And the witnessing of the performance, far from relieving us of these emotions, — which we were not experiencing, — arouses them instead. And to claim that it arouses them in order to give us pleasure by relieving us from them, would be to compare the theater-goer to a man who deliberately puts on a shoe that pinches in order to have the delightful pleasure of taking it off. Interpretation of the tragic catharsis after the analogy of the vicarious expression of anger would, moreover, require that we *express* in some active way the pity and the fear; but this is not the case. Only the playwright could truly be said to have done this, through the very creation of the play.[9]

[9] Thus, speaking of the writing of his *Bouvard et Pécuchet,* Flaubert writes: "Moreover, inasmuch as I hope to spit into it the gall that chokes me, that is, to utter a few truths, I hope by this means to purge myself, and to be thereafter more olympian, — a quality which I lack absolutely." Quoted from Flaubert's correspondence, by Delacroix, *Psychologie de l'Art,* p. 160.

Other sources of pleasure that might possibly be invoked would be sadistic joy in the inflicting of misfortune, or the masochistic enjoyment of undergoing it, experienced empathically. But although these may occasionally contribute something, the fact remains that for most people the witnessing and the empathic experiencing of misfortune are painful, not pleasant, and that the emotional state in which the beauty of a tragedy is felt is vastly different in quality from the unholy lusts just mentioned.

Again, it has been said that the *slight* excitement of emotions which would be painful if present at their normal intensity, may be pleasant. Such pleasure, however, is the pleasure of excitement, of play, which relieves boredom; and if this were the source of the tragic pleasure, tragedy would not mean to us anything different from what does any other sort of entertaining performance. There are, no doubt, many persons for whom that is the case; but they are the very persons who remain ignorant of the "true tragic pleasure" of which Aristotle speaks.

Clues to the nature of the catharsis to which that pleasure is due are I think to be found in some of the requirements that Aristotle lays down for the tragedy. The hero, for instance, must be a man not preëminently good or evil, but more or less like any one of us; that is, he must be a man whose actions and experiences might easily be ours. Again, the events represented must be not exceptional or freakish, but such as would be involved with probability or necessity in the course of human life in the supposed circumstances. In other words, we might say that the play must be such as to place before us a typical sample of human life, in such of its aspects as alone constitute problems, namely, the aspects which are painful and inevitable. When the tragedy (or indeed the novel)

is such as thus to give us truly sound and valuable *vicarious experience,* it makes a not inconsiderable contribution to the wisdom which is our most useful equipment in dealing with, or warding off, tragic events. This gain in wisdom is felt in a quite direct and immediate way, and is pleasant. This pleasure is I believe the essential constituent of the tragic pleasure. Enlightenment, even when it does nothing but reveal the inevitability of at least some tragic events, is valued. It prepares us for them and lessens the shock. When evils fall upon us suddenly, of which we know nothing, the imagination has unlimited scope and our terror reaches the utmost. Foreknowledge of what is probable or necessary enables us in some degree to view the tragic events when they come, "under the form of eternity" and to win a measure of the serenity that goes with this. As Spinoza observes, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive to be free (i.e., unnecessary) is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary; and the mind is therefore less subject to the emotions in so far as it understands all things as necessary. Thus, no one pities an infant for being unable to speak, walk, or reason; but one would do so if most people were born full-grown, and infancy were accidental instead of natural and necessary.[10]

The "true tragic pleasure" certainly cannot come directly from the pity and fear excited since these emotions are not pleasant. It must arise from the "catharsis" of them; and this "catharsis" I should interpret in the way indicated above. It means the obtaining of a consciousness of superiority to and relative freedom from pity and fear, as a result of the realization of the inevitableness of the tragic events in human life. This realization itself results from the Tragedy's exhibition of them as effects

[10] *Ethics,* Part V. Props. V, VI.

of causes present in all of us. To the more rational person made of us by the witnessing of the Tragedy, life is then less fearful and pitiful than it was. Pity and fear, as Spinoza observes, are in themselves bad and useless in a man who lives under the guidance of reason.[11] Butcher's statement,[12] in line with the view of Bernays, that "Tragedy is a form of homoeopathic treatment, curing emotion by means of an emotion like in kind, but not identical," may possibly be a true interpretation of what Aristotle had in mind at least in the passage of the *Politics* in which he discusses Catharsis. But it does not seem to me that it can be accepted as describing the facts themselves with complete accuracy. As already pointed out, there is not usually in the theater-goer any antecedently present pity and fear to be "cured." The correct medical metaphor to describe what occurs is not purgation, but *vaccination*. The process is truly homoeopathic, but it is a process of immunization, not of cure of something pre-existing. Purgation, on the contrary, is that. But purgation is not a homoeopathic process.

§ 12

The Comic. Schopenhauer was I think fundamentally right when he declared the comic effect to arise from "the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought through it in some relation." [13] Taken as it stands, however, his statement is open to various objections, — particularly that of over-intellectualizing,[14] which might easily cause

[11] *Ethics*, Part IV. Props. XLVII, L.
[12] *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, 4th Ed., p. 248.
[13] *World as Will and Idea*. Engl. Transl., p. 77.
[14] For a criticism of it, see Max Eastman, *The Scene of Humor*, pp. 154 ff.

one to overlook the essentially correct, if not entirely novel insight from which it proceeds. From the clue which it furnishes, it seems to me that a formulation of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the comic may be arrived at, which would be as follows.

The essential conditions of the comic would be three, the comic effect requiring, (a) that there exist a marked disparity between some given fact and an adjustment in us wherewith we are prepared or induced to meet it; (b) that the perception of the disparity be unexpected; and (c) that our attitude at the time be the play attitude. Should we wish to compress this into a definition of the comic, we might (reserving an explanation of the meaning of some of the terms), say that *the comic is that in which we unexpectedly perceive a marked disparity between a fact given in play and an adjustment in us wherewith we attempt to meet that fact.* The entity judged comic would be *either the fact or the adjustment,* according as the one or the other is presented as departing from what it should be. The three conditions stated above will now be considered in greater detail.

(a) The comic effect requires that some fact be given us, whether actually or by supposition; that an adjustment wherewith to meet it be existent in us; and that there be a pronounced disparity between the fact and the adjustment, that is, either that the adjustment be regarded as fundamentally right and sound but the fact different from what it ought to be, or vice versa, that the fact be regarded as true and right, but the adjustment as inappropriate to it. We call comic or laughable whichever one of the two is considered as not being what it should be. It may be noted incidentally that the distinction sometimes made between "laughing at" and "laughing with" is not fundamental. When the laughter

is truly an expression of comic feeling, cases of "laughing with" are always cases of laughing *with* somebody *at* something or somebody. However, laughter is probably not always a response to the comic. For instance, we laugh from exuberant joy; also, sometimes, mechanically by sheer imitation; also, from being tickled or pinched; and it might not be possible to show that in such instances there is any perception of the comic. At all events, it is the comic and not laughter, that we are essentially concerned with here.

In perhaps the majority of cases, the adjustment exists or is induced in us first, and the fact between which and it there is disparity, then given. But the converse also often occurs. That is, some fact is first considered, and the comic effect obtained by suggesting some way of meeting it which is plausible enough to make us try it at least in imagination, but is suddenly perceived to be grossly inappropriate. For instance, a mouse is seen running about the room, and the inevitable lady yells: Quick, John, get your gun. The idea of using a gun on a mouse is comic. But if a man hunting in the woods suddenly fires, or almost fires, at a mouse, we have then a case where the adjustment, viz., readiness to use a gun, is present first, and a plausible but really inappropriate object then presented.[15] It may be noted that if, instead of a mouse, the object to be dealt with had been, say, a yellow-fever mosquito, definitely known to be such, then no comic effect would have ensued in either case in spite of the even greater disparity between the adjustment and the fact, because the third of the requirements mentioned above would not have been satisfied; namely, the situation would have been not a play situation but a serious, dangerous

[15] The adjustment, in these and similar cases, becomes our own by empathy. Otherwise no comic effect would occur.

one; and our attitude would have remained unshakably practical.

It must next be emphasized that that which has been referred to above as an adjustment present in us, may be of any sort. It may indeed, as Schopenhauer's statement has it, consist of a thought or concept of kind. But it may be less abstract than that, consisting, for instance, of an ordinary act of perceptual interpretation of a given appearance. Thus, if an animal having exactly the visual appearance of the house cat should suddenly *bark* at us, the disparity between the fact thus concretely given and the house-cat perceptual adjustment in us, would be great, obvious, and unexpected; and the comic effect would be very great unless our attitude should at once be the scientific and not the play attitude. In a similar way, the fact that when a cat has played hard for some time in a hot room he will pant like a dog, with his mouth open and his tongue hanging out, is found most comical by persons who observe it for the first time. In the act of perception, e.g., of the perception of something as being a cat, we do refer the immediately given appearance to a kind; but the kind is not present to our minds discursively but rather in terms of images of certain motor and sensory experiences.

The adjustment, however, may be still more concrete than that which the act of perception constitutes. It may consist of some mode of action, whether instinctive, habitual, or teleological, *actually* going on, for instance, climbing stairs. If we climb one more step than there is, the comic effect may arise; or if we sit on a chair that collapses under us. But in such cases, which are natural instead of artificial practical jokes, the comic effect arises only if the attitude, which to begin with is the practical (or, it might be, the scientific), shifts to the play attitude.

This does not occur if the mishap is somewhat painful or important to us, whether directly or through sympathy. The mishap then remains only an unpleasant or unfortunate incident.

The instances given show that the comic effect cannot be said always to involve disparity between a fact and a concept, for the adjustment is a conceptual one only in some cases. The disparity must be described more generally, as above, viz., as disparity between an *adjustment* in us, preëxisting or induced; and a *given fact* with which the adjustment might plausibly deal.

The *disparity* itself may next be considered. It may be of several types, to be distinguished on the basis of the relation happening to exist between the element (viz., the fact or the adjustment) which is considered anomalous, and the element which in its stead would have been regular (and therefore not comic). What varieties that relation may have is easiest to state in terms which usually describe relations between judgments explicitly involving concepts. These terms would be Inconsistency, Irrelevancy, and possibly certain others of the same general nature. To describe by means of such terms the relations with which we are here concerned, however, is permissible because these relations have precise analogues at all levels of abstraction. The relation of *contradiction,* for instance, which is primarily conceptual, finds an exact *physical* analogue in the relation which exists between the two pans of a balance in respect of motion up or down. Both cannot go up at once (relatively to the fulcrum) nor both down at once. The only difference is that the impossibility is here physical, i.e., causal, instead of logical.

Speaking, then, in conceptual terms, the nature of irrelevancy is essentially as follows. Whenever we use a predicate (whether affirmatively, negatively, or interroga-

tively,) we *insinuate* something, that is to say, we *assert by implication,* i.e., through the mere use of that predicate, that the subject to which we apply it belongs to a certain class (which may vary more or less on different occasions). Thus if, referring to you, dear reader, I should ask: "When did he escape?" I should obviously be asserting by implication (i.e., insinuating) that you have been locked up; and likewise if, instead of asking, I had asserted, or denied, that you escaped. Similarly, if I use in connection with you the predicate "failed," I insinuate that you tried; if, "absent," that you were due; if "sober to-day" that you are a habitual drunkard, etc. The class into which something is placed when a given predicate is used in connection with the thing, may be called the universe of that predicate, or its *realm of relevant application.* That is to say, the use of that predicate in connection with a thing which in fact does *not* belong to that realm, constitutes an irrelevancy or incongruity. Thus, if I say "This is not Webster's Dictionary," I refer the thing talked about to the class of *books.* If it is a book, my assertion that it is not Webster's Dictionary may be false, but it is not incongruous. But if this, which I assert not to be Webster's Dictionary, in fact happens to be my grandfather, then my assertion was not simply untrue in fact, but irrelevant, incongruous to its subject, viz., not *even possibly* true of it. Likewise, if I ask what the square-root of minus-one eats for breakfast. In any such case, we have not a contradiction *in adjecto,* but an *irrelevancy in adjecto.*

Now, by using any given predicate, we induce an adjustment to its universe; and if we then suddenly bring in as subject for that predicate something which does not belong to that universe, we have a disparity of the sort called irrelevancy or incongruity; so, vice versa, if we introduce the subject first (with its natural universe), and then shift

suddenly but temptingly to a different universe. This is what occurs if, for instance, a man who had spilled a lady's coffee on her gown meets her expostulations by offering to make amends, and does so by ordering: "Waiter, another cup of coffee for the lady." Another instance would be that of the sexton who had never seen an ear trumpet, and who, noticing a dear old grandmother walking into the church with one under her arm, warned her: "Just one toot, and ye're out!" The irrelevance of the reaction, to the fact, is here qualitative, but it is in some cases quantitative. If a marksman, under ordinary conditions, misses the bull's eye, that is not funny; but if he is obviously aiming at something lying in so different a direction that it seems he could *not possibly* hit the target, and yet does so, that is funny.

The disparity is of the nature of *an inconsistency*, on the other hand, when the plausible adjustment induced is self-defeating, e.g., when it is such as to create or perpetuate the very thing it would remedy. A case would be that of a man who picks another's pocket for money wherewith to repay a sum he had borrowed from him. Another typical case would be the familiar story of the man who at a dance, having discovered a rip in his garments, is taken by his friend into another room to effect a repair. But, while he is in his underwear, ladies are heard coming, and his friend hurriedly pushes him through another door, supposedly into a closet, but in fact into the ball room.

Ambiguity is not a relation between the appropriate and an inappropriate adjustment, but rather something that can be used to make plausible and induce the inappropriate adjustment. Words or phrases (or other clues to adjustments) that are ambiguous, make possible the inducing to some extent of the inappropriate adjustment, through the very words in which the fact to be met

is given. Thus, in the headline "Chicago man lies dying," the ambiguous word "lies" both gives (a part of) the fact, and contributes to induce the inappropriate conceptual adjustment "liar." A better instance, also turning upon ambiguity, occurred in a conversation in the course of which one man remarked that Mr. Soandso was one of the community's greatest assets. "Assets?" another sarcastically asked, "why use the diminutive?"

(b) The second of the requirements for the comic effect is that the perception of the disparity be *unexpected*. This implies that either a conscious expectation, or some tendency (whether instinctive, habit-begotten, or other), must be present, not in the sense only of having been suggested, but in the sense that the adjustment which it constitutes must *really exist in us* at the moment; and the more definite and tense it is, the greater will be the comic effect, other things being equal. When the adjustment is closely connected with some strong human emotion, such as lust, envy, hatred, fear, vanity, etc., such definiteness and tenseness are likely to be present, and the comic effect marked. These emotions, however, are not intrinsic parts of the mechanism of the comic, but only sources of energy which, when piped into that mechanism, may make it function more vigorously. It is thus not true, I think, that the comic pleasure is essentially malicious, in the sense that it arises from perception of the discomfiture or inferiority of some other person. That such discomfiture in many cases constitutes the sudden fact which, from the standpoint of our adjustment at the time, is disparate or anomalous, is true. But what is essential is the disparity, and not that the fact be of just that sort. In many cases, the element of discomfiture is absent, or counts for little or nothing in the comic effect. Consider for instance the following:

Speaker: I hope I have not been speaking too long. There is no clock in this room.

Voice from the audience: No, but there is a calendar!

The comic object in this case is not primarily the speaker so apostrophized, but the idea of measuring the length of a speech not by a clock but by a calendar. Likewise, the suggestion of using a hammer and chisel on a beefsteak at the dinner table, is comic apart from the representation of someone doing it. We laugh at the foolishness, rather than at the particular fool that might perform it. But if the performer happens to be a person that we envy, or fear, or dislike, we will doubtless laugh the harder on that account.

The requirement of unexpectedness implies not only an expectation of some sort, but also *suddenness* of the insight into the disparity between it and the fact. This, obviously, is not something which a given comic situation can permit permanently, or many times. The comic effect can be reëxperienced from the same situation only if we have more or less forgotten our previous experience with it, so that the necessary expectation is again present. This necessary condition may to some extent be met by a deliberate act of abstraction of our attention from what we otherwise know is coming. But the more familiar the situation becomes, the more the comic effect evaporates from it for us.

(c) The third requirement for the comic effect is that our attitude be, or have become, the play-attitude. When one tells or is told a joke, or attends the performance of a comedy, the play-attitude is adopted to begin with. In the case of practical jokes, whether deliberate or accidental, the attitude of the victim is on the contrary earnest until the moment when the disparity is perceived by him; and if his attitude does not then shift to the play attitude,

then, as already pointed out, the comic effect does not arise for him and the situation remains merely unpleasant. The shift to the play attitude, if impossible at the time, may, however, become possible later, when the situation is viewed in retrospect and the fear to which it perhaps gave rise is no longer present. We then laugh at that which at the time we regarded as tragic.

With the requirements of the comic effect now before us, the source of the pleasure attaching to it may be discerned. That pleasure is essentially intellectual, for it is essentially that of *detecting an error or mistake,* either in a fact, or in an adjustment. "Seeing the point" of the comic situation gives us intellectual elation, and the pleasure of it is the true comic pleasure. We laugh either at an anomalous fact (which sometimes consists of someone else's empathized inappropriate adjustment to some fact); or at an (abandoned) inappropriate adjustment directly in ourselves. In this sense it is true that the comic pleasure always involves a feeling of the superiority of our present self; and of the inferiority either of a thing or of an abandoned previous self. But, as already noted, this does not mean that malice is of the essense of comic pleasure. Malicious pleasure is that which we take in the misfortune or defect of another when by comparison it makes our own lot appear better than it did. The comic pleasure, on the other hand, arises not from the *fact* of our superiority to something inferior, but from the elation caused by our intellectual success in seeing a point, i.e., in *detecting* the disparity between an adjustment and a given fact. Therefore, laughter at the pompous dignitary who suddenly trips and falls may be malicious; but it need not be so any more than is laughter at the antics of our pet cat. What is funny in either case is the unexpectedly anomalous behavior; and that the anomalous behavior in

the former case is such as to make unhappy an official we dislike, is a fact quite accidental to the comic quality (if not quantity) of the situation. It may be noted that whereas in the case of the comic what we detect is unexpected disparity, in the case of *wit* it is unexpected *appropriateness* either of an adjustment to a fact, or of a fact to an adjustment.[16] Wit, moreover, is playful of manner, but may well be earnest of intent.

The comic thing (whether adjustment or fact) always departs in some way from what we consider it ought to be. That is, it is always perceived as possessing a defect. But it would not I think be correct to say as did Aristotle that the comic is a species of the ugly, because ugliness presupposes the attitude of aesthetic contemplation, whereas the attitude in which the defective entity is perceived as comic is neither contemplative nor aesthetic, but playful and cognitive. What can be said is that if the entity which, under the proper conditions, would be found comic, is instead made an object of aesthetic contemplation, it is found ugly. But it is not ugly *qua* comic, nor comic *qua* ugly.

It is, however, possible to contemplate aesthetically an entity which in a previous experience has been found comic. Through this previous experience, that entity may have acquired a connotation of pleasurable (comic) feeling, which then colors the aesthetic feeling and value obtained when the entity is aesthetically contemplated. In such contemplation we do not laugh, but at the most smile, for we are now experiencing the aesthetic value of something *already* classed by us as comic, not experiencing the comic value of something not hitherto known to be so. The aesthetic value of the already comic entity would

[16] "Unexpected justness makes wit, as sudden incongruity makes pleasant foolishness." Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, § 62.

then be positive, i.e., its comic flavor, being pleasant, would so far as it goes bring the entity when aesthetically contemplated into the class of the beautiful rather than of the ugly.

But in fact, the matter rather tends to turn out otherwise, because the comic pleasure is too transitory to become a solid part of the connotation of the comic entity. For the comic entity, as we have seen, is not such in itself, but becomes such (and therefore pleasant, instead of unpleasant because defective) only owing to its becoming related to a mind in the way defined by the three requirements discussed above. This, we saw, cannot usually recur more than a few times; and unless some factor other than recurrence of the particular situation in which the entity was comic, is present to fasten upon it the (pleasant) comic connotation, the entity does not acquire that connotation, and in contemplation has only the ugliness corresponding to the (unpleasant) defectiveness or anomaly which, in a different relation, satisfied one of the requirements of the comic effect. If therefore the entity which was comic is found to have some beauty when aesthetically contemplated, that is not likely to be owing to its comic past but rather in spite of it, and owing to the fact that the entity contains aspects of positive value sufficient to compensate for the defects which, in a different relation, made it comic; but which in aesthetic contemplation would (if uncompensated) make it ugly. An entity which is comic, but which when contemplated is found to have some degree of beauty, rather than ugliness, would be *humorous,* rather than ridiculous or ludicrous.[17]

It may moreover be noted that the gain in our knowledge through acquaintance with the anomalous fact; or the gain in scope of our capacity for adjustment, which

[17] Cf. Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty,* § 63.

occurs in the comic, is almost always of little or no objective importance, since the comic situation is always of the nature of an *exception to the normal.* It gives us the *feeling* of intellectual gain, by means of a gain which as a rule is, for any direct purpose, nearly useless, although in the case of the witty, of course, as distinguished from the merely comic, direct intellectual utility may often justly be claimed. Yet the comic has at all times played much too large a part in human affairs to allow of its being deemed valueless. In the light of the discussion of play-activities in earlier chapters, the reasons for the great importance of the comic in the life of man become evident if only we notice that perception of the comic constitutes the typical spontaneous *play-activity* of the human intellect.

CHAPTER XV

STANDARDS OF CRITICISM

§ 1

Criticism is (*a*) *judgment,* (*b*) *of worth,* (*c*) *mediate or immediate, and* (*d*), *respectively fallible or infallible.* Criticism is judgment concerning questions of worth, value. All criticism involves reference to some character, the possession of which by the object criticized is regarded by the critic as being in some way good, or the lack of it, bad. The object is then examined with respect to that character, and pronounced good or bad in the degree in which it possesses it or lacks it. Such a character so used constitutes a standard of criticism. The character used may be one the possession of which makes an object *mediately* good; or on the other hand it may be one that makes the object *immediately* good. The object is said to be mediately or instrumentally good, when the character used as standard of goodness, and possessed by the object, is that of being an adequate instrument to or a necessary condition of the production or preservation in certain other objects, of characters which confer upon those objects immediate goodness of some sort. An object, on the other hand, is said to be immediately good when the character used as standard of goodness, and possessed by the object, is that of being directly and immediately a source of active or passive pleasure to some conscious being. That is to say, the object is called im-

mediately good when it is, to the sentient being in terms of whose point of view it is asserted to be good, a source of pleasure *directly through its relation to him,* and apart from any pleasure which it may also procure him indirectly through its actual or potential effects upon other objects. The conscious being in terms of whose point of view the assertion of immediate goodness is made may be one person or a class of persons; it may be oneself or someone else; it may be a self considered in someone only of its aspects, which may be an active or a passive one; or it may be a self, such only as it is at a given time or in given circumstances. But any doubt as to which such sort of self is referred to when goodness is predicated of anything, will leave the import of the predication hopelessly ambiguous.

The instrumental goodness of an object can be proved or disproved, if there is agreement as to the end, being a means to or condition of which constitutes the object's goodness; for it is then only a matter of showing whether or not the object does under the sort of conditions in view, cause or make possible in other objects effects of the sort desired. Thus it is possible to prove to someone who doubts or disbelieves it, that a given chisel is a good, or as the case may be, a bad chisel. As to instrumental goodness, mistakes can be made.

But the immediate goodness of an object cannot be proved or disproved to the self in terms of whose point of view immediate goodness is asserted to be possessed by the object. Such immediate goodness being a matter of the pleasure which *that* self experiences through his direct relation to the object, he himself is the final and infallible judge of it; for, as to pleasure, appearance and reality are identical. His actual pleasure or displeasure when in direct relation to the object, constitutes the proof or dis-

proof *to others,* of any assertions or predictions that *they* may have made as to what, in terms of his point of view, is, or will turn out to be, immediately good. Such an other, to whom the prediction may have been made, may of course be, or have been, living under the same skin as the self who verifies the prediction; but it cannot be strictly the same self.

§ 2

Possible standards of criticism of aesthetic objects. The foregoing remarks embody the essential propositions of a general theory of criticism, which cannot itself be argued here in greater detail, but of which an outline was necessary since it constitutes the foundation of the opinions on the criticism of works of art and aesthetic objects, to be set forth in this chapter.

The principal standards of criticism that may be used in connection with works of art and aesthetic objects are as follows:

(a) A work of art may be considered as such, i.e., as the product of an endeavor on the artist's part to express objectively something he felt, and the question be raised whether or not it is good, in the sense of expressing that feeling adequately.

(b) The question may on the other hand be asked whether the work adequately expresses not so much the feeling that the artist originally attempted to express through it, but rather a feeling which on consideration he is willing to acknowledge as truly an aspect or part of himself.

(c) A work of art may, however, be considered also in the light of its capacity to communicate to others the feeling that the artist objectified in it, and be judged good or bad according to the measure of that capacity.

(d) Again, any aesthetic object, whether it be a work of art or a natural thing, may be criticized simply in respect to its beauty or ugliness.

(e) Any aesthetic object, whether natural or a product of art, may also be criticized in the light of the worth of the sort of action through which the particular feeling obtained in the contemplation of the object will tend to discharge itself, if, when that feeling has been obtained, the *practical* attitude is then allowed to replace the contemplative.

These various standards of criticism will now be examined in turn.

§ 3

Success of the attempt at self-expression, as standard. The most common form of criticism of works of art is criticism in terms of beauty and ugliness. The terms beautiful and ugly, however, have no meaning whatever in terms of the creating artist's point of view, but only in terms of the spectator or "consumer," whether he be the artist himself later contemplating and evaluating his creation, or someone else. That which is evaluated in terms of beauty and ugliness is therefore not at all the work of art as such, viz., as product of the artist's endeavor to give his feeling embodiment in an object, but only the object itself that the spectator contemplates, and wholly without reference to the question whether that object is a product of art or of nature.

On the other hand, criticism of a work of art considered as such, would be concerned solely with the measure of success or failure of the art, i.e., of the artist's attempt consciously to objectify his feeling. It is obvious, however, that no one but the artist himself is in a position to say whether, or how far, he has succeeded in creating an

object adequately embodying his feeling. The test of the success of his attempt at objectification, as we have seen, is whether the object created does, in contemplation, mirror back the feeling which he attempted to express. What that feeling was, however, is something which is known to no one but himself; and therefore he alone is in a position to perform the test. If the artist is able to say: "Yes, this exactly reflects back to me the feeling I had," then the last word has been said *as to that,* i.e., as to the success of his attempt at objective expression of his feeling. It may quite properly be insisted, however, that success of that sort is something which is of interest to no one but himself, or, possibly, his mother or his wife. Conscious objectification of feeling, as defined by that test, may therefore be termed *private or individual objectification,* as distinguished from *social objectification,* the test of which would be the object's capacity to impart in contemplation the artist's feeling not merely back to himself, but on to others also. Criticism in terms of this test will be considered presently.

§ 4

Signability of the work of art by its creator. As already noted, however, the artist's *final* criticism at least, of his own work, is likely to be based not so much on the question whether the feeling which he finds he has objectified is exactly that which he attempted to objectify, as on the question whether, after thoroughly "tasting" (through contemplation of his work) the feeling he has actually objectified, he finds it to be one that he is *willing to own,* i.e., to acknowledge as being really a part or aspect of his emotional self at the time. In other words, the question is whether the work he has created is one which he honestly feels he can sign.

It is obvious that, again, no one but the artist himself is in a position to criticize his own work on that basis. Criticism of this sort would normally accompany criticism of the kind first mentioned, which passes on the question of the sameness of the feeling actually objectified, and of the feeling which was to be objectified.

As pointed out earlier, this sameness obviously cannot be sameness in every respect, but only *qualitative* sameness. Such qualitative identity of the two feelings, however, leaves room for gain in clearness and vividness of the given quality of feeling, as a result of the process of objectification. Such a gain in clearness and vividness beyond question occurs, but it is the only respect in which the feeling need become different through the process of objectification. Indeed, the qualitative identity of the feeling before and after objectification is an absolute prerequisite, if one is to be able to say that it is *that* feeling which has been clarified. That the feeling should be clear, however (in the sense in which it is possible for a feeling to become so), is in turn a prerequisite of criticism of one's work in terms of the second question mentioned above, namely, the question whether it constitutes objectification of an emotional self *truly one's own.*

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out in this connection that approving on this basis the object that one has created is quite a different thing from finding it beautiful. The pleasure which such approval does express is pleasure found, *not in the feeling* objectified by the work (which would be what would constitute the work of art beautiful), but *in the success* of one's attempt to objectify an aspect of one's emotional self; and this latter pleasure remains, whether the feeling objectified be a pleasurable or a painful one, i.e., whether the object created be beautiful or ugly. The difference is analogous to that between the

pleasure of having succeeded in stating accurately some thought that one had, and the pleasure (or displeasure) of finding true (or false), on reflection, the statement that one has made.

§ 5

Signability of the work of art by the beholder. Criticism of a work of art (and equally of a natural object) on the basis of the question whether one is willing to *own* the feeling which it objectifies, is possible to others than the artist himself. The only difference is this. When the artist answers that question in the negative, he then proceeds to alter the object he has created until he finds himself able to say: "Yes, the feeling which this now objectifies is truly a part of myself." But when the critic on this basis, is someone else than the artist, that critic is then not trying to objectify his feeling himself, nor therefore is he called upon to make alterations in the object before him. His problem is simply to decide whether or not the thing before him objectifies a feeling that was his, or one that perhaps he had not yet experienced but that he is able and willing to call his. And once more, this decision is one quite distinct from the question whether or not the feeling objectified is pleasant and the object therefore beautiful. Most of us are quite able to obtain pleasure from various sources of which we are ashamed; so that the self that experiences pleasure from such sources is not one which we acknowledge as truly our own, but only a self with which we find ourselves saddled, and of which we cannot get rid.

§ 6

Capacity to transmit the artist's feeling to others. To say that a given aesthetic object (whether natural or a

work of art), objectifies a certain feeling means, we have agreed, simply that that feeling is obtainable from it in contemplation, and we have just seen that, with regard to such a feeling, the question can be raised, by others as well as by the maker of the object (if it be man-made), whether the feeling objectified in it is a feeling that they are *willing to own.*

We saw too that another question distinct from this can be asked, namely, the question whether the feeling actually objectified, i.e., obtained from the object in contemplation, is qualitatively *the same as* that which the artist originally endeavored to objectify. We may now go on and point out that this question, like the preceding one, can be asked (if not, perhaps, answered) by others than the artist himself. When others than the artist ask it, what they do is to consider the work of art as a possible *means for the conveying to them* of the feeling which the artist endeavored to express.

Expression of a feeling in a manner adequate to impart it in contemplation not merely back to the artist himself, but also on to others, may be called *socially objective,* as distinguished from expression which is only *privately* or *individually objective.*

Whether an artist's expression of a feeling which he had, achieves private objectivity, is something which, as we have noted, cannot be decided by others; but *can* be decided by the artist, since both of the feelings the qualitative sameness of which is in question are facts of his own experience. Social objectivity of the expression of a feeling, on the contrary, is not something the achieving of which can ever be strictly proved or disproved either by the artist or by others, since God alone would be in a position to compare *directly* the two feelings experienced by two persons in contemplation of the same object. All

that can be said is that the two feelings will be qualitatively the same (i.e., social objectification of the feeling will be a fact), if the two (or more) persons concerned are alike in their psycho-physical constitutions. Of this, however, we can make no direct observation either, or at least none that will be adequate. Any conclusion that we reach as to the sameness of the feeling that the two persons each have on the given occasion, has therefore no other status than that of an inference from their observable behavior, which here would be mainly verbal behavior, viz., their words. And any such conclusion, therefore, is reliable only so far as the two persons use their words in the same sense. But whether two people use their words in the same sense is something which, in *ultimate* analysis, can be checked up only through the act of pointing. This means that it can be checked up only in case a word signifies something that can be pointed to, and even in such cases, the sameness that is insured is sameness only so far as purposes of coöperation are concerned. For intance, if I say that by "green" I mean something which I actually point to, and another person accepts my use of the word, all that we then know is that we call by the same name whatever color we each perceive in the place pointed to. We do not in the least know that the *quality* of sensation which the one experiences when he looks there, is the same quality as that experienced by the other. It is quite conceivable, for instance, that all my sound sensations in response to given stimuli should be pitched one octave above those which another man has in response to the same stimuli. If this were so, all *relations* between sounds would be left unaltered by this difference, and the answers of each of us concerning questions of intervals, pitches, tone-color, etc., would agree perfectly although we never in fact would be hearing liter-

ally the same thing. The *literal* qualitative sameness of the subjective experiences of two persons, such as their sensations and feelings, could be ascertained only if we, or some third party, were in a position to compare the experience of the two in the same direct manner in which anyone of us can compare, for instance, two of his own sound sensations, or two of his own emotions.

Such literal qualitative sameness, of course, has no *practical* importance whatever. For all practical purposes the only thing important is the sameness of the relations, which can be checked up by pointing. But where the transmission of feeling for purely aesthetic purposes is concerned, the *literal qualitative sameness of the feeling* is on the contrary the only sort of sameness then relevant. Oratory, in probably the majority of cases, is primarily skilled work. That is, the orator is usually not primarily intent upon transmitting integrally his own feelings to his auditors, but rather upon inspiring them with any feeling that will express itself practically in the sort of behavior he desires of them, — voting, fighting, subscribing to a fund, or what not. But with the artist it is otherwise. The poet, for instance, if he reads his verses to others at all, is not concerned to make them do anything, but only to have them reproduce in themselves the very feeling which he sought to objectify. Only literal sameness of the feeling will do here. The most enthusiastic praise of an artist's work by someone else is disappointing to the artist and makes him feel more alone than adverse but discriminating criticism would, if he believes the praise to be based upon a misperception of what he sought to express. Pragmatic sameness of feeling, i.e., sameness *of behavior* after contemplation of the object, has no relevance here except in so far as it may constitute evidence of literal qualitative sameness of feeling. And

that it constitutes any evidence of it at all is ultimately nothing but a postulate, a fond hope of the gregarious heart, the fulfilment of which is never actually to be verified. But it is nevertheless a hope that the gregarious heart does entertain, and does stake upon.

Just this, viz., staking upon a hope, is what constitutes *making* a postulate, as distinguished from merely *stating* one. But when once is made the general postulate that sameness of behavior constitutes evidence of sameness of feeling, then under that postulate *the strength* of the evidence becomes a matter of the *degree* of sameness of the behavior, and of the *variety of respects* in which that sameness obtains. This theoretically precarious criterion of literal sameness of feeling being the only one available, it is the one we actually use to decide whether another person gets or (with more confidence) does not get from the contemplation of a given object the same feeling that we do. The same thing may be put in other words by saying that that criterion is the one we use to decide whether or not a given work of art is good, considered as a means of conveying some certain feeling from one person (who may or may not be the artist) to another.

§ 7

Judgments passed on aesthetic objects constitute information concerning the judge. It is interesting to note, however, that that criterion may, under the same postulate, equally be used to judge, not the worth of the work of art as instrument of transmission of feeling, but the range and nature of the feeling-capacity of the person to whom we exhibit it. For *what* a person's reaction to a given aesthetic object is or is not signifies fully as much concerning him as concerning the object. He may thereby be re-

vealed, for instance, as learned, or intelligent, but aesthetically insensitive; or as aesthetically sensitive, but without knowledge *about* works of art, or without much aesthetic past experience and aesthetic perspective; or as possessed of a highly specialized sort of aesthetic sensitivity; or of an aesthetic sensitivity which we ourselves should call perverted, or exaggerated; and so forth.

§ 8

Connoisseurship. This directly leads to the question what exactly constitutes a person a "connoisseur," and what do a connoisseur's pronouncements signify.

A clue to the answer may be found in what we find ourselves spontaneously saying on the concrete occasions where we discover that a given person is *not* a connoisseur of something or other. The discovery is likely to be expressed by us in the remark that *he cannot tell the difference.* This clue, however, must not be followed blindly. We cannot define a connoisseur as a person who can "tell the difference," for the important matter here is not capacity to *tell* it, but capacity to *know* it. Moreover, among those who "know the difference," we must distinguish between those who know it as it were by proxy, i.e., by inferring from memorized signs a difference which they have learned that *others would perceive;* and those who "know the difference" in the sense of *concretely experiencing it themselves.* It is to these, I should say, that the name of connoisseurs most properly belongs, although when confronted by the distinctions to which I have just called attention, linguistic usage in regard to the term "connoisseur" must I think acknowledge itself hazy. Let us suppose that we have before us two men, one of whom can experience the difference concretely himself but can-

not tell it to others, (i.e., cannot conceptualize it); and the other, a man who cannot himself experience it concretely but is able to infer it from signs learned and to formulate it conceptually to others. We should I think say that it is the former rather than the latter who is truly a connoisseur. The second we should rather describe as an intelligent echo; or compare him, perhaps, to the trained reporter who, himself barren of deeds and blank of adventures, writes up those of automobile magnates and African pioneers. Such a person is not a connoisseur, but only the mouthpiece of a tongue-tied connoisseur. Or, the most that could be said of him is that he is a connoisseur at second-hand. However, although one may be tongue or pen-tied and yet truly a connoisseur, one may also be truly a connoisseur, and yet not be tongue or pen-tied. That is, one who knows the difference through his own direct experience may well also be able to state it in concepts. Although neither capacity involves the other, the two are quite compatible; and to the man who has both, the name of connoisseur would be disputed by no one.

We must next inquire, however, just what being able to experience the difference, means. Most people are amply aware of a difference between, for instance, "Home, Sweet Home," and "The last Rose of Summer"; that is, if one is played after the other, they are aware that the second melody is not the same as the first. Or again, if one of these melodies is played first in one key, and then in another, most people, I suppose, are aware that the second time their experience is somewhat different from the first. But a much smaller number of persons would be aware of any difference if the same melody were played first in perfect tune, and then with a note here and there slightly off pitch; and probably a still smaller number, if the difference were between the melody as played, let us

say, first by Elman and then by Kreisler, each behind a screen. But, the number of those aware of any difference would dwindle down to relative insignificance if, instead of a simple melody played by two different violinists, the test were, let us say, a Beethoven symphony as interpreted by two different conductors. In each of these supposed cases, the sort of difference referred to is, let it be emphasized, *difference in feeling import* of what is heard, whether or not accompanied by awareness of a conceptually analyzed difference between the objects, — such as awareness of difference in pitch, recognized as such, would constitute.

A person, we may then say in general, is a connoisseur in proportion as he is capable of experiencing directly differences of which others remain unaware. And in particular he is connoisseur *in aesthetic matters,* when the differences he intuits are differences in the aesthetic feelings and the aesthetic pleasure obtained in the contemplation of closely similar aesthetic objects; but *not* when the differences of which he is aware are *merely* differences between the objects themselves. In that case he is merely fitted to be an expert detective of such historical facts as authorships, periods, influences, fine points connected with the technique of the medium, etc.; or an augur, expert in reading the signs on the basis of which can be predicted the aesthetic experiences of certain persons or classes of persons. Connoisseurship in such things, however, is quite compatible with nearly complete emotional and algedonic anaesthesia. The art-critic's essential business is not to "consume" works of art, i.e., to contemplate them aesthetically, but to write or talk about them, i.e., *around* them; and the best art-critics are not infrequently persons of the type just described, who are connoisseurs of everything about works of art, except of the work's aes-

thetic import. Indeed, it has been said, — I believe by Müller-Freienfels, — that the best critic must be a man who has no taste. His essential interest being in matters which do not require the aesthetic experience, capacity for the latter and inclination to it, could only distract his attention.

But even in connection with the definition of the true aesthetic connoisseur given above, certain reservations must be made. The aesthetic connoisseurship of a given person may be confined not merely, as usual, to some particular aesthetic field such as that of music, poetry, painting, etc., but to some very limited aspect of one of those fields. For instance, in the field of painting, a person may possess high aesthetic sensitivity to color differences, and yet be aesthetically very insensitive to line or shape differences; or he may be sensitive to line differences but not to differences of "values," i.e., of lights and darks; or again he may be sensitive to the feeling-import of the design aspect as a whole, but virtually anaesthetic as regards the feeling-import of the dramatic aspect, or vice versa; and so on. Aesthetic connoisseurs of such specialized sensitivity may be good guides but are bad leaders. They are useful if one allows them to lead one's attention for a time, but dangerous if one lets them capture it and permanently mold it to the warp of their own.

Again, it should be clearly realized that the nature of aesthetic connoisseurship is one thing, and the value of it another. The capacity to intuit differences to which others are insensitive constitutes connoisseurship, whatever it is worth. It has a worth, but it also has a cost, the nature of which is suggested by the saying that where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise. The usual reason why a "fool's paradise" is not as good as any other is that it soon leads one into some sort of purgatory owing to its

practical connections. Aesthetic "fool's paradises," however, are relatively free from such connections, and so far as this is the case, they are as good as any others. Indeed, if one should elect to measure worth purely in terms of aesthetic value (as one may well do where aesthetic objects are concerned), one would have to say that there are then no such things as aesthetic fool's paradises, but that all aesthetic paradises are genuine, and equally capable of filling with bliss the individual cup of such persons as find themselves at home there. Connoisseurship makes possible aesthetic pleasures, and also pains, which persons who are not connoisseurs cannot experience. But it also makes impossible the aesthetic pleasures which none but aesthetically less sensitive souls can taste, — and the corresponding pains, such as that of the aesthetic bafflement and bewilderment experienced by such a tune-hungry soul, in listening to a symphony.

Increase in aesthetic sensitivity may then with equally good reasons be described as progress or as perversion. Which of the two one calls it depends usually on whether one's own aesthetic sensitivity is changing (and in what direction), or on the contrary "standing pat" at a place where it finds itself happy.

The upshot of these remarks is then that to call upon the aesthetic connoisseur for an answer to one's own questions *of aesthetic worth,* is, when considered in broad daylight, as ludicrous a procedure as would be the letting some person whose taste in matters of cookery differs from ours, but who is a connoisseur of foods, while we are not, choose our dainties for us. What he may do for us is to *introduce us* to delicate dishes of which we knew nothing and which perhaps will disclose to us pleasures hitherto unknown. But if after tasting these connoisseur's dishes we do not like them, or do not find them more enjoyable than our

own familiar foods, we should be fools indeed to pick our menu according to our gourmet's taste rather than our own. Coarse the latter may be called by him; but we too have a stock of poisoned, question-begging adjectives, out of which we may without fear of refutation call his taste perverse.

§ 9

Beauty as standard. The account of standards of criticism of works of art and other aesthetic objects given up to this point has remained throughout essentially independent of the notion of beauty. But the endeavor persistently through the present work to leave that notion out wherever possible is not due to an underestimation of the importance of beauty. It is due only to a desire that the notion of beauty shall not, as usual in works on aesthetics, spread itself like a spot of fragrant conceptual oil, haphazard over the whole subject. In these pages, on the contrary, the endeavor has been to define in the sharpest possible manner both what is, and what is not, the true place of beauty in the philosophy of art.

But now, after all the eloquence with which I have so far *not* brought in beauty on every occasion, I may without fear of misunderstanding freely acknowledge, or rather vigorously assert, that beauty is a perfectly legitimate standard (among others) in terms of which to evaluate works of art; that it is the standard most commonly and spontaneously used; and that of all standards of evaluation, it is the one here most obviously and directly relevant. Indeed, if beauty should have anything like the commendable affinities and hidden relations that Plato, perhaps rightly, ascribed to it, one might well then claim that beauty is not only the most naturally and generally employed standard of criticism of works of art, but also

the most significant from the point of view of human life considered as a whole. While such far-reaching worthy affinities and hidden relations are not implied by the definition of beauty which I have proposed, they could not, on the other hand, be regarded as precluded by that definition, except on the puritanical assumption that whatever is pleasant is somehow bad. I have myself more sympathy with the opposite assumption, that whatever is pleasant is somehow good, not only directly but also in the fundamental tendencies of its affinities. However, I shall not attempt to argue this matter here; nor do I claim it to be much more than an article of faith, to be held cautiously and practiced with discrimination.

§ 10

Beauty is relative to the individual observer. Beauty, it will be recalled, was defined as the capacity of an object aesthetically contemplated to yield feelings that are pleasant. This definition cannot be characterized simply either as objective, or as subjective. According to it, "beautiful" is an adjective properly predicable only of objects, but what that adjective does predicate of an object is that the feelings of which it constitutes the aesthetic symbol for a contemplating observer, are pleasurable. Beauty being in this definite sense dependent upon the constitution of the individual observer, it will be as variable as that constitution. That is to say, an object which one person properly calls beautiful will, with equal propriety be not so judged by another, or indeed by the same person at a different time.

There is, then, no such thing as authoritative opinion concerning the beauty of a given object. There is only the opinion of this person or that; or the opinion of per-

sons of some specified sort. When one has stated the opinion and mentioned the person or class of persons who hold it, one has gone as far as it is possible to go in the direction of a scientifically objective statement relating to the beauty of the object. When some matter (as that of beauty) is not of the sort which "is so," or "not so," in an *absolute* sense, the nearest approach that one can make to the wished-for absoluteness lies in furnishing, as fully as possible, the data to which the matter in question is *relative;* and this is what one does in the case of beauty when one indicates just who it happens to be, that judges the given object beautiful or the reverse.

All that was said above concerning aesthetic connoisseurship, i.e., concerning superior capacity for experiencing difference in aesthetic feeling in the presence of slight differences in the aesthetic object, applies equally here, where differences in the pleasantness of the feelings are particularly in question. There are connoisseurs of beauty, or, more often, of particular sorts of beauty; but their judgments of beauty are "binding" on no one. Indeed it is hard to see what could possibly be meant by "binding" in such a connection, unless it were an obligation on others to lie or dissemble concerning the aesthetic feelings which in fact they have or do not have on a given occasion. There is, of course, such a thing as good taste, and bad taste. But good taste, I submit, means either my taste, or the taste of people who are to my taste, or the taste of people to whose taste I want to be. There is no objective test of the goodness or badness of taste, in the sense in which there is an objective test of the goodness or badness of a person's judgment concerning, let us say, the fitness of a given tool to a given task.

§ 11

Why we have a natural inclination to think otherwise. What makes it so difficult for us to acknowledge that judgments of aesthetic value, i.e., of beauty and ugliness, which are truly judgments about objects, are not universally and necessarily valid, but on the contrary valid, except by chance, only for the individuals who make them, is that we are so constantly occupied otherwise with judgments concerning instrumental values. These have to do with relations of the object judged, *to other objects,* and such relations are socially observable, and the judgments concerning them socially valid. That a given railroad bridge is a good bridge can be proved or disproved by running over it such trains as we wished it to carry, and observing whether or not it does carry them. But there is no similar test by which the beauty of a landscape could be proved or disproved. Judgments of beauty (which is an immediate value) have to do with the relation of the object judged to the individual's own pleasure experience, of which he himself is the sole possible observer and judge. Judgments of beauty are therefore in this respect exactly on a par with judgments of the pleasantness of foods, wines, climates, amusements, companions, etc. Like these they are ultimately matters of the individual's own taste. It is of course quite possible that two persons, or two million, should have similar tastes, i.e., should happen alike to find pleasure in a given food or wine, or to obtain pleasurable feelings in contemplating aesthetically a given picture, melody, etc. But such community in the experience of pleasure, even then remains a bare matter of fact concerning just the persons who have it in common, and leaves wholly untouched the equally bare fact that other persons — whether many, few, or only one — find not pleasure but displeasure in the very same objects.

The fact that judgments of immediate value (such as judgments of aesthetic value) differ from judgments of mediate value in being incapable of proof, or disproof, and are therefore binding (except by accident) only on the individual who makes them, seems to be entirely overlooked by Professor Thomas Munro, in his recent interesting short book, *Scientific Method in Aesthetics.* Starting from the fact that the essence of science is verification, — "a constant checking up of results by various workers in the same subject," — he goes on to say that, "carried over into aesthetics, this would suggest a systematic comparison of notes on the results of individual experiences in art. Its aim would be to discover more specifically how people agree and how they vary in aesthetic responses and critical appraisals" (p. 56). But supposing we should thus discover some widespread agreements and thereby be enabled to formulate some probable predictions, I then ask, what of it? What exactly will this prove concerning the aesthetic merits of the objects judged, and to whom will it prove it? And what is anybody going to do with information of that sort? Truly it is scientific, but it is information *not about laws of the objects studied* (as in chemistry, or mathematics), but *about the public* who looks at the objects. And art-creation is no manufacturing of spiritual candy, that the artist should need to inquire, and cater to, what the market happens to like. And supposing half-a-dozen people, or a hundred, agree that a certain melody is "gay and sprightly" (p. 58), what of it? If this is mere description, it is indeed either true or false, but is then no more criticism, — no more involves any "oughts" or "ought-nots," — than, say, the assertion that a given animal is a dog. If on the other hand the assertion that the melody is "gay and sprightly" constitutes criticism, — implies praise or blame, — then the

fact that a hundred people evaluate the melody alike has neither more nor less significance than the fact of a hundred people being similar in liking (or disliking), say, caviar, or tobacco. What Professor Munro regards as constituting scientific method in aesthetic criticism, seems to me, for these reasons, to be on the contrary the using of scientific method in the study of facts wholly irrelevant to aesthetic criticism, for the ultimate and sole foundation of aesthetic criticism is indidivual taste such as it happens to be, and whether shared or not.

Beside the fact that we are so constantly occupied with instrumental values, however, and tend unconsciously to carry the habits of thought acquired there into the realm of immediate values, there are other human traits which explain, or manifest themselves in, our persistent reaching for rules also in the domain of aesthetic values. Most of us, for instance, instinctively abhor anything that savors even remotely of anarchy, and refuse to consider the possibility that a realm of anomic values may exist where anarchy would be legitimate. We fear that if we should grant it the right to live even there, anarchy (or shall we say freedom?) would come forth a monster elsewhere and bite us. Again, whatever is individual is unpredictable and therefore likely to be upsetting; and we ourselves, hating and dreading the responsibility of being ourselves, cling for dear life, — or it may here be dear death — to any seeming ready rules that would promise to save us from the need. Were one to lean on modern slang for a contribution to the ancient game of differentiating the species *homo,* one could well say that man is the animal that loves to "pass the buck" to a rule! But, like the fact or dislike it, there is a realm where each individual is absolute monarch, though of himself alone, and that is the realm of aesthetic values.

§ 12

Beauty cannot be proved by appeal to consensus, or to the "test of time," or to the type of person who experiences it in a given case. In the light of what precedes, it is obvious that the familiar attempts to prove the beauty of certain works of art by appeal to the consensus of opinion, or to the test of continued approval through long periods of time in the life either of society or of the individual, are, like the appeal to the connoisseur's verdict, entirely futile. Such tests cannot possibly prove the object's beauty to those who do not perceive any in it; and to those who do, they are needless. They prove nothing whatever, except that beauty is found in the object . . . by such as do find it there.

We might attempt to rank beauties on the basis of the particular aspect of human nature, or type of human being, that experiences aesthetic pleasure in given cases. This would lead to a classifying of beauties as, for instance, sentimental, intellectual, sexual, spiritual, utilitarian, sensuous, social, etc. We might well believe in some certain order of worth or dignity in the human faculties respectively concerned, but this would not lead to any aesthetically objective ranking of beauties. To suggest it would be as ludicrous as a proposal to rank the worth of various religions according to the average cost of the vestments of their priests. For a ranking of beauties, there are available only such principles as the relative intensity of the pleasure felt, its relative duration, relative volume, and relative freedom from admixture of pain. These principles, however, do not in the least release us from the need of relying upon the individual's judgment; on the contrary their application rests wholly upon it.

§ 13

Beauty cannot be proved by appeal to technical principles or canons. It may yet be thought, however, that there are certain narrower and more technical requirements in the various fields of art, without the fulfilling of which no work can be beautiful. Among such alleged canons of beauty may be mentioned the rules of so-called "harmony" in music; various precepts concerning literary composition; unity; truth to nature; such requirements as consistency, relevance, and unambiguity; and so on. There are indeed "rules" or "principles" of that sort, some of which are, I will freely declare, valid for me; so that when I find myself confronted by flagrant violations of them, I am apt to feel rather strongly, and to be impatient or sarcastic about "that sort of stuff." And indeed, on occasions when I have found myself inadvertently guilty of having drawn some line or written some sentence in violation of my own aesthetic canons, I have at times felt as ashamed of the line or the sentence as I should of having picked somebody's pocket. I admit having pronounced opinions about the beauty or ugliness of various things, and what is more, in many cases I am able to *give reasons* for my opinions.

But of what nature are those reasons? They are, ultimately, of the same nature as would be that offered by a man arguing that my pen had to fall when I let go of it a moment ago, *because of gravitation.* Gravitation is but the name we give to the general fact that unsupported objects *do* fall, and at a certain rate; but it is not a reason, or cause, or proof of that fact. To say that something always happens, is not to give any reason why it ever does. Therefore when I say that a certain design is ugly because it is against the "law of symmetry," I am not giving a reason why it *had* to give me aesthetic displeasure, but

only mentioning the fact that it resembles in a stated respect certain others which as a bare matter of fact also do displease me. This character which displeases me and many persons, may, however, please others. And, what is more directly to the point, it not only may but it does, — jazzy or uncouth though I may call the taste of such persons. But what most obstinately drives me to the acquisition of a certain, at least abstract, sense of humor concerning the ravening intolerance and would-be-authoritativeness of my own pet canons of beauty, is the fact that they have changed in the past, and that I see no reason why they should not change again in the future. For all I can see to prevent it, I may well to-morrow, next year, or in some future incarnation, burn what I aesthetically adore to-day, and adore what I now would burn. If this happens, I have no doubt at all that I shall then smugly label the change a progress and a development of my taste; whereas to-day I should no less smugly describe the possibility of a change of that sort in me, as a possibility that my taste may go to the devil. And, let it be noted, the sole foundation upon which either of the two descriptions would rest, would be the fact that the describer *actually* possesses at the time the sort of taste which he does. Tastes can be neither proved nor refuted, but only "called names," i.e., praised or reviled.

Certain limited and empirical generalizations have been found possible concerning factors upon which the aesthetic pleasure of most people, or of some kinds of people, appears to depend. Precarious generalizations of this sort may be found for instance in manuals of design and of pictorial composition, where they are often dignified by the name of "principles." People familiar with them may then be heard to say that a given picture, perhaps, is well composed and why; or that the tones, the masses,

or the values are, as the case may be, well or ill balanced, and so on. Other statements that we may hear and which also imply "principles," would be that the color is clean, or else muddy; that the drawing is, perhaps, distorted; that the surfaces are well modelled; that the lines are rhythmical; that the color combinations are impossible; that the masses lack volume or solidity, etc. The words beauty and ugliness may not occur once, but it is nevertheless obvious that all such statements are not merely descriptive, but *critical*. They are not direct assertions of aesthetic value or disvalue, viz., of beauty or ugliness, but, taking it as an obvious fact, they attempt to trace it to certain definite sorts of features in the work. The more intelligent and better informed kind of art-criticism is of this analytical and diagnostic sort, and there is nothing beyond this that the art-critic could do.

All such comments, worded in the technical jargon of the particular craft, have the imposing sound of expert judgments based upon authoritative principles, and are likely to make the lay consumer of art feel very small and uninitiated. Therefore it cannot be too much emphasized here that a given picture is not ugly because the composition of it, or the color combinations in it, are against the rules; but that the rule against a given type of composition or of color combination is authoritative only because, or if, or for whom, or when, compositions or combinations of that type are *actually* found displeasing. All rules and canons and theories concerning what a painting or other work of art should or should not be, derive such authority as they have over you or me or anyone else, solely from the capacity of such canons *to predict to us* that we shall feel aesthetic pleasure here, and aesthetic pain there. If a given rule predicts this accurately for a given person, that person's *actual* feeling of aesthetic pleasure or displeasure

then, proves that that rule *was* a valid one so far as *he* is concerned. That is, the feeling judges the rule, not the rule the feeling. The rule may not be valid for someone else, and it may at any time cease to be valid for the given person, since few things are so variable as pleasure. The *actual* experience of beauty or ugliness by somebody is the final test of the validity of all rules and theories of painting, music, etc., and that test absolutely determines how far, and when, and for whom any given rule or theory holds or does not hold.

The difference between the criticisms of the professionals, and those of the people who, having humbly premised that they "know nothing about art," find little more to say than that a given work is in their judgment beautiful, or as the case may be, ugly or indifferent; — the difference, I say, between the criticisms of professionals and of laymen is essentially that the former are able to trace the aesthetic pleasure or displeasure which they feel, to certain features of the object, while the latter are not able to do it. From this, however, it does not in the least follow that the evaluations of the professionals ultimately rest on any basis less subjective and less a matter of individual taste than do those of the layman. Indeed, so far as the non-professionals really judge at all, i.e., do not merely echo an opinion which they have somehow been bluffed into accepting as authoritative, their judgment is based on the fact that they actually feel something. The artists and professional critics, on the other hand, are exposed to a danger which does not threaten people who know nothing of the factors on which aesthetic pleasure or displeasure has in the past been found to depend for most people, or for some particular class of people, — the danger, namely, of erecting such empirical findings into fixed and rigid rules, and of judging the work of art no

longer by the aesthetic pleasure it actually gives them, but by that which they think it "ought" to give them according to such rules. This danger is really very great, especially for the artist, who, in the nature of the case, is constantly forced to give attention to the technical means by which the objective expression of his feeling is alone to be achieved. Having thus all the time to solve technical problems, it is fatally easy for him to become interested in them for their own sake, and, without knowing it, to be henceforth no longer an artist expressing what he feels, but a restless virtuoso searching for new stunts to perform. This may be the reason why so many of the pictures displayed in our exhibits, although well-enough painted, make one feel as though one were receiving a special-delivery, registered, extra-postage letter, . . . just to say, perhaps, that after Thursday comes Friday!

Listening to the comments of artists and of some critics on a picture will quickly convince one that, strange as it sounds, they are as often as not almost incapable of seeing the picture about which they speak. What they see instead is brush work, values, edges, dark against light, colored shadows, etc. They are thus often not more but less capable than the untrained public of giving the picture *aesthetic* attention, and of getting from it genuinely aesthetic enjoyment. The theory that *aesthetic* appreciation of the products of a given art is increased by cultivating an amateur's measure of proficiency in that art, is therefore true only so far as such cultivation results in more intimate and thoroughgoing *aesthetic* acquaintance with the products of that art. This is likely to be the case in an interpretative art like music (not music-composing). But in an art which, like painting, is not so largely interpretative, and is at the same time dependent on rather elaborate technical processes, the amateur practitioner's

attention is from the very first emphatically directed to these processes; and, when it is directed to extant works of art it is directed to them as examples of a technique to be studied, not as aesthetic objects to be contemplated. The danger is then that such technical matters will come to monopolize his attention habitually, and that even in the face of nature he will forget to look at her, wondering instead whether the water or the sky be the brighter, or what color would have to be used to reproduce the appearance of a given shadow. Attention to technique is of course indispensable to the acquisition of it; and mastery of technique is in turn necessary to the production of art on any but the most humble scale. The risk is that the outcome of technical training will be not mastery of technique, but slavery to it. This risk disappears only when the technical apparatus has become as intimately a part of the artist as the hand is of the body for ordinary purposes, and is used without requiring attention. The attention can then turn from the means to the ends of art, viz., to the objective expression of feeling. But the stage at which technique has so become second-nature as to be forgotten, is not often fully reached. With most artists, what we may call their technical *savoir-faire* creaks more or less, as does the social *savoir-faire* of people who have become emilyposted but lately. Like the nouveaux gentlemen, such artists are too conscious of their technical manners, and forget what they are for.

§ 14

Beauty and accuracy of representation. Among the special criteria by which the merit of works of art — especially paintings — is judged by many, there is one about which something should be said here, namely, accuracy of

representation. Accuracy of representation is important from the standpoint of aesthetic criticism only so far as beauty happens to be conditioned by it. Representation, in painting, is a relation between the perceptual varicolored canvas and the aesthetic object, when that aesthetic object is not simply a flat design as such, but contains imaginal and conceptual elements. Accuracy of representation of the intended aesthetic object, by the perceptual canvas is thus not in itself an aesthetic but a noematic merit. Nevertheless it is a merit which is indispensable since without it the intended aesthetic object (in the sort of cases considered), would be set up before the attention either not at all, or only in altered form.

Accuracy of representation of the aesthetic object is of course not at all the same thing as accuracy of representation of the model. An accurate representation of a model is, merely as such, not a work of art at all, but only a document, — a piece of reliable information about the appearance of an existing object. If it is accurate, the copy will indeed have more or less the same aesthetic import and value as the model itself, but that copy as such will none the less be only a work of imitative skill. It will not be a work of art unless it also constitutes the conscious objective expression of a feeling experienced by the painter. Accuracy of representation of the aesthetic object, on the other hand, means only that the perceptual canvas sets up clearly before the ideational attention just the aesthetic object that embodies the feeling which it is intended should be obtained in contemplation.

Photographic accuracy of drawing, and faithfulness of representation of persons or things, provokes the pleasure of recognition, and admiration of the painter's capacity to act as a color camera. But this does not mean that his work is a work of art; nor even that he has created

something beautiful, if the object which he has "photographed" happens not to be so. On the other hand, the fact that various elements are out of drawing in some pictures in which the artist is expressing himself in terms of represented objects, does not mean that they are necessarily ugly. What is important for beauty is *not truth but plausibility*. A dramatic entity represented may in fact be distorted, but it is not on this account ugly if it does not *look* distorted. Contrariwise, if something which in fact is photographically accurate looks distorted or unplausible, it will be disagreeable in aesthetic effect. The works of El Greco, who is famous for his distortions of drawing, illustrate this. Some people have thought that something was wrong with his eyes; but the true explanation of his distortions is much more probably his preoccupation with the design-aspect of his paintings. When his design needed a line or thing of a particular shape and size at a certain place, and the object represented at that place happened to be, say, a human leg incapable of the needed shape and size, then it was so much the worse for the leg. Either design or accuracy of representation had to be sacrificed, and in such cases El Greco did not hesitate to sacrifice the latter. Whether ugliness is produced thereby, however, depends on whether the sacrifice is obvious, — the inaccuracy flagrant. In many places it is not; and it does not there constitute an aesthetic fault. Where the distortion is not plausible, on the other hand, but thrusts itself upon our notice as distortion, it gives rise to ugliness and is therefore to that extent aesthetically bad, whatever aesthetic gains it may otherwise involve. Only the addicts of design, who are satisfied with but a half of what an aesthetically complete beholder demands, fail to see this. On the other hand, to the painter who justifies this or that bad part of his picture by insisting that

"nature looked just like that," the answer is that even if she did, she ought not to have, so far as beauty was concerned. As often has been said, when truth is stranger than fiction, it does not make good fiction, but only news for the papers.

§ 15

Criticism of aesthetic objects in ethical terms. Instead of asking whether a work of art or other aesthetic object is beautiful or ugly, i.e., whether the feeling obtained in aesthetic contemplation of it is pleasant or unpleasant, we may on the contrary disregard this and ask whether the feeling so obtained by a person is or may become connected with the rest of his life, and in what manner it may affect it for good or ill. The ethical or the religious worth of the feelings obtained in aesthetic contemplation of works of art, it will be recalled, would have been made by Plato and by Tolstoi the ruling standard in terms of which to judge art as good or bad. It is worth noting, however, that standards of evaluation cannot themselves be evaluated, except in terms of some standard not itself in any way vindicated, but only dogmatically laid down. And any standard evaluated in this manner may itself equally well be laid down in turn as absolute, and be used to evaluate the standard which before was evaluating it. Arguments about the relative worth of various standards of worth are therefore wholly futile, inasmuch as, in the very nature of the logical situation, every such argument must to begin with beg as its premise the point essentially at issue. Ultimately, then, a given standard can only be sympathized with and adopted, or the reverse; and logic can come in only *after* this has occurred. Plato's and Tolstoi's choice of the ethical or religious nature of the aesthetic feelings imparted, as ruling standard for the evalua-

tion of art, is legitimate, but it constitutes only a manifestation of their own ruling interest, and a different choice of ruling standard is equally legitimate by anyone else whose ruling interest happens to be different. With these remarks concerning the permissibility, but the arbitrariness, of describing any one standard of worth as "supreme" or "ruling," we may leave the matter, and now simply consider the question raised, namely, whether the feelings obtained in aesthetic contemplation may affect the rest of one's life, and how.

The value other than aesthetic that aesthetic feelings may have depends upon the fact that if, when a feeling has been obtained through aesthetic contemplation, the aesthetic attitude is then given up and replaced by the practical, that which had up to that moment the status of aesthetic feeling now assumes that of impulse.

So long as our state is properly describable as aesthetic feeling, its value is immediate and intrinsic, and consists in the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the state. But when our state comes to be properly describable as impulse, then its value is as usual to be measured in terms of the eventual significance of the impulse. An impulse is a seed of conduct, and an aesthetic feeling is at least a potential seed of impulse; the terms in which we commonly appraise conduct are therefore potentially applicable to it.

The impulse or embryonic conduct resulting from the transmutation of an aesthetic feeling through a shift to the practical attitude, may be either a novel impulse in the life of the individual, or not. If it is an impulse of a sort already experienced and more or less established, with characteristic modes of manifestation in the life of the person concerned, then the reëxperiencing of it as aftermath of aesthetic contemplation will not affect the

individual's life qualitatively, but only quantitatively. It will be simply fuel to an engine already existing and functioning; it will add to the intensity of some aspect of life but will not alter it in kind, except perhaps indirectly if the changes of intensity involved are such as to upset an equilibrium previously existing, and thus force the recasting of life in a different qualitative pattern.

If however the impulse is a novel one in the life of the individual, then it constitutes directly the seed of a change in the kind of life that has been his. The evolution (whether towards good or evil) of the will-aspect of man's nature does not take place merely through increases in his knowledge of the facts and relations that constitute the field of action of his will, but also through the advent in him of qualitatively novel impulses. Indeed, it might well be argued that mere increase in the quantity as distinguished from the nature of one's knowledge and experience, only furnishes one with new means for the service of old ends, or makes one better aware of the ends to which one's hitherto blind impulses tended; but that, however such increase of knowledge may transform the manifestations of existing longings or impulses, it does not of itself alter their intrinsic nature. Transformation in the nature of the impulses themselves (apart from maturation) seems traceable to experiences of two sorts. One of them is awareness by the individual of the presence of a practically real situation novel in kind in his life. This may call forth in him an impulse hitherto foreign to him. The other is what we might call the surreptitious implantation of the impulse itself in him, through the transmutation which we are now considering of an aesthetic feeling into an impulse, by a shift to the practical attitude.

The aesthetic contemplation of nature and of various

aspects of life is, through such a shift of attitude, a source of germs of new impulses, and of food for old ones. Some persons are known to the writer, in whom the contemplation for the first time of the ocean, or of great mountains, seems to have produced feelings comparable in point of novelty and depth to those reported by the mystics, and the aftermath of impulse due to which gave to life a different pattern, somewhat as does a religious conversion. But art is capable of being as much more effective in the sowing of such seeds of novel impulse, as, for instance, the study of existing records is more effective than personal investigation in acquiring a knowledge of geography. For one thing, art is usually easier than nature to contemplate, being, we might almost say, made for that. Again, when nature was its model, art may be described as at least a drastic editing of nature, supplying what she forgot, omitting what was irrelevant, accenting her here or there into unambiguity. The work of art, being created specifically to give objective expression to a given feeling, is likely to have a pointedness of feeling-import which nature matches only by accident. The work of art, moreover, can be contemplated at length, and returned to again and again, whereas natural facts and the aspects they show us are mostly beyond our control. They come and go heedless of the conditions which alone would make it possible for us to contemplate them adequately. But lastly, art, although in some ways it falls short of nature, has in another way a range of resources far greater than nature's, for it has at its command the boundless resources of the imagination. What it cannot present it often can represent, and thus set up before our attention objects of contemplation never to be found in nature. It can lead us into new worlds, in the contemplation of which our feelingselves spontaneously burgeon and bloom in all sorts of

new ways. Some poems, some music, some statues and pictures, have had in an extraordinary degree this power to bring to birth in people qualities of feeling that had remained latent in them. One such work of art is Leonardo's Mona Lisa. Art theorists whose fundamental dogma is that the end of painting is the representation of plastic form, and who find that picture but indifferently successful in this respect, cannot understand why the theft of it a few years ago should have been deemed a world-calamity. Their only explanation is the aesthetic ineptitude of mankind at large. They cannot see that design and the representation of plastic form is not the whole of the art of painting, but is rather a means which may be used to the ends of art, *when it is important to those ends.* Not the aesthetic ineptitude of mankind, therefore, but the sophomoric character of the measuring-rod by which such theorists would judge Leonardo's picture, is the lesson of the effect produced by that famous theft. There are doubtless people who, in a similar way, would insist on characterizing Socrates essentially as a Greek who was not a "good provider."

§ 16

Liberalism in Aesthetics. The principal standards in terms of which works of art and aesthetic objects may be criticized have been considered above, and the general nature of the conclusions reached concerning the significance and validity of such criticisms may now be summarily characterized.

Judgments of mediate or instrumental value are capable of being proved or disproved. Their truth or falsity is objective, in the sense that it is not conferred upon them by the individual's taste, but is a matter of connections in nature independent of the critic's taste. But the

relevance or importance, if not the truth, of any judgment of mediate value, is a matter of the individual critic's taste or constitution, since for any such critic that relevance depends on a judgment of immediate value by him.

As regards judgments of immediate value, and in particular of beauty and ugliness, it seems to me that here as in other fields, ultimate analysis leads unavoidably to *the particular constitution of the individual critic* (no matter how he may have come by it), as the necessary and sufficient ground for all such judgments. The constitutions of numbers of individual critics may, of course, happen to be alike in some respects; or they can be made more or less alike by subjecting them to the sort of psychological pressure appropriate to the causation of such a result. If a number of critics are constituted alike in some respects, then any one of them will be able to formulate value judgments with which will agree as many of the other critics as are constituted like him in the respects needed for such agreement! I cannot see that "objective validity" in the case of a judgment of immediate value, means anything whatever but this; namely, several people judge alike because they are constituted alike. But whether a given taste be possessed by one person only, or by a thousand alike, the maxim that *de gustibus non est disputandum*, holds with regard to it.

Is there then no such thing as the refining and educating of taste? Certainly there is, — and there is also such a thing as perversion and depravation of taste. But the question in any given case is, which is which? No one so far as I know has yet pointed out any way of answering this question otherwise than arbitrarily and dogmatically, i.e., otherwise than in terms of the taste actually possessed by some person or other, usually oneself, *arbitrarily* taken as standard. That question, indeed, is hardly ever frankly

faced. Those who have approached it at all seem always to have labored under the strange delusion that if only they succeeded in showing that the tastes of a large number or a majority of people were alike, the question was answered; whereas the truth is on the contrary, as just pointed out, that mere numbers have no bearing whatever on the question. Taking a vote is only a device for ascertaining in advance what would be the outcome of a fight between two groups of people, if every person were as strong as every other and strength alone counted. "Proof" by appeal to a vote is obviously but a civilized form of the *argumentum ad baculum.*

It may be asked, however, whether in the absence of any standard of immediate value objectively valid in any sense other than that described above, it is not possible at least to point to some respects in which the (immediate) value judgments of all people whatever, would agree. Nobody whatever, it may be urged, likes great hunger or thirst or cold, or cuts and burns, etc. Now it may be granted that certainly not many do. But after all there are masochists and ascetics and martyrs. It may be true because tautologous that nobody likes pain; but we must keep in mind that pain and pleasure are the predicates, not the subjects, of immediate-value-judgments. Their subjects are things, situations, experiences. The question is thus not whether painfulness is ever pleasurable, but whether there are any *situations* or *experiences* which everybody without exception finds, for instance, painful. And this is very doubtful. We can probably say only that with regard to some situations or experiences, the dissentients are very few. And as we have just seen, numbers mean nothing at all in such a matter.

This brings us to what may be called a dogmatico-liberalistic position. Neither I nor anyone can refute any-

one else's judgments of immediate value, — here, of beauty and ugliness; nor can anyone refute mine. This is the liberalistic aspect of the situation. The fullest insight into it, however, constitutes no reason whatever why any one should hold to his own immediate valuations any the less strongly. That our own opinion must in the nature of such matters be dogmatic is no reason why it should not be honest, vigorous, and unashamed.

APPENDIX

"Significant Form"

In recent years, the term "Significant Form" has gained a certain vogue among persons whose interest in aesthetics does not take them beyond the outskirts of the subject. The term was coined by Mr. Clive Bell in his book, *Art*. It supposedly denotes a species of aesthetic value other than those commonly recognized, but analysis of Mr. Bell's would-be account of it quickly reveals that in fact he gives it no meaning. It is a wholly empty, but sonorous and catchy phrase. An account, in lighter vein, of the merits of it, which was published by the writer some years ago in *The Nation* is here reproduced in slightly expanded form, that the antidote for the catchword may be rendered permanently available.

Perhaps not everyone in this generation is acquainted with Mark Twain's story of the Petrified Man. While he was editor of a certain Western paper, Mark Twain printed a news item describing with the utmost seriousness and much scientific detail, the discovery of a petrified man. In the description, he mentioned the fact that the thumb of the man's right hand was against his nose, the fingers spread out, the thumb of the left hand hooked into the little finger of the right, and the fingers spread out likewise. Only, instead of saying it all at once like this, he sandwiched the bits of the description in among other items. Unbelievable as it may seem, nobody saw the joke. The story was reprinted all over the world as a serious

item of scientific news, and actually appeared in the London "Lancet."

Now a very similar, highly elaborate, and wonderfully baited trap seems to have been laid, some years ago, by the talented art critic, Mr. Clive Bell, for the innocent readers of his book on *Art*. But the trap has worked so well and caught so many that it soon became quite impossible for Mr. Bell, who is not like Mark Twain a professional humorist, to let out the secret. And by now he certainly must have developed a half-dozen complexes, for an ingrowing joke is a terrible thing. Some attempt must therefore in sheer kindness be made to relieve this awful situation.

The joke concerns his famous term "Significant Form," which makes its first appearance on page eight of his book. It is introduced as an answer to the question: "What quality is shared by all objects that provoke our aesthetic emotions?" We are then told that in each such object "lines and colors combined in a particular way, certain forms and relations of forms" are what stir our aesthetic emotions; and that it is to these aesthetically moving forms that the name Significant Form is to be applied. But if now we go on to ask just what particular way of combination of lines and colors it is, that the name designates, the only answer is, the particular way which moves us aesthetically! Thus, Significant Form, like the X in a mathematician's equation, turns out to be but the name which Mr. Bell proposes to give to what he is looking for. Naming the baby before it is born is indeed a legitimate and amusing pastime, but unfortunately it does not tell us whether it is a boy or a girl, blue-eyed or black, or anything else about it.

However, it might be thought that the simile is not fair, for while a baby's name is a proper name and does not describe, Significant Form appears to be a descriptive name; and thus it perhaps does of itself constitute an answer after all. But this possibility is left open by Mr. Bell, I fear, only to entice us along to the second instalment of the joke. The cunning of the man is truly devilish: he, so to say, trips us into the river; then holds out to us a pole; and when we seize it in our agony he

pushes us under with it. Thus we may think that Form at least, has a pretty definite meaning, namely, whatever is other than content. In visual art, we should suppose, whatever is other than color. But if so we have reckoned without our author, who tells us on page twelve that " the distinction between form and color is an unreal one," because, forsooth, "you cannot conceive a colorless line, or a colorless space . . . a boundary line without any content, or a content without a boundary line." That is as much as to tell us that because one cannot conceive of an uncle without a niece or nephew, the distinction between uncle and nephew is an unreal one! Thus Mr. Bell proposes to use the word Form to mean *both* form and content — which is like saying that a Negro is a black man, and adding that black is to be taken to mean white also. By this clever device of making the word Form mean also its own opposite, Mr. Bell has thus, as his little joke demanded, very neatly and quietly robbed the term of all intelligible meaning.

He is no less adroit in the case of the word Significant, for he writes: "For a discussion of aesthetics, it need be agreed only that forms arranged and combined according to certain unknown and mysterious laws do move us in a particular way, and that it is the business of an artist so to combine and arrange them that they shall move us. These moving combinations and arrangements, I have called, for the sake of convenience and for a reason that will appear later 'Significant Form'." This passage in effect informs us that so long as we confine ourselves to aesthetics, and leave out what our author calls metaphysics, the word Significant in the expression Significant Form is to be taken *not* as a descriptive name as we thought, but as a proper name only, a mere tag, which can be pinned on to things, but which tells us about them only the fact that we did pin it on.

To avoid being misled by the so-called metaphysical meaning of the expression, it would then be well for us, so long as we confine ourselves to aesthetics, to replace it by an honest proper name, for instance, Abracadabra. This done, we can better observe what the "aesthetic hypothesis," as Mr. Bell deliciously calls it, turns out to be when the veils wherewith his wit had

clouded its glory are torn asunder. It is this: The quality common to such lines, colors, and combinations of lines and colors as move us aesthetically is, that we shall henceforth call them all Abracadabra! Mr. Bell, I submit, is much too clever to have done a thing like that unawares. Morevoer, other evidences of the plot confront us on every side.

For instance, the little joke about Significant Form would have missed fire if Beauty had not been cleared out of the way first, and it is interesting to note what our author has to say on the subject, for he appears to have had a "metaphysical" axe to grind at that point, in addition to that of the *farceur*. His objection to the use of the word Beauty is that everyone calls a butterfly or a flower beautiful, but that no one feels for them, or in general for natural beauty, the same kind of emotion that he feels for a cathedral or a picture, namely, aesthetic emotion. Therefore, to avoid misunderstanding, he says that what calls forth the aesthetic emotion should not be designated beautiful.

However, in addition to the beauty of the butterflies, the flowers, and the birds, he mentions also the beauty of woman as something that is not aesthetically moving. All that is commonly meant, Mr. Bell believes, when a woman is called beautiful, is that she has sex appeal. He does not say whether this definition of beauty is intended also to cover the case of the birds and the butterflies; but so far as concerns men who like most of us venture to call not only women but at times also other men, beautiful, it is obvious that on such a definition of beauty, they belong in Reading Gaol.

Salvation from the slough of impurity in which we thus find ourselves wallowing unawares would seem, however, to lie in the possibility of making artists of ourselves, for Mr. Bell admits that artists at least are moved aesthetically by nature: that is, what in it arrests their gaze is not the foulness which Beauty is, but the pure sublimity of Abracadabra.

But this brings us from aesthetics — where the word "Significant" in the expression "Significant Form" had, according to our author, no meaning — into metaphysics, so-called. And there, with the many hesitations and question-marks which are

the expected local color when metaphysics has been announced, he proceeds to give the term a meaning as follows: Form that moves us aesthetically is called Significant "because it expresses the emotion of its creator."

With Tolstoi — or might it perhaps be Croce? — thus brought to the rescue, our hopes of solid nourishment suddenly rise. But alas! we have here but the fragrant bit of intellectual cheese which is to entice the guileless bohemian mouse into the cruel trap of Mr. Bell's malicious contriving. For if the art which moves us does so because it conveys to us something that the artist felt, how is it that the same aesthetic emotion can be provoked, at least in artists, by nature, which does not constitute the expression of anybody's feeling, but just *is?* With this question, which he so cleverly compels us to ask, the wicked author has almost drawn us to the place of execution. But now Schopenhauer, in strict *incognito* it is true, is brought in to help us over the last step. Natural objects, we are told, give rise to aesthetic emotion only when one ceases to attend to their associations, uses, origins, etc. And when a natural object is being thus viewed as what Mr. Bell pleases to call an end-in-itself, then what there is left to provoke our emotion is, he tells us, something which philosophers used to call "the thing-in-itself," and now call "ultimate reality." A devilishly subtle transition, that: End-in-itself, Thing-in-itself, Ultimate Reality! One almost regrets that it should be but verbal. However, what comes next is the *coup de grace;* or shall we say, after the analogy of Mark Twain's story, the grand *pied de nez?* It is this: "Shall I be altogether fantastic in suggesting, what some of the profoundest thinkers have believed, that the significance of the thing-in-itself is the significance of Reality?"

I submit that in thus embodying the most arrant nonsense in such marvellously impressive language, and with never even a sly wink, Mr. Bell has crowned himself king of the wags. It does seem like a scurvy trick, though, to have conjured up poor Schopenhauer's ghost and made it squeak while the "dirty work" was being done, just as though it really had something to do with the business. One can almost hear the testy old

philosopher turning in his grave, and asking how it is possible to speak of a thing as *in-itself*, and at the same time make it function as *significant of* something! But then, what's a little contradiction in terms, among "metaphysicians"? Schopenhauer, however, instead of arguing the logic of that outrageous statement, would more likely have roared at seeing the words "significant forms," which he uses to proper purpose,[1] wantonly made a joke of under the shroud of a dim spook which, on some intellectually dark night, might be mistaken for his own.

The people who have bought stock in a wildcat oil well usually are those who most vehemently vouch for the soundness of the enterprise; and it may therefore be expected that some innocent who has taken stock in Significant Form will rush to its rescue. The question, he will urge, is not what Schopenhauer said, but what Mr. Bell maintains; and very likely what he has done is to improve on Schopenhauer. Let us then see just where Significant Form has been left by Mr. Bell.

When his glorious final suggestion, with the neat little internal contradiction which so unobtrusively makes nonsense of it, is left out of account, the only meaning which he has really assigned to Significant Form is this: Significant Form is that which *a work of art* has when it expresses the emotion of the ar-

[1] The passage is this: "As long as that which raises us . . . to aesthetic contemplation . . . is this fittingness of nature, this significance and distinctness of its forms . . . ; so long it is merely *beauty* that affects us. . . . But if these very objects whose significant forms invite us to pure contemplation, have a hostile relation to the human will in general . . . in that case he [the beholder] is filled with the sense of the *sublime*" (*World as Will and Idea*, Eng. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 260/1). Any student of Schopenhauer of course knows that in thus speaking of objects having significant forms, what he means is objects the appearances of which to perception are such as not to obscure, but on the contrary to display, the forces of nature at work in them; e.g., a building in which the essential structual elements are not covered up and hidden, but rather, emphasized, reveals the interplay between gravity and the rigidity of the materials of which it is made. In such cases, he holds, one directly intuits the Platonic Ideas, i.e., as he conceives them, the forces of nature. But this, he says explicitly, is not an apprehension of the thing-in-itself: "The Ideas reveal not the thing in itself but only the objective character of things, thus still only the phenomenon" (*op. cit.* Vol. III, p. 123).

tist who made it. But now, since gifted people do get aesthetic emotions from nature as well as from works of art, "significant form" cannot be essential to the object of aesthetic emotion. That is, of course, unless we wish to divert ourselves by describing nature as a work of art perpetrated by an artist called, perhaps, Mr. Reality, whose emotions it expresses. Those emotions of his, of course, would then have themselves to be originally quite objectless, like the impersonal, disinterested, objectless grouch with which one sometimes awakens in the morning. For to give an object to them we should have to suppose two such cosmic artists, chasing each other, perhaps, around some pristine vortex, and admiring the Significant Form of each other's galloping callipygia. But such myth-making would be on a level with that of a city-born child who knows stone only as the stuff of houses, and who, finding an outcropping of rock on his first excursion into the country, should insist that it must be the house of some cosmic ground-hog called Mr. Reality.

Obviously the truth is not "without a house, no stone," but on the contrary "without stone, no house." And likewise in the case of art and nature, the truth is that unless objects naturally gave us emotions in contemplation, works of art could not possibly be used as a medium of emotional intercourse. But the mere fact that something imparts meaning (or feeling) to us, does not warrant the inference that there is a mind behind the thing, addressing us through it. When my cat is hungry, he makes a sound like "gold fish," and this particular combination of sounds means something to human hearers, but . . . well, the obvious need not be labored.

Just how the arrrangements of lines, colors, sounds, etc., which "move us aesthetically" differ from those which do it less well or not at all, no one has yet indicated very exactly, Mr. Bell less than anyone. But there is nothing to be gained by giving a resounding name to that problem, and calling that the answer. This would be like sucking one's own thumb for nourishment. "Significant Form" is but a clever catchword for putting a real aesthetic problem out of the way in a painless and humane fashion. It puts one in mind of the advice of Goethe's Mephis-

topheles to the student: Why think when a pompous word will serve so well? One is almost led to the conclusion that after all Mr. Bell is a humanitarian rather than a wit, and proceeds on the principle that where ignorance is bliss, why, chloroform inquiry!